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ABSTRACT
One of the most significant problems facing environmental law is
the dearth of scientific information available to assess the impact of
industrial activities on public health and the environment. After
documenting the significant gaps in existing information, this Article
argues that existing laws both exacerbate and perpetuate this problem.
By failing to require actors to assess the potential harm from their
activities, and by penalizing them with additional regulation when
they do, existing laws fail to counteract actors’ natural inclination to
remain silent about the harms that they might be causing. Both theory
and practice confirm that when the stakes are high, actors not only
will resist producing potentially incriminating information but will
invest in discrediting public research that suggests their activities are
harmful. The Article concludes with specific recommendations about
how these perverse incentives for ignorance can be reversed.
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1

“Picture a pasture open to all.” In contrast to Professor Hardin’s
simple scenario, this commons has cows, but the land managers are
not sure whether the cows number 12 or 120, and they do not know
where or how much they graze. They are also not sure how much
waste the cows produce, or how much of their grazing, waste, and
traffic the land and surrounding surface waters can tolerate. Cattle
owners, who have the best information about these questions, are
disinclined to share it, much less invest resources in developing a
more accurate measure of the damage that their cattle inflict on
common property. In fact, these owners maintain that their cattle
are not damaging the pasture but fertilizing it and discredit all
information to the contrary. Now, how should one characterize the
“tragedy of the commons”?

INTRODUCTION
Rational choice theory and the large body of laws premised on it
understand that those who inflict invisible and costly harms on others
are disinclined to document the problems, much less take
responsibility for them.2 Indeed, rational choice theory predicts that if
wrongdoers are going to invest in research at all, they will dedicate
resources to concealing and contesting incriminating information and
producing exculpatory excuses and alibis. The criminal justice system
is certainly familiar with this natural reaction to culpability.3 Yet, for
some reason, environmental law has largely failed to come to grips
with this inescapable feature of human nature. Instead,
environmental law innocently assumes that information linking actors
to resulting invisible harms will arise serendipitously, and, even more
surprising, that the actors will either volunteer or accept this

1. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
2. See, e.g., JOSEPH J. SENNA & LARRY J. SIEGEL, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE
85–90 (6th ed. 1993) (discussing rational choice theory, which underlies criminal law’s
commitment to both general and specific deterrence); see also Part I.A. infra.
3. In fact, there is a facet of criminal law that focuses specifically on issues arising from the
use of alibis. See, e.g., Jack P. Friedman, Note, Criminal Procedure—Alibi Instructions and Due
Process of Law, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 343, 351 (1998) (discussing whether the Due Process
clause requires the trial court to provide jury instructions on the burden of proof for an alibi
defense).
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4
incriminating information without fuss or fanfare. Perhaps most
remarkable, leading theorists in environmental law often repeat these
same errors, ignoring the problems that incomplete and contested
information about the causes of environmental harm present to their
idyllic assumptions.5
The inattention of environmental law and its scholars to the large
gaps in information and regulated actors’ incentives to perpetuate
these gaps has been a costly oversight. Despite the enormous growth
in environmental law and regulation since the 1970s, much of the
scientific information needed to ensure environmental protection is

4. See infra Parts II–III.
5. Many of our nation’s most prominent scholars, including Professors Cass Sunstein,
Bruce Ackerman, and Richard Stewart, as well as many of the nation’s leading environmental
economists, presume that much of the information needed to set regulations is readily available
and fail to consider the possibility that those engaging in externalities might enjoy superior
information and have reasons to conceal it. See infra Part IV.A. Professor Garrett Hardin’s
classic article, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” similarly assumes that the needed information
on externalities is readily available and makes no mention of the inclination of his herders,
polluters, and despoilers of public lands to cover and contest this incriminating evidence. See
Hardin, supra note 1, at 1244–45. Hardin’s classic is excerpted in the introductory chapter of
every leading environmental law casebook and treatise in the United States. See, e.g., ROGER
W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 42–44
(5th ed. 1999); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 58–60 (3d ed. 2000); THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & RONALD H. ROSENBERG,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND READINGS 46–50 (3d ed. 1996).
Even the Coase theorem, a model widely used to understand externalities regulation,
erroneously assumes that any missing information can be discovered easily or at least with some
investment, and this investment is simply counted as a cost of negotiation. See R. H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (arguing that a frictionless market produces
perfect outcomes, but lumping all information costs in the category of “transaction costs”);
Joseph Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, 1 ECON. PERSP. 113, 117 (1987) (arguing
that “[p]roperty rights and negotiation will not yield first-best outcomes when there is important
private information, and that case is the one that should be examined”); Pierre Schlag, The
Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1664 (1989) (arguing that Professor
Coase’s “concept of transaction costs does not have the sort of theoretical intelligibility and
operational applicability necessary to make the market-based transaction cost approach
plausible”). If critical information on externalities resists discovery because it is known only to
actors and remains stubbornly undiscoverable to others even with incentives and payments, or if
the information is essential to initiate bargaining (because an externality is invisible and a party
does not even know it is harmed), then categorizing incomplete information as simply a
transaction cost is fatally oversimplistic. However, to the extent that Coase intended to show
that information problems are one of the challenges to determining the appropriate point for
government intervention, and that assuming them away makes all institutions work perfectly,
the fact that some information resists discovery may be partly what Coase hoped to convey with
his theory. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 109–10 (1994) (taking this position with regard to
Coase’s intended argument).
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still missing. The quality of most air, water, and land in the U.S. is
unknown, even though the country has devoted hundreds of pages of
laws to regulating activities that threaten the environment. No one
knows when industrial and manmade activities stress ecosystems
beyond the breaking point or how to help the ecosystems recover,
even though the effectiveness of some federal programs depends on
this information. Scientific knowledge is insufficient to identify, much
less test for, a variety of invisible hazards associated with household
products, pesticides, food additives, and biotechnology products.
Ignorance prevails in spite of elaborate licensing requirements that
purport to protect the public health and environment from these
hazards.7
This void in scientific knowledge is not inevitable. Science cannot
answer all of the questions put to it, but modest investments in
environmental monitoring and basic scientific research can make
headway in isolating environmental and health problems that need
attention. For example, research could determine the extent to which
an oil refinery is polluting the air or a paper mill is polluting a river
and the possible consequences of that pollution. Yet objective,
reliable information vital to informing regulatory policy is generally
unavailable.
These significant deficiencies in scientific knowledge result in
large part from the failure of the environmental laws to require the
production of basic information about the harms caused by polluting
activities and hazardous products. Regulated actors, despite creating
most of the need for this information, are excused under most
environmental laws from providing any more than a partial inventory
of their activities and are not required to track the resulting impact on
public health and the environment.8 In fact, in many circumstances

6. These problems are elaborated in notes 10–24 and accompanying text, infra.
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. Contrary to what currently occurs, responsibility for producing information on
externalities should fall on the very actors who create and profit from externalities. See infra
notes 31–33 and accompanying text. The notion that wrongdoers can best calculate the social
costs of their accidents (or externalities) and decide whether to bear them through increased
liability in light of private benefits is also a fundamental premise of Professor (now Judge)
Calabresi’s well-known theoretical analysis of tort liability. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS
OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 166–73 (1970) (discussing the wisdom of
placing accident costs on the cheapest cost avoider in product-related accidents).
This Article sidesteps the philosophical question of who originates an externality by
assuming that the party who engages in polluting or manufacturing insufficiently tested toxic
products imposes a nonreciprocal risk and is thus the party responsible for the externality. See
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the laws actually deter regulated parties from volunteering
information on the adverse effects of their activities. Regulators are
more likely to greet such information with fines and increased
restrictions than with regulatory rewards and letters of
9
commendation.
This Article documents the pivotal role that responsible actors
play in perpetuating the scientific uncertainty that impedes the
progress of environmental law. The Article begins in Part I by
providing a considerable body of theory and practical evidence that
identifies a number of remediable gaps in the body of scientific
knowledge needed for regulation, but that also reveals that actors will
actively conceal and contest the information necessary for regulation
when it is in their interest. Part II then identifies multiple ways that
the environmental laws fail to address remediable scientific
uncertainties or require regulated actors to produce information
within their superior control. Part III uncovers even more legal
dysfunction, documenting the ways in which the laws not only excuse
actors from responsibility for producing information regarding their
activities, but actually provide wrongdoers with added legal
opportunities for concealing adverse information and contesting the
information produced by others. Part IV concludes by offering a
series of reforms that could begin to counteract some of the most
unnecessary problems in the current legal approach to addressing the
information deficiencies that afflict environmental law.
I. THE IGNORANCE EQUILIBRIUM
Virtually every prominent expert panel convened to consider the
effects of industrial activities on health and the environment
expresses alarm at the dearth of research and basic information.10 At
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 543–51 (1972)
(“[U]nexcused nonreciprocity of risk is the unifying feature of a broad spectrum of cases
imposing liability under rubrics of both negligence and strict liability.”). This assumption is fully
consistent with the environmental laws’ intention to assign responsibility for assessing the harm
produced by activities on the actor. See infra notes 154–55 and accompanying text.
9. See infra Part III.A.
10. See, e.g., COMM. ON ENVTL. RESEARCH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESEARCH TO
PROTECT, RESTORE, AND MANAGE THE ENVIRONMENT (1993); COMM. ON GRAND
CHALLENGES IN ENVTL. SCIS., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GRAND CHALLENGES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE (2001); COMM. ON RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES AND PRIORITIES
FOR EPA, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR SOUND
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS (1997) [hereinafter NRC, BUILDING A FOUNDATION]; COMM. TO
REVIEW THE EPA’S ENVTL. MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAMS, NAT’L RESEARCH
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present, only rudimentary models are available to estimate the effects
11
of large-scale pollution on ecosystems, and the validity of these
models is only sporadically evaluated—if at all—using actual data.12
Although scientists have progressed in developing a mechanistic
COUNCIL, REVIEW OF EPA’S ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAM:
OVERALL EVALUATION (1995) [hereinafter NRC, ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM]; 1998 WORKSHOP ON EMERGING DRINKING WATER
CONTAMINANTS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IDENTIFYING FUTURE DRINKING WATER
CONTAMINANTS (1999); STEERING COMM. ON IDENTIFICATION OF TOXIC AND POTENTIALLY
TOXIC CHEMS. FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOXICITY TESTING: STRATEGIES TO DETERMINE NEEDS AND
PRIORITIES (1984) [hereinafter NRC, TOXICITY TESTING]. The National Science Foundation
has recognized the dramatic undersupply and undersupport of environmental research relative
to needs. See generally NAT’L SCI. BD., NAT’L SCI. FOUND., ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE AND
ENGINEERING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
(2000), available at http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2000/nsb0022/reports/nsb0022.pdf. The General
Accounting Office (GAO) has produced narrower reports highlighting the substantial
deficiencies in the available information on various environmental externalities. See generally
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, TOXIC SUBSTANCES: EPA’S CHEMICAL TESTING PROGRAM HAS
MADE LITTLE PROGRESS (1990); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, MAJOR MANAGEMENT
CHALLENGES AND PROGRAM RISKS (2001). The president of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science has bemoaned the rampant ignorance surrounding anthropogenic
effects on health and the environment and, in her presidential address, called upon fellow
scientists to assist in conducting desperately needed research on human impacts on the
environment. See Jane Lubchenco, Entering the Century of the Environment: A New Social
Contract for Science, 279 SCIENCE 491, 495 (1998) (urging fellow scientists to contribute to “the
urgent need for improved understanding, monitoring, and evaluation to protect, manage, and
restore the environment”).
11. See Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,846, 26,851 (May 14,
1998) (presenting an expanded flowchart of the EPA’s ecological risk assessment framework
that illustrates the simplistic state of environmental modeling). The EPA’s struggle to develop
an environmental monitoring and assessment program highlights parallel problems that arise in
scientists’ efforts to identify basic features of ecosystems, like indicators and endpoints, that can
be used to understand the larger system. See NRC, ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 31 (questioning whether the monitoring program’s
primary goal—to be able to detect a 20 percent change in a ten-year period—has any scientific
or policy relevance). One of the National Academy of Sciences’ reports details the gaps in
understanding for specific areas of environmental research, including research on the movement
of contamination through soil, NRC, BUILDING A FOUNDATION, supra note 10, at 20, the effect
of particulates on public health, id. at 22, balancing the risks in disinfecting drinking water, id. at
44, climate change, id. at 24, the ozone hole, id. at 42, synergies between large-scale
environmental problems, id. at 56, and coastal waters, id. at 38.
12. See K. H. Reckhow & S. C. Chapra, Modeling Excessive Nutrient Loading in the
Environment, 100 ENVTL. POLLUTION 197, 206 (1999) (discussing problems in water quality
modeling, much of which stem from inadequate data, and concluding that “it should not be
surprising that theoretically based improvements in a model often cannot be supported with the
limited available observational data”); see also NRC, ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 64 (expressing “very serious doubts” as to whether
the EPA’s data collection system is “an appropriate solution to the long-term data and
information processing requirements” for environmental assessments).

WAGNER FINAL.DOC

2004]

2/9/2005 11:06 AM

COMMONS IGNORANCE

1627

understanding of cancer, they have made only limited progress in
determining how to assess, much less screen, hazardous substances
for other harms, such as reproductive, neurological, hormonal, and
13
developmental effects, or how to account for variability in human
14
susceptibility. Regulators essentially cross their fingers and hope
that current primitive carcinogenic assessments protect against these
other harms, while toxicologists struggle to develop tests for
amorphous changes in neurological and endocrine function.15

13. See infra notes 202–06 and accompanying text. Two of the largest barriers to assessing
these types of risks are the lack of understanding of the mechanism of action for many of these
effects, see, e.g., COMM. ON HORMONALLY ACTIVE AGENTS IN THE ENV’T, NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, HORMONALLY ACTIVE AGENTS IN THE ENVIRONMENT (2000) (identifying great
scientific unknowns for hormonally active agents, including mechanisms of action, and
identifying several major areas for needed future research), and scientists’ continuing struggle to
identify appropriate endpoints (specific types of harms or changes) to measure in experiments
and studies, see, e.g., John Ashby et al., The Challenge Posed by Endocrine-disrupting
Chemicals, 105 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 164, 165 (1997) (observing considerable confusion
among scientists in defining an “endocrine disrupter,” a definition that is obviously an essential
first step to identifying appropriate testing strategies).
The EPA has promulgated guidelines for assessing neurotoxicity, Guidelines for
Neurotoxicity Risk Assessment, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,926 (May 14, 1998), developmental toxicity,
Guidelines for Developmental Toxicity Risk Assessment, 56 Fed. Reg. 63,798 (Dec. 5, 1991),
and reproductive toxicity, Guidelines for Reproductive Toxicity Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg.
56,274 (Oct. 31, 1996), but even a nonscientist will quickly appreciate that these guidelines are
only a starting point for assessing those harms. For example, after noting the preliminary nature
of the guidance for neurotoxicity assessments, the EPA closes by noting the guidance’s basic
assumptions and some of the more substantial areas in need of research:
Research to improve the risk assessment process is needed in a number of areas. For
example, research is needed to delineate the mechanisms of neurotoxicity and
pathogenesis, . . . develop improved animal models to examine the neurotoxic effects
of exposure during the premating and early postmating periods and in neonates,
further evaluate the relationship between maternal and developmental toxicity,
provide insight into the concept of threshold, develop approaches for improved
mathematical modeling of neurotoxic effects, improve animal models for examining
the effects of agents given by various routes of exposure, determine the effects of
recurrent exposures over prolonged periods of time, and address the synergistic or
antagonistic effects of mixed exposures and neurotoxic response.
Guidelines for Neurotoxicity Risk Assessment, 63 Fed. Reg. at 26,950. The EPA is still
struggling to develop tests for assessing endocrine disrupters. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2000
ENDOCRINE DISRUPTER SCREENING PROGRAM REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (discussing the
EPA’s continuing struggle to develop screening tests for endocrine disrupters), available at
http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/oscpendo/docs/reporttocongress0800.pdf.
14. See NRC, BUILDING A FOUNDATION, supra note 10, at 28–29 (discussing the
substantial variability in susceptibility and observing that “[u]sually there are no data on human
variability in toxic response to regulated chemicals, and a one-size-fits-all default value is used
instead”).
15. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at 4 (noting that although some industrial
chemicals and many pesticides “may have already undergone extensive toxicological testing,
conventional toxicity tests may be inadequate to determine whether these substances interact
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Even if scientists had a strong theoretical understanding of how
hazardous substances impact health and the environment, available
information is insufficient to apply these theories to assess ecosystem
16
and human health. As of 1996, water quality testing had been
conducted on only 19 percent of all water miles in the United States,17
and only a fraction of this data was collected by reliable methods.18

with specific components of the endocrine system and whether additional testing is needed for
the EPA to assess and characterize more fully their impact on both human and ecological
health”); Thomas O. McGarity, Politics by Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in EPA’s
Implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 142–43 (2001)
(discussing how the EPA requires neurotoxicity testing only on a subset of pesticides because of
the expense of these types of tests); infra notes 198–205 and accompanying text; cf. MARK R.
POWELL, SCIENCE AT EPA: INFORMATION IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 30 (1999) (reporting
that “[a]ccording to a former senior EPA official, the pesticides program is the only regulatory
area that routinely considers noncancer health effects”); Status of Administration’s Response to
NAS Recommendations Released to NACA, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 209, at A-8 (Nov. 1,
1993) (reporting that a National Academy of Science committee found the EPA’s toxicity
testing guidelines for pesticides inadequate in some areas, including with regard to assessing
effects of pesticides on neonate and adolescent animals).
16. See NRC, BUILDING A FOUNDATION, supra note 10, at 34 (“While in the past the
federal government has monitored human disease outbreaks and has collected data on the
weather, stream flow, and tides as basic information needed for societal planning, no similar
data collection effort has ever been implemented and funded to monitor the condition of the
broader environment.”); see also id. at 25, 31 (discussing in concrete terms the drastic need for
basic monitoring and citing other EPA and NRC studies similarly concluding that there is a
need for better environmental monitoring). Insufficient data on basic features of environmental
quality, in turn, prevent scientists from evaluating the accuracy of their theories and models and
from developing new ones.
17. NAT’L ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ENVTL. POLICY & TECH., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD (TMDL) PROGRAM 3 (1998)
(citing the EPA’s Final National Water Quality Inventory Report to Congress for 1996),
available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/faca/facaall.pdf; see also ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL.,
THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 33 (1993) (observing that the “[l]ack of federal
leadership has resulted in the complete absence of monitoring in some states and in substantial
variations in testing methods and closure standards” and noting that “[o]nly four states use
EPA’s recommended testing method.”); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, NATIONAL WATER
QUALITY ASSESSMENT: GEOLOGICAL SURVEY FACES FORMIDABLE DATA MANAGEMENT
CHALLENGES 1 (1993) (describing the difficulties of developing a national assessment because
“efforts to collect, analyze, and store data are expensive and labor-intensive”); Katharine Q.
Seelye, U.S. Report Faults Efforts to Track Water Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2003, at A1
(reporting that an EPA inspector general harshly criticized the EPA for using a computer
system that was “obsolete, full of faulty data and [did] not take into account thousands of
significant pollution sources” needed to track and control water pollution).
18. See PUB. EMPLOYEES FOR ENVTL. RESPONSIBILITY, MURKY WATERS: OFFICIAL
WATER QUALITY REPORTS ARE ALL WET (1999) (concluding in an executive summary that
“an unfortunate mix of politics, bureaucratic inertia and bad science means that conflicting,
erroneous and manipulated sets of water quality data containing little accurate information on
the actual condition of the nation’s rivers and streams are routinely reported by States and
dutifully compiled by EPA for presentation to Congress and the public”), available at
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Air is monitored for eight general pollutants, but the remaining 189
toxic air pollutants are rarely monitored regularly and in many areas,
19
including industrial centers, have never been monitored at all.
Federal law requires testing of groundwater only as a condition for
operating active municipal dumps or hazardous waste sites, or when
groundwater is a source of public drinking water.20 Otherwise
21
groundwater contamination is discovered purely by accident. Land is
rarely sampled, even when it is routinely covered with pesticides,
fertilizers and other wastes; generally, this sort of sampling occurs

http://www.peer.org/execsum.html; Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier, 29 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,469, 10,475–76 (1999) (discussing the problem of inconsistent
techniques in water quality monitoring and citing Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) and
GAO studies that make these same observations). The National Research Council review of the
EPA’s monitoring program provides some important guidelines (again based on the EPA’s own
errors) on how to ensure that monitoring data is collected in a representative and helpful way.
See NRC, ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 32–
35 (discussing the problems of summarizing the EPA data by regions).
19. See Lynn Blais et al., Enforcement Against Concentrations of Toxic Air Pollution in
Texas: A Report to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality and United States
Environmental Protection Agency 12 (Aug. 5, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (“[C]urrent laws rarely require facilities to directly monitor the hazardous
air pollutants that are emitted from their facility or to contribute resources to this important
effort.”). The information picture is still more bleak if one is concerned with useable
information. A considerable amount of the baseline data that have been collected as described
above is not in electronic form and remains effectively inaccessible to all but the most
determined analysts. Cf. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, AIR POLLUTION: NATIONAL AIR
MONITORING NETWORK IS INADEQUATE 2 (1989) (discussing impediments to implementing a
national air monitoring network, including insufficient funding at national, state, and local
levels).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-7 (2000) (laying out general requirements for monitoring public
drinking water under the Safe Drinking Water Act; to the extent the source of drinking water is
groundwater, the required monitoring thus provides some information on the quality of that
groundwater); 42 U.S.C. § 6924(p) (2000) (generally requiring groundwater monitoring for
operation of treatment, storage, and disposal units under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA)); Solid Waste Disposal Facility Criteria, 56 Fed. Reg. 50,978, 51,009
(Oct. 9, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257–58) (requiring regular groundwater
monitoring for active solid waste landfills by 1996).
21. See, e.g., JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995) (recounting a neighborhood
group’s discovery of contaminated groundwater in their effort to understand the cause of an
unusually high number of leukemia cases in neighborhood children). In Austin, for example, the
unexplained decline of an endangered salamander in Barton Springs, which has historically also
been used as a spring-fed, municipal swimming pool, led to water quality testing of the pool
sediments, which then led to the discovery of contaminated subsurface waters suspected to enter
the public pool from land contamination. See Kevin Carmody, City Didn’t Provide All Data
Needed to Assess Pool Risks, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Feb. 4, 2003, at A1 (reporting that an
inquiry began when a city biologist got a rash after being immersed in Barton Springs while
looking for sick salamanders).
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22
only when there is a suspected hazardous waste disposal site. As of
1984, no toxicity testing existed for more than 38,000, or eighty
percent, of all toxic substances used in commerce.23 As of 1998, at
least one third of the toxic chemicals produced in the highest volumes
failed to satisfy minimal testing standards recommended by an
international expert commission.24 Of course, it is naive to expect
comprehensive information, but existing information falls far short of
what one would reasonably expect, even after factoring in the costs of
producing it.
So, what accounts for this pervasive commons ignorance in the
United States? The complexity of the systems is an important

22. The EPA will typically conduct or require soil sampling if cleanup is needed at an
active hazardous waste disposal facility, 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u)–(v) (2000), or sometimes when the
site has been reported to the National Response Center under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) reporting provision, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9603 and 9604 (2000). State laws might require the sampling as a condition to land
transfer, although concern about CERLCA liability produces strong incentives for voluntary
sampling by purchasers of land suspected of containing significant hazardous waste
contamination. See Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-118, § 223, 115 Stat. 2360, 2372–74 (2002) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 9601)
(providing immunity from Superfund liability for “innocent landowners” who make “all
appropriate inquiries” into potential contamination at a site). At the same time, Superfund
liability may cause current owners who suspect high levels of contamination to retain the land
and remain ignorant of possible contamination in the hopes that the problem will not be
discovered.
23. Considerably more baseline toxicity information is available on other potentially toxic
substances such as drugs, food additives, and pesticides, although data gaps remain even for
these much more heavily regulated substances. NRC, TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 118.
Particularly significant data gaps exist for products in existence prior to passage of these
regulatory statutes (products that were “grandfathered” into the much more rigorous licensing
schemes). Thus, there remains a dearth of baseline toxicity data for pesticides in use prior to
1976. As of the NRC’s report in 1984, for example, there was still no toxicity information
available for 38 percent of available pesticides, and toxicity testing was complete for only 10
percent of the universe of pesticide products. Id.
24. The one-third estimate is the lowest estimate produced in three separate efforts to
estimate the percentage of untested chemicals. This low estimate was produced by a trade
association, the Chemical Manufacturers Association. See ENVTL. DEFENSE FUND, TOXIC
IGNORANCE 15 (1997) (concluding that 71 percent of the high production volume chemicals in
commerce did not have toxicity data available in the major databases that met the minimum
data requirements set by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD)); Office of Pollution Prevention & Toxics, Envtl. Prot. Agency, What Do We Really
Know About the Safety of High Production Volume Chemicals?, 22 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA)
261 (May 1, 1998) (concluding that basic safety information is unavailable for roughly half of the
chemicals produced in the highest amounts); CMA More Optimistic than EDF On Lack of Data
for 100 Chemicals, Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 230, at A-4 (Dec. 1, 1997) (reporting that thirtythree out of one hundred of the Chemical Manufacturer Association’s chemical samples had
insufficient screening data).
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25
impediment to producing better information. But this is not the
whole explanation. Research in other fields is also complex, and yet
discoveries in health care and technology greatly outpace the minimal
advancements in assessing man’s impact on health and the
environment.26
Much of the blame belongs to industry’s rational and vigorous
resistance to producing information about the damage that it may
cause to the commons. In other areas of scientific inquiry, private
actors contribute substantially to advancements in public knowledge
because the research promises to provide simultaneous private
27
gains. No equivalent benefit attaches to research on the adverse
effects of human activities on health or the environment. Rather than
presenting the opportunity for private profit, these questions pose the
opposite equation for private actors generating externalities.28 These
actors vastly prefer ignorance over research because most
29
documentation of externalities will ultimately affect them negatively.

25. See, e.g., NRC, BUILDING A FOUNDATION, supra note 10, at 6–10 (discussing the vast
complexity of studying natural systems).
26. Federal spending on medical sciences, through the National Institutes of Health,
increased 33 percent from 1993 to 1999, reaching a total almost thirty times the research budget
of the EPA. BD. ON SCI., TECH., AND ECON. POLICY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TRENDS IN
FEDERAL SUPPORT OF RESEARCH AND GRADUATE EDUCATION 122–23 tbl.B-1 (2001)
[hereinafter NRC, TRENDS IN FEDERAL SUPPORT] (NIH’s budget in 1999 was about $13 billion;
the EPA’s was about $500 million). In terms of end products, contrast also the rapid
developments in genetics (including cloning), aerospace, and computer technologies with the
developments in ecological modeling and basic toxicity testing discussed above.
27. See id. at 4 (noting that “data show that corporations’ spending on research has been
increasing but is concentrated in a few sectors such as the pharmaceutical industry and the
information technology sector,” and observing that within this funding “only a small fraction . . .
is basic research”). In fact, the private sector’s increasing reliance on academic researchers has
created a crisis in diverting the resources for basic science towards the advancement of
technological innovations that can produce a profit. See Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The
Kept University, in AAAS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY YEARBOOK 293 (Albert H.
Teich et al. eds., 2001) (commenting that a major concern is that “as university-industry ties
grow more intimate, less commercially oriented areas of science will languish”), available at
http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/ch26.pdf.
28. See infra Parts I–III. Amazingly, however, this simple strategic incentive for ignorance
has generally been missed in both economic and legal scholarship on the regulation of
externalities. See infra Part IV.A. For example, in surveying the justifications for introducing
regulation to correct problems of inadequate information, Justice (then Professor) Breyer
provides four separate rationales, none of which consider the perverse incentives for ignorance
that attach to externalities. Instead, he focuses on public good problems and the costs associated
with individual policing of fraud. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 26–28
(1982).
29. See infra Part I.A.1.
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Thus, rather than contribute to enlightenment, actors seem more
willing to contribute to, and even invest in, the perpetuation of
30
ignorance.
Although it is rarely noticed, ignorance regarding the harm that
private actors are causing health and the environment is just another
external cost of their activities that they are able to pass on to
society.31 The common law courts have sometimes appreciated this,
requiring actors to disprove that they caused harm when they are best
32
situated to know how their activities might affect others. Similarly,
externality theory supports requiring actors to internalize the costs of
researching an externality, because these costs are imposed on society
by the actor’s conduct.33 As long as there are predictable, nonobvious

30. It can be argued that the public should not bear any of the burden of financing
assessments of the harm caused by private activities; rather, actors should be required to fund
this research themselves. Nevertheless, there is general recognition that government testing will
be needed to fill in the gaps. Ironically, though, the federal government dedicates more than
nine times the funding to the medical sciences, a field in which the private sector is already
contributing a great deal of resources, than to environmental biology, where there is no
indication that the private sector contributes in any meaningful way. NRC, TRENDS IN
FEDERAL SUPPORT, supra note 26, at 129 tbl.C-2. The computer sciences, another industry
enjoying an influx of significant private research and development funding, enjoys twice the
federal funding of environmental biology. Id.; see also id. at 144–45 tbls. F-1, F-3 (providing
tables of nonfederal and corporate spending).
31. In the economics literature, externalities are broadly defined as those activities in which
an actor does not “bear all of the consequences of his or her action.” TOM TIETENBERG,
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS 45 (2d ed. 1988); see also Mary L.
Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use
Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1799 (1989) (recommending that “public research costs” of testing
hazardous chemicals should be linked to their “private economic origins”).
32. See generally Fleming James, Jr., Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51, 66 (1961)
(arguing that “[a]ccess to evidence is often the basis for creating [such] a presumption” on
grounds of convenience, fairness, and public policy). Specifically, common law courts shift the
burden of proving negligence under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, in part when defendants have
superior information regarding their conduct. Stephen A. Spitz, From Res Ipsa Loquitur to
Diethylstilbestrol: The Unidentifiable Tortfeasor in California, 65 IND. L.J. 591, 599 (1990).
Courts also shift the burden of proof to disprove specific causation to defendants under limited
circumstances, based again in part on their superior access to information. See, e.g., Summers v.
Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948) (shifting the burden to the defendant hunters to disprove
causation of harm to the plaintiff’s eye, in part because the defendants enjoyed information over
the cause of the injury). Finally, courts shift the burden of proof for both causation and
negligence to a defendant when the defendant has negligently or intentionally destroyed
medical records or other evidence central to a plaintiff’s case. See, e.g., Sweet v. Sisters of
Providence, 895 P.2d 484, 491–92 (Alaska 1995).
33. Although theorists appear not to have identified separate categories of externalityrelated social costs, one can imagine at least three separate categories of social costs that arise
sequentially from an action that creates an externality. First are the costs and related harms of
identifying and measuring the externality (costs most theorists ignore by assuming perfect
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harms that flow from an activity, it is the actors’ duty to investigate
and disclose these harms before taking action. Otherwise, the
externatility and the ignorance surrounding it will be selfperpetuating.
This Part explores, at a preliminary level, the reasons why actors
who produce significant amounts of pollution or potentially
dangerous products are unlikely to assist in documenting the adverse
effects of their activities. In many cases, the disincentives created by
the marketplace and tort law may cause actors to be content simply to
avoid documenting the harm. In a more limited set of cases, however,
it might be in an actor’s financial interest to actively discredit and
obfuscate damaging information. Thus, even when the public is
willing to subsidize research on the harms that various externalities
impose on society, the research may be subject to unwarranted
challenge. Public research becomes both more expensive and less
fruitful when powerful actors profit from ignorance.
A. Actors Will Generally Resist Documenting the Adverse
Consequences of Their Activities and Products
Actors do not generally welcome information about the adverse
effects of their activities and products on public health and the

information). Second are the damages to society resulting from the externality. Third are the
costs needed for society to engage in collective action to address the problem, often referred to
as “administrative” costs. Each of these three categories of costs results from the externality.
Society would not incur any of them if the externality did not exist. To internalize the costs of an
activity in a pure sense, one would need to add these three categories of costs up, subtract any
positive spillovers that an activity might produce, and require actors to internalize the
remainder.
In considering what actors should internalize, however, both academics and regulators
traditionally focus only on the second category of costs that flow from an externality. Cf.
Richard O. Zerbe Jr. & Howard McCurdy, The End of Market Failure, REG., Summer 2000, at
10, 13 (arguing implicitly that the transaction costs involved in responding to externalities—
when the social benefits are less than the social costs of a polluting activity—are a collective
responsibility and should not also be assigned to the actor engaged in the externality). Yet in
ignoring the other two categories, especially the first, one misses a large set of external costs. As
long as rational actors pay for the reasonable radius of external costs that they impose on
society, including the costs of developing information, they will identify the socially optimal type
and level of activity to undertake. Assigning the costs of information production to actors gives
them a more complete accounting of the harm that their activity causes and improves their
decisionmaking in this regard. See, e.g., John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk:
Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 317
(1991) (“Indeed, one justification given for data call-ins [a regulatory demand for more testing
of pesticides and chemical substances] is that owners of marginally useful registrations will
discontinue the product rather than pay for expensive research.”).
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environment. Economic theory reinforces this simple intuition: it
suggests that producing new information will be optimal only if its
34
expected value is greater than the costs of its production. For actors
whose activities or products create externalities, conducting research
35
on potential harms is not only costly but may yield bad news.
1. Reasons to Remain Ignorant about Negative Externalities. In
Professor Mary Lyndon’s classic article about the lack of safety
research on toxic products, she details the ways in which the market
discourages manufacturers from conducting research on the long36
term safety of potentially toxic products. Professor Lyndon’s
analysis reveals that the market penalizes, rather than rewards, actors
who document the negative effects of their products when the effects
are neither obvious nor visible and immediate.37 Although Professor
Lyndon focuses on the disincentives for manufacturers to research
long-term product safety, her analysis applies even more forcefully to
actors who discharge pollution, whose responsibility for downstream
effects is even more difficult to discern.
According to Professor Lyndon, there are at least three reasons
that actors will not find it in their interest to document the potential
harm from their products or polluting activities.38 First, the out-ofpocket (direct) costs associated with conducting safety research are

34. See Steven Shavell, Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information About Risk, 21 J.
LEGAL. STUD. 259, 263 (1992).
35. Mass toxic tort cases provide the most dramatic illustration of when companies learn
this lesson the hard way. In several cases, corporations voluntarily undertook safety research,
only to have that research produce bad news. Rather than recall the products and risk liability,
however, the corporations decided to conceal adverse testing. See, e.g., Tetuan v. A.H. Robins
Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1240 (Kan. 1987) (awarding punitive damages based on corporate
misconduct, including evidence that A.H. Robins “commissioned studies on the Dalkon Shield
which it dropped or concealed when the results were unfavorable” and “consigned hundreds of
documents to the furnace”); PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS
INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 145 (1985) (chronicling a number of concealment efforts by the asbestos
industry, including executive decisions to develop “a corporate policy of not informing sick
employees of the precise nature of their health problems for fear of workmen’s-compensation
claims and lawsuits”); PHILIP J. HILTS, SMOKESCREEN: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE TOBACCO
INDUSTRY COVER-UP 10–11, 20–22, 23–41, 129 (1996) (documenting, in an early exposé, the
tobacco industry’s concealment of adverse, in-house health studies).
36. See Lyndon, supra note 31, at 1813–17 (“Ignorance will tend to prevail.”).
37. See id. at 1813 (“As long as no way exists for buyers to identify the toxic effects of
specific chemicals, there is no commercial incentive for chemical producers to identify and
publicize them. Sellers will not willingly reveal negative characteristics of their products.”
(citations omitted)).
38. Id. at 1810–17.
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not only expensive but also may not produce definitive results.
Indeed, even after protracted testing, the results generally cannot
completely exonerate a product or activity, nor do they enable the
39
manufacturer to quantify risks in a definitive way. Given the lack of
inexpensive screening tests, actors will rarely be able to obtain
information about the harms created by their product or activity at
low cost.40 Thus, financial realities and lack of research efficacy
combine to explain why long-term safety testing is generally not an
attractive investment for actors.
Second, virtually no market benefits accrue to actors who
produce research on the long-term safety of products or activities.
Professor Lyndon demonstrates that when safety representations
cannot be easily validated or compared, consumers are unlikely to
make purchasing or investment decisions based upon a
manufacturer’s self-serving statements about safety.41 Moreover,
given that the results are rarely determinative, even thorough safety
research will seldom provide a clear market signal of “safety.”42 Even
if research results were definitive and comparable between different
products and activities, advertising that a product or activity did not
cause cancer in animals might not impress consumers or be received
positively in the marketplace.

39. The most extreme example is the cost of safety and efficacy testing for drugs under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Testing a single drug was estimated to cost $231 million in the
early 1990s. Veronica Henry, Problems with Pharmaceutical Regulation in the United States:
Drug Lag and Orphan Drugs, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 617, 617 (1993). At the same time, a recent
study reports that 20 percent of all new drugs are found to have serious or life-threatening
adverse effects within the first twenty-five years of use that were either unknown or undisclosed
at the time of drug approval. Karen E. Lasser et al., Timing of New Black Box Warnings and
Withdrawals for Prescription Medications, 287 JAMA 2215, 2216 (2002).
40. In critiquing tort reform proposals designed to incentivize greater safety testing,
Professor Pierce emphasizes false positives resulting from early screening tests and expresses
the concern that “there is no finite limit on the amount of testing that can enhance our
understanding of the potential risks that are posed by a substance.” Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Causation in Government Regulation and Toxic Torts, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1307, 1324–25 (1998).
41. See Lyndon, supra note 31, at 1816 (discussing how information on chemical safety
produced voluntarily by manufacturers might be discounted because of its commercial context);
see also id. at 1813–14 (“Comprehensive and accessible toxicity rating systems would support
affirmative advertising, but without a developed information context, there is no incentive to
study a chemical: the long-term health effects remain invisible for one’s own products and for
those of one’s competitors.”); John Leland, Is Organic Shampoo Chemistry or Botany?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 2003, at 9-1 (discussing the enormous variability in products that use the
“organic” label and the lack of federal oversight to ensure uniformity in labeling for
consumers).
42. See supra note 39.
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Third, for toxicity and safety testing, there are few guarantees
43
about what the testing will reveal. Any possible good news,
moreover, is always tempered by looming uncertainties. Most
44
screening tests produce false positives by design. Yet even when “no
effect” is observed in a toxicity study, the testing cannot ensure that
the product is safe—only that it did not cause a few types of adverse
effects (e.g., cancer) in one exposure setting (e.g., ingestion by rats).45
On the other hand, a bad result is almost always definitive in the
following sense: When a substance does cause cancer in laboratory
animals, uncertainty about how those results could or should be
extrapolated to humans does not materially diminish the impact of
the adverse result.46 The best that can be said is that bad news
encourages more testing to refine and improve the outlook for the
47
product or activity.
Beyond the lack of market incentives for developing information
on externalities, actors also have legitimate concerns about increased

43. One of the most recent surprises is research by a Berkeley biologist who discovered
that low levels of atrazine, a widely used herbicide, are associated with a statistically significant
increase in the percentage of hermaphroditic frogs. Tyrone B. Hayes et al., Hermaphroditic,
Demasculinized Frogs After Exposure to the Herbicide Atrazine at Low Ecologically Relevant
Doses, 99 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCIENCE 5476, 5476 (2002). This discovery led the manufacturer
of atrazine to contest the use of the findings in the risk assessment for the herbicide, see Center
for Regulatory Effectiveness et al., Request for Correction of Information Contained in the
Atrazine Environmental Risk Assessment, Docket No. OPP-34237A (Nov. 25, 2002)
[hereinafter Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Request for Correction], available at
http://www.thecre.com/pdf/petition-atrazine2B.pdf, and to fund other scientists to conduct
reanalyses of the study, see James A. Carr et al., Response of Larval Xenopus Laevis to
Atrazine: Assessment of Growth, Metamorphosis, and Gonadal and Laryngeal Morphology, 22
ENVTL. TOX. & CHEM. 396, 404 (2003) (acknowledging that the authors are funded by atrazine’s
manufacturer, Syngenta). See also NRC, BUILDING A FOUNDATION, supra note 10, at 10
(discussing the inevitability of surprises in environmental research as a “consequence of the
complexity of environmental systems” and underscoring the need to limit these surprises with
additional research).
44. See Pierce, supra note 40, at 1323–24 (discussing the combined false positive rate of the
simple Salmonella assay and the rodent carcinogenicity test).
45. See supra note 13 (discussing the limited endpoints capable of being studied in toxicity
testing).
46. See David Roe, Toxic Chemical Control Policy: Three Unabsorbed Facts, 32 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,232, 10,232 (2002) (using empirical evidence to argue that the
additional disclosures required by Proposition 65 in California, which requires industries to
disclose chemicals in their products and polluting activities that cause cancer in animals, led
California industries to reduce these carcinogens significantly relative to the rest of the country).
47. Although actors can attempt to secret away bad news to prevent its dissemination (in
other words, disseminate only the good and hide the bad), history suggests that “this strategy is
risky.” See supra note 35 (listing some case studies that surfaced through toxic tort litigation).
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tort liability that could result from producing incriminating
information about the harms caused by their products or activities.
Common law tort liability is generally imposed only after injured
48
parties prove that the defendant’s activity caused their harm.
Producing and publicizing internal research on such harms is,
therefore, a risky proposition. Once plaintiffs’ attorneys seize on a
firm’s internal research suggesting that harm may result from the
firm’s products or activities, catastrophic liability may follow.49 Under
such information-triggered common law regimes, actors benefit from
knowing nothing, in part because it deprives plaintiffs of the evidence
that they need to bring their case.50
That remaining ignorant about the impact of their products and
activities is an effective strategy is evident in practice. Industries do
not volunteer information on the long-term safety of their products
and activities, and they lobby against laws requiring them to share
51
even basic internal information. The dearth of information available

48. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 270 (W. Page Keeton et al.
eds., 5th ed. 1984) (discussing that, when proving causation, a “plaintiff must introduce evidence
which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the
conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result”).
49. See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, Emerging Themes and Dilemmas in American Toxic
Tort Law, 1988-91: A Legal-Historical and Philosophical Exegesis, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 43 (1993)
(noting that one of a toxic tort plaintiff’s obstacles was “inadequate toxicological
information . . . and the enormous expense of trying to gather whatever information or expertise
is available”); Frank J. Macchiarola, The Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust: Lessons for
the Future, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 583, 583–84 (1996) (describing the Manville Trust, established
as a result of Johns-Manville Corporation’s bankruptcy, which was caused by asbestos liability);
Francine Schwadel, Robins and Plaintiffs Face Uncertain Future, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1985, at
1-4 (reporting that Robins filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy because of plaintiffs’ claims in
Dalkon Shield litigation).
50. See Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory
of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2135–40 (1997) (arguing that the current
common law causation standard provides perverse incentives for defendants to remain
ignorant); Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 41 (1995) (arguing that underdeterrence will occur under current toxic tort liability rules
because “placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff creates a perverse incentive for actors to
foster strong uncertainty about general causation”); Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in
the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 796 (1997) (“The common law
requirement that plaintiffs assume the entire burden of proving causation in toxic tort cases . . .
creates inappropriate incentives for long-term safety research . . . .”); see also Pierce, supra note
40, at 1308–10 (agreeing that the common law requirements present a problem but disagreeing
with the Berger and Wagner proposals for reform).
51. See Addition of Reporting Elements; Toxic Chemical Release Reporting; Community
Right-To-Know, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,322, 51,326 (Oct. 1, 1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 372)
(recounting and responding to industry’s objections to an addition to the toxic release inventory
requiring an accounting of materials to the toxic release inventory); Roe, supra note 46, at
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on environmental quality, waste streams, and the safety of products
speaks volumes about the disincentives to producing this
52
information. But case studies reveal that ignorance is not merely a
byproduct of a market system that fails to offer incentives to provide
this information; ignorance actually represents a willful, strategic
choice. Makers of the Dalkon Shield,53 high-absorbency tampons,54

10,234 (discussing industries’ consistent opposition to Proposition 65 (a California law requiring
additional toxicity labeling on products)); Sidney M. Wolf, Fear and Loathing About the Public
Right to Know: The Surprising Success of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-ToKnow Act, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 217, 220 (1996) (discussing strong industry opposition
to passage of Environmental Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA)). Some
of the opposition is based on trade secret concerns, although this does not explain all of
the opposition.
52. See supra notes 10–24 and accompanying text.
53. A.H. Robins Company manufactured the Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine birth control
device (IUD), and its own corporate scientists bemoaned the inadequate state of the company’s
safety testing on the IUD. See MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN,
AND THE DALKON SHIELD 123 (1985) (quoting a memo by Dr. Robert Murphey, the director of
scientific development and international research for the company, stating that “we possess
inadequate support data from animal studies as to long-term safety of the current Dalkon
Shield”); id. at 133 (quoting a memo of Dr. Oscar Klioze, the director of pharmaceutical
research and analytical services, warning that the string on Dalkon Shield “has not been
subjected to any formal stability testing”); id. at 134 (quoting a memo by Kenneth Moore,
Dalkon Shield Project Coordinator, warning that “[c]onsidering that we have been marketing
the device for going on three years . . . it is about time that data are collected on the effect of the
uterine environment”); see also Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co., 196 Cal. Rptr. 117, 132 n.21 (Ct.
App. 1983) (observing that “plaintiff presented substantial evidence of a conscious decision by
defendant Robins not to test the IUD device prior to or during marketing”). See generally
SHELDON ENGELMAYER & ROBERT WAGMAN, LORD’S JUSTICE 28, 36–38 (1985) (describing
the inadequate safety testing of the Dalkon Shield); MINTZ, supra, at 131–48 (describing the
considerable amount of information that Robins ignored when it delayed and avoided safety
testing of the string on the Dalkon Shield).
54. In 1980, when the Center for Disease Control (CDC) became aware of a virtual
epidemic of Toxic Shock Syndrome (TSS) among women, it conducted an epidemiology study
that correlated the disease with the recent use of tampons. West v. Johnson & Johnson Prods.,
Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437, 442–43 (Ct. App. 1985). The CDC then requested safety research from
tampon manufacturers but received almost no information. Id. at 443. As a result of the
considerable scientific uncertainty, CDC conducted a second study and within three to four
weeks had isolated the cause of TSS as a potentially fatal bacteria present in a small percentage
of women that thrived as a result of tampon use. Id. Evidence later adduced by the plaintiffs
revealed that, between 1975 and 1980, one of the tampon manufacturers (Johnson & Johnson)
had received 150 complaints “of a more serious nature” resulting from tampon use. Id. at 445.
The court found that “[u]p to the time of trial, [Johnson & Johnson] had conducted no studies
to ascertain whether use of a tampon was in any way related to vaginal infection.” Id. Similarly,
see O’Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1446 (10th Cir. 1987), finding that
Playtex disregarded studies demonstrating a connection between highly absorbent tampons
and TSS.
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55
56
57
58
Bendectin, DES, breast implants, and tobacco all dug in their
heels and resisted conducting safety research on their products, even
when preliminary study indicated that the products harmed the
public. Although these manufacturers, thanks in large part to public
research on their products, were ultimately held at least partly
accountable for the harms that they created, their strategy of resisting
research enjoyed a long period of success and remains a popular
approach.59 Remaining ignorant about the potential harms caused by
one’s products and activities increases the likelihood that the actor
can avoid tort suits and stay out of the range of plaintiffs’ attorneys’
radar.

55. Merrell Dow, the manufacturer of Bendectin, conducted only a minimal amount of
safety studies on Bendectin, all of which were done after marketing the product. See Joseph
Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS
L.J. 301, 321 (“[T]he compound had not undergone substantial testing when introduced.”). The
absence of adequate safety testing led to early liability of Merrell Dow, although later evidence
exonerated the manufacturer because it revealed a low to zero probability that Bendectin
actually caused birth defects. See MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE
CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION 329 (1996) (“The best that we can say
[with the benefit of the science available up until the mid-1990s] is that if Bendectin causes any
birth defects, it does so extremely infrequently.”).
56. For example, in Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 182 (N.Y. 1982), at trial “[t]he
jury determined that Lilly and other DES manufacturers wrongfully marketed the drug for use
in preventing miscarriage without first performing laboratory tests upon pregnant mice” and
that these tests would have alerted the manufacturers that “DES was capable of causing
cancer.” Id. at 185; see also id. at 189 (discussing Lilly’s partial admissions regarding
foreseeability of cancer resulting from DES).
57. Breast implants were not safety tested until the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
repeatedly insisted on added testing as a condition to marketing. The research finally filed with
the FDA in 1991 was sorely inadequate. The leader of the FDA’s Breast Prosthesis PMA Task
Force reported that Dow’s clinical studies were:
“[S]o weak that they cannot provide a reasonable assurance of the safety and
effectiveness of these devices” because they provide “no assurance that the full range
of complications are included, no dependable measure of the incidence of
complications, no reliable measure of the revision rate, and no quantitative measure
of patient benefit.”
STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON HUMAN RES. AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 102D CONG., THE FDA’S REGULATION OF SILICONE BREAST
IMPLANTS 27 (Comm. Print 1993) (quoting the FDA report).
58. See HILTS, supra note 35, at 10–11, 20–22, 23–41, 129 (describing the concealment of
adverse health studies conducted by the tobacco industry).
59. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The
Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 779 (1983) (observing that in
terms of making safety improvements in an existing product, frequently “the safest course in the
short run . . . is to admit nothing, alter course as little as possible, and offer to settle with no
one”).
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2. Reasons Not to Produce Information That Becomes a Public
Good. The tort system, which creates disincentives for actors to
develop information on the externalities resulting from their products
and activities, combined with the lack of any significant market
incentives for producing such information provides sufficient
explanation for the dearth of voluntary testing on externalities. In
addition, whatever positive incentives may exist are mitigated
because the information—once produced and publicized—becomes a
public good. Thus actors producing useful information, unless it
60
pertains exclusively to them, will be unable to capture its full benefit.
Any good news that safety testing may yield is of little value to a
manufacturer unless it is publicized. But once publicized, competitors
can capitalize on the information without bearing any of the costs of
producing it.61 Although theoretically actors will produce information
on the harm resulting from their activities if the benefits outweigh the
costs, when the information is also useful to competitors, the resulting
reduction in benefit will be added to the tally in determining whether
the information is worth the investment. For example, investments in
research on improving screening methods for detecting neurological
harms from exposure to toxic products not only helps the investing
actor assess the harm caused by its activities, but can be used by
others. Thus, if private actors develop enhanced capabilities for

60. See generally JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF
UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION 259–94 (1992) (dedicating a chapter to exploring the tension
between information as a public good and incentives that encourage actors to invest in the
production of information). Thus, positive spillovers, an opposite sort of market failure
problem, can also arise in understanding and characterizing externalities. In close cases, the
extent to which the information will reveal negative and/or positive spillovers may be difficult to
anticipate. The only thing that can be sure from the production of information is that the
information will produce some spillover effects—positive or negative—that discourage its
production.
61. The public good problem accompanying scientific and technological discoveries
provides the economic basis for justifying patents, copyrights, and trade secret protections. In
these cases, the researcher is developing information that must remain private, thus “allowing
the researcher to improve his situation relative to uninformed parties.” Id. at 258. By contrast,
disseminating privately produced information on air or water quality or even methods for
testing harms would seem to rarely, if ever, provide advantages to competitors. In this way, the
“public good” aspects do not necessarily detract from the actors’ original incentives for
obtaining the information: the information is not less valuable to the original researcher once it
has been disseminated. Rather, the public good features simply underscore the reality that
actors have produced a good for which they are not capturing full economic benefits. The
pesticide laws attempt to mitigate this problem by requiring competitors to share the costs of
mandatorily produced health and safety data incurred by one company when such data are also
relevant to the safety of the competitors’ products. See infra note 393.
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detecting these harms, they help produce a public good for which they
will not be compensated adequately.
B. Actors Will Generally Resist Disseminating Information about the
Adverse Effects of Their Activities and Products
If actors believe that information about their activities has a
negative value, they might not only resist producing this information,
but also may make it more difficult for third parties to produce it.
Indeed, the extent to which actors will actively impede the public
production of information can be predicted using essentially the
reverse of the economic formula for the production of information.
Actors will invest as much in obstructing research as they expect to
62
lose if the information is made publicly available. Moreover, to the
extent that actors enjoy superior access to or control over information
essential to assess externalities, they may be able to increase the costs
of third-party research simply by preventing access to key
information. If actors believe that they have much to lose from public
enlightenment about externalities—particularly, for example, if there
is a potential for mass liability—they might even take affirmative
steps to discredit or counter the claims made by third parties. Even if
these efforts ultimately fail, the actors benefit by postponing the
ultimate “day of reckoning”—sometimes indefinitely.
1. Actors Often Enjoy Superior Information about the Suspected
Harms Caused by Their Activities, and They Sometimes Conceal This
Information. Actors who create externalities affecting public health
and the environment often enjoy private or superior information
about their externalities.63 These actors, with mountains of detailed

62. Cf. Shavell, supra note 34, at 263 (“It is socially optimal to acquire information when
[the value of the information exceeds the cost of acquiring that information].”).
63. Although the economics literature is incomplete, see infra notes 366–71 and
accompanying text, economists do acknowledge firms’ informational advantages with respect to
determining the costs of abatement and with respect to private knowledge of compliance. See,
e.g., Claus Huber & Franz Wirl, The Polluter Pays Versus the Pollutee Pays Principle Under
Asymmetric Information, 35 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 69, 71 (1998) (assuming that a polluter
has asymmetric information on the benefits of the polluting activity); Tracy R. Lewis, Protecting
the Environment When Costs and Benefits Are Privately Known, 27 RAND J. ECON. 819, 826–31
(1996) (modeling regulation when firms have superior information about abatement costs and
emissions levels); Daniel F. Spulber, Optimal Environmental Regulation Under Asymmetric
Information, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 163, 163 (1988) (modeling regulatory options around the
constraint of firms’ private information on abatement costs); infra note 245 and accompanying
text. Importantly, however, economists also assume that the victim actually has superior
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facts about about their polluting activities and products, amass
specialized private expertise about the ways that these activities or
64
products could cause harm. In their unique role as creators of a
product or activity, these actors enjoy both superior knowledge and
65
superior access to this information.
The extent to which an actor has superior knowledge about an
externality is generally a function of whether the harms associated
with the externality are readily visible, without the aid of expensive
instruments. When the information is not readily visible to others,
actors can enjoy different degrees of asymmetrical access to that
information. First, actors can have direct information about the
effects of their activities on the environment and public health as a
66
result of internal research and analysis. Second, usually as a result of
operating research production facilities or directing specific research,
actors often enjoy privately-held, circumstantial information about
the effects of their activities, as well as greater sophistication about
how to conduct additional research on these effects.67 Finally, actors
might be in a better position to obtain information about the effects
of their activities relative to others because they know approximately
where or what to sample or could sample more cheaply, even though
they have not yet done the research. In this setting, actors have
superior access to information because they have an “inside track” on
where best to obtain it.68

information on the damages done to public health and the environment. See infra note 367 and
accompanying text.
64. The actor discharging wastes or producing products is essentially an expert for that
activity and enjoys the types of information advantages that experts enjoy over their domain of
expertise. Cf. Asher Wolinsky, Competition in a Market for Informed Experts’ Services, 24
RAND J. ECON. 380 (1993) (discussing professional experts’ advantage in determining the level
of service needed).
65. Although the distinction between these two types of asymmetries—asymmetric
information and asymmetric access to information—is not clearly relevant to economic analysis,
it is pertinent to law because once the information is in the “files,” it is potentially discoverable
and, in some settings, reportable. Moreover, failure to disclose known information relevant to
another party can constitute fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (prohibiting the submission of
false information to a government agency, and prohibiting the concealment of information). In
such a legal setting, a manufacturer is better off remaining ignorant of all adverse effects when
there are not specific, enforceable rules requiring information production. See Wagner, supra
note 50, at 790–96 (arguing generally that common law tort causation requirements reward
ignorance).
66. See infra notes 73–80 and accompanying text.
67. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
68. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
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For externalities that are not readily apparent, actors can use
their superior access to information to increase the costs associated
with public efforts to understand the externality and, in some cases,
69
can even impede third-party efforts to assess the resulting harms.
For example, the manufacturers of Agent Orange understood that the
ingredient dioxin could adversely affect health and the environment,
yet this harm was largely invisible and therefore unknown to veterans
and others who were sprayed with the substance, as well as by the
government who purchased it for wartime use.70 The same story can
71
be retold for a number of other products and wastes. By contrast,
other sorts of external harms—car accidents caused by drunk drivers;
poorly designed buildings that collapse on individuals—impose
obvious costs on society. Asymmetric, or private, information about
the potential for harm might exist before the accident takes place, but
after the accident, the fact that the activity caused harm is widely
known.72
The types of information advantages available to actors who
create externalities can be divided into at least two general categories.
The first category relates to the superior information that actors
derive simply from their expertise and involvement in the production
73
cycle. Manufacturers best know the contents, contaminants, and

69. The tobacco papers, for example, suggest that the tobacco industry learned how to
manipulate nicotine levels to make cigarettes more addictive simply by using trace amounts of
ammonia. Government and third-party research on cigarettes, by contrast, was unable reliably
to characterize the addictive properties of nicotine, much less hypothesize that a manufacturer
could manipulate a substance like ammonia to make cigarettes more addictive. See, e.g., HILTS,
supra note 35, at 46, 171 (reporting that “[t]he studies of nicotine among the [tobacco]
companies were extensive—far beyond anything outside their walls” and quoting from a
deposition of Dr. Jeffrey Wigand, Brown & Williamson whistleblower, describing how ammonia
frees up nicotine so that more of it will be activated during smoking).
70. PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE
COURTS 159 (1986). Judge Weinstein censured chemical companies for their failure to warn the
government in light of earlier indications about Agent Orange’s effects. Id.
71. See supra notes 53–58 and infra notes 246–48 and accompanying text.
72. Because there is little ambiguity about the existence of these sorts of accidents or the
existence of some resulting harm, there are simply no opportunities for actors to argue that the
harm really did not occur or was caused by others. These are, however, familiar arguments in
toxic cases. See, e.g., SCHUCK, supra note 70, at 3–15.
73. See, e.g., Peter Osmundsen, Regulation of Common Property Resources Under Private
Information About Resource Externalities, 24 RESOURCES & ENERGY ECON. 349, 350 (2002)
(analyzing the regulatory impediments created by various firms’ asymmetric information
regarding common resource exploitation); see also CLIFFORD S. RUSSELL ET AL., ENFORCING
POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS 10 (1986) (discussing the movement toward self-regulation in
environmental laws); infra notes 245–48 and accompanying text. This “asymmetrical advantage

WAGNER FINAL.DOC

1644

2/9/2005 11:06 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:1619

waste products associated with producing their products and often
experience firsthand any adverse effects of the products and
74
associated wastes. Actors also have superior information about
when, where, and how they eject materials into the environment.
75
Whether the actors dispose of materials within a plant site, in rural
76
77
areas at midnight, or in the normal course of business, others will
have a difficult time learning about it. Moreover, by actors’ sheer
proximity to the discharge or emission point, they are bound to gain
additional information about pollution through smells, color, and
78
even worker or wildlife reactions, such as rashes or fish kills. Actors
also best appreciate the probability and magnitude of a range of risks
that could arise from their activities.79 For example, Union Carbide at

enjoyed by firms is why the environmental laws have gradually moved increasingly toward”
relying on heavily proscribed self-monitoring regimes that often require constant monitoring,
assessing criminal penalties for fraudulent monitoring or tampering with monitoring equipment,
and providing increasingly attractive protections for industrial whistleblowers. PERCIVAL ET
AL., supra note 5, at 986–88.
74. See, e.g., Lyndon, supra note 31, at 1815 (“[T]he chemical producer knows what the
chemical is, while the buyer often does not. Without the chemical identity of the product, the
buyer cannot seek assistance in developing information independently.”) The existence of this
asymmetrical access to adverse information regarding products is also the basis for the adverse
information reporting requirements under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). See infra note 164 and
accompanying text.
75. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
76. The difficulty of catching parties who secretly dump hazardous wastes on the property
of others (i.e., “midnight dumpers”) led Congress to create an exclusion for owner liability
under CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (2000).
77. See, e.g., Lynn Blais et al., Enforcement Against Air Toxics Hotspots in Texas: A
Report to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality and the United States
Environmental Protection Agency 45–50 (Nov. 8, 2004) (preliminary draft report, on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (discussing residents’ reports of flaming plumes and noxious odors in
the middle of the night, but noting that inspectors were unable to verify the problem the next
day when the problems had disappeared and the facilities denied the existence of any problem).
78. Employers also appreciate the suite of toxic exposures that their employees will
encounter in the plant far better than outsiders who can spend only an hour at the plant trying
to assess safety from sporadic data points. See, e.g., infra note 103 (describing the asbestos
industry’s concealment of information regarding the adverse effects of asbestos on their sick
workers). However, manufacturers may not have superior information about the adverse effects
of their air emissions on global warming, for example, because they have no private advantage
in understanding these potential regional and global harms.
79. Overcoming some of these asymmetries is the sole objective of the Emergency
Planning Provisions of the Environmental Planning and Community Response Act (EPCRA)
42 U.S.C. § 11,001–11,050 (2000), which requires facilities to work with local emergency
response officials to develop plans for responding to unexpected releases, explosions, and the
like. Included in these detailed plans is the location and characteristics of all of the hazardous
substances on the site. Id. §§ 11,021–11,023.
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its Bhopal plant best understood the risks of the leak of methyl
isocyanate arising from its manufacturing process and even had
advance notice of the leak, but delayed notifying the surrounding
80
neighborhood for more than an hour after the gas escaped the plant.
The second type of informational advantage is the actor’s ability
to use several legal protections to actively exclude others from
accessing the basic information and physical data needed to assess
externalities. For example, intellectual property law allows actors to
raise the costs of accessing information about externalities and, in
81
some cases, to bar access to this information completely. Using
broad trade secret protections, manufacturers impede public access to
a large body of information regarding their manufacturing processes,
testing data, and the contents of their toxic products and waste
streams.82 Until a federal agency is forced to review the merits of a
confidential business information claim and determines that it is
unjustified, the information remains unavailable to health
professionals, risk assessors, members of the public who have been
83
exposed to the waste or product, and most regulators. Even the
legitimacy of an underlying trade secret claim is based largely on
asymmetrical information; firms best know whether competitors can
readily use information regarding their products and wastes to their
economic detriment, or whether their trade secret claim is instead
intended simply to impede access to “troublesome” information.84
Similarly, privacy law and real property law give actors the
ability to exclude others from accessing information about activities

80. JOHN S. APPLEGATE ET AL., THE REGULATION OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND
HAZARDOUS WASTES 1138–39 (2000).
81. The right to exclude others provides the purpose of these property-based legal
protections. See, e.g., HIRSHLEIFER & RILEY, supra note 60, at 259 (observing how patents,
copyrights, and trade secrets provide “imperfect and partially effective property rights in ideas”
to encourage the production of new information); see also MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6-3 (1999) (discussing how copyright, trade secret, and patent laws
each offer a unique contribution to the protection of “sensitive corporate information”).
82. See infra Part III.B.1.
83. See Mary L. Lyndon, Secrecy and Innovation in Tort Law and Regulation, 23 N.M. L.
REV. 1, 34–39 (1993) (discussing the costs of broad protections for confidential business
information); Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and
Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837, 840–
48 (1980) (same); infra note 280 and accompanying text.
84. Disparate evidence reveals that firms do exaggerate the need for broad trade secret
protections for basic information about the externalities that the firms generate. See infra notes
284, 290–97 and accompanying text.
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occurring on their property that might create negative externalities.
For example, government inspectors are typically permitted to enter
private property to collect health and safety information only under
conditions acceptable to the owner; otherwise they must obtain a
warrant.86 This privacy protection is maintained even if the actor
engages in an activity suspected of creating external social costs. Such
87
protections are relaxed only in an emergency. As a result,
government inspections often provide, at best, a preliminary and
incomplete picture of the potential hazards and pollution sources at
large facilities.88 Government officials may be able to determine if an
actor significantly underestimates or underreports pollution levels by
conducting expensive ambient monitoring outside a facility, but such
monitoring is still of little use in pinpointing particular, problematic
sources of pollution inside the facility.89

85. See infra Part III.B.2. Although this Article focuses primarily on how the laws
sometimes motivate actors to hide or ignore adverse effects of products and wastes on health
and the environment, these same types of legal disincentives also occur in the laws governing
the protection of endangered species. Most notable is the ability of private landowners to
exclude those who wish to survey endangered species or landowners who can secretly destroy
the species or its habitat to avoid the regulatory constraints of species protection. For an
insightful analysis of these advantages that arise out of private property rights, see Stephen
Polasky & Holly Doremus, When the Truth Hurts: Endangered Species Policy on Private Land
with Imperfect Information, 35 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT 22, 26–29 (1998).
86. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 324 (1978) (holding that warrantless
searches under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2000), are
unconstitutional). See generally ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW:
COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT 496–504 (2001) (describing procedures governing consensual
inspections conducted under environmental laws and procedures that apply to obtaining
warrants when consent is not provided).
87. See, e.g., REITZE, supra note 86, at 496–503 (discussing generally when a warrant is
required for an inspection); id. at 500 (discussing the emergency circumstances when warrants
are not required, which include “potential imminent hazardous situations and situations where
evidence may be destroyed or removed while a warrant is obtained”).
88. See generally id. at 489 (observing that inspections provide the “most important source
of compliance information” but that they are “resource intensive” and thus need to “target
sources to maximize the effectiveness of their inspection expenditures”).
89. See, e.g., Michael May, The One That Got Away: Polluting Perps Go Down, But
Huntsman Walks, TEX. OBSERVER, Nov. 8, 2002, at 20 (observing that even if the few monitors
in industrial neighborhoods reveal high levels of air pollutants, “it is usually impossible to prove
which plant is responsible”); see also David Allen et al., Accelerated Science Evaluation of
Ozone Formation in the Houston-Galveston Area, at 18 (Sept. 13, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (reporting, based on overflight monitoring of
plumes, that plants in Texas are emitting far more hydrocarbons than would be expected based
on
their
permit
limits
and
emissions
inventories),
available
at
http://www.utexas.edu/research/ceer/texaqsarchive/accel_science_eval.PDF; Blais et al., supra
note 77, at 3–16 (discussing elevated air pollutants in Texas City (in the Houston-Galveston
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Experience bears out the prediction that actors will sometimes
take advantage of these informational advantages and limit access to
90
potentially damaging information about their products and activities.
91
92
93
For example, Johnson & Johnson, A.H. Robins, Merrell Dow, and

corridor) based on two-day, annual mobile monitoring trips that measured elevated levels of air
toxics).
90. See, e.g., ALICIA MUNDY, DISPENSING WITH THE TRUTH: THE VICTIMS, THE DRUG
COMPANIES, AND THE DRAMATIC STORY BEHIND THE BATTLE OVER FEN-PHEN 133–34 (2001)
(citing Fen-Phen’s attempts to conceal how many reports of pulmonary hypertension it
received, and noting that the approved labeling was based on only four cases, though there were
an additional thirty-seven that the company’s safety surveillance officer was aware of but did
not reveal). For examples of more general, industry-sponsored campaigns to mislead the public,
media, and decisionmakers about the safety of the companies’ products or the products of their
competitors, see generally DAN FAGIN & MARIANNE LAVELLE, TOXIC DECEPTION xxi (1996).
See also supra notes 53–58; infra notes 245–48 and accompanying text. See generally SHELDON
RAMPTON & JOHN STAUBER, TRUST US, WE’RE EXPERTS! (2001) (using extensive case studies
to illustrate the prolific use by corporations of third-party public relations consultants to
distance themselves from misleading information and appear more reputable and credible).
91. See supra note 54.
92. A.H. Robins, the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield, actively concealed the adverse
results from the very limited safety testing it did conduct. For example, eight months after it
started selling the Dalkon Shield, Robins initiated a two-year study on the effects of the Dalkon
Shield on baboons that was never made available to the medical profession. “Among eight [of
the baboons tested], one ‘perished,’ and among ten, three suffered perforation of the
uterus . . . .” MINTZ, supra note 53, at 123 (quoting the testimony of Dr. John W. Ward, Director
of Toxicology and Assistant Director of Scientific Development). Following an escalation of
concern by company employees over the potential for the Dalkon Shield’s string to carry
bacteria from the vagina to the uterus, Robins retrieved 303 used strings for examination by a
staff scientist, Thomas C. Yu, who found defects in all but 35 of the strings. Company officials
swore that Robins maintained “no written records of the exams or the results.” Id. at 134–35.
There is also some suggestion that Robins destroyed sensitive Dalkon Shield documents to
better defend against litigation. Schwadel, supra note 49; see also supra note 69 (describing a
similar pattern with tobacco).
93. Merrell Dow’s culpability in the controversial breast implant litigation in large part
derived from its stubborn refusal to research the adverse effects of silicone in the body cavity
(even at the insistence of the FDA), when its own preliminary, secret, in-house evidence
suggested that the implants leaked and were harmful. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp.,
33 F.3d 1116, 1127–28 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming a punitive damage award based in part on
evidence that Dow Corning concealed the adverse results of clinical studies and knew that longterm studies were needed). In Hopkins, the court stated:
Dow obtained results of a study in which four dogs received silicone gel implants that
resembled the implants that Dow was then marketing. The results demonstrated that
after six months, the implants appeared to be functioning properly, but that after two
years, inflammation surrounding the implants demonstrated the existence of an
immune reaction. Dow did not publicly release the results of this research for several
years, and when it did ultimately release the results, Dow omitted the negative
findings and implied that the implants were safe.
Id. at 1119; see also Rebecca Weisman, Reforms in Medical Device Regulation: An Examination
of the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Debacle, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 973, 987 n.122 (1993)
(quoting Dow Corning discovery documents and a summary of scientific studies). Dow Corning
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94
95
the asbestos and tobacco industries were all caught concealing
information about their products’ adverse health impacts. Companies
also have concealed the existence of contaminants in products, even
when the products are widely used or heavily regulated.96 Some
companies have even resisted mandatory reporting requirements on
the adverse effects of their products. For example, it was only after
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) granted substantially
reduced penalties for noncompliance with adverse reporting
requirements under the Toxic Substances Control Act that companies
volunteered 11,000 studies of their products—four times the number
of studies submitted in the previous fifteen years.97 Actors have not
only taken advantage of existing information asymmetries but have
worked to secure additional or broader protections on privately held
information regarding the adverse effects of their products and
activities.98 This evidence, taken as a whole, indicates that many

also conducted a study in 1974 that revealed that silicone could “[t]rigger strong reactions of the
immune system,” but Dow Corning denied such a reaction at an FDA hearing in 1991. Id. at 988
n.123. Finally, in 1987 Dow Corning was aware that some of its employees had falsified
documents regarding silicone breast implants, but Dow Corning did not alert the FDA to these
misstatements until 1992. Id.
94. See infra note 103.
95. See supra note 58.
96. See, e.g., MINTZ, supra note 53, at 123–27 (noting that A.H. Robins, the manufacturer
of the Dalkon Shield, apparently failed to disclose that the shield contained copper and copper
sulfate to avoid having the FDA classify and ultimately regulate the Shield as a drug); supra
note 69 (discussing the tobacco industry’s use of ammonia to manipulate nicotine levels without
detection by government machines).
97. Agency Watch, EPA’s Voluntary Data, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 4, 1996, at A10. In a related
type of inducement to disclose violations within the companies’ superior control, the National
Pork Producers Council agreed to an independent environmental audit of their compliance with
the Clean Water Act, conditioned on the EPA’s agreement to significantly lower the penalties
for the reported violations. See, e.g., Richard E. Schwartz et al., Encouraging Self-Auditing
Within the Pork Industry: The Nationwide Clean Water Act Enforcement Agreement for
Agriculture’s First Industry-Wide Environmental Auditing Program, 29 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,395, 10,395 (1999).
98. Actors’ primary investments along these lines are their efforts to broaden the privileges
available to keep information secret. See infra Parts III.B.1, III.B.5. Actors also have invested in
constitutional challenges to prevent government inspectors from obtaining information about
the externalities that the actors generate—challenges that appear generally unsuccessful. See,
e.g., Balelo v. Baldrige, 724 F.2d 753, 758–60 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting a challenge mounted by
the commercial fishery industry against regulations under the Marine Mammal Protection Act,
16 U.S.C. § 1371 (2000), as imposing an unconstitutional search and seizure because the
regulations required stationing federal observers aboard large fishing fleets to ensure
compliance); see also infra Parts III.A.2., III.B.2. Private actors have also worked affirmatively
to destroy key information and evidence, thus precluding subsequent researchers from
obtaining critical information. See, e.g., supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text.
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companies do have information regarding the harms of their activities
and products that is unavailable to the general public and, depending
on their corporate leadership and culture, may be unwilling to share
that information.
In sum, actors who create externalities are best situated to access
and produce information on the nature of the harms that their
activities cause, but they also stand to lose from providing such
information. As a result, these actors use their ability to control
access to this information to create impediments for third parties who
seek to ensure that polluting activities and hazardous products are in
fact safe. At the very least, actors’ ability to limit access to
information about their products and activities raises the costs to
third parties of developing even a preliminary understanding of these
99
externalities. Just as importantly, as the next Section discusses, this
problem is exacerbated if and when an actor decides to actively
discredit and obfuscate damaging third-party research.
2. Actors Sometimes Manufacture Uncertainty about the
Suspected Harms Caused by Their Activities. Faced with especially
incriminating information on the adverse effects of a product or
activity, actors may not only decline to voluntarily assist in producing
additional research but may actively work to obfuscate especially
100
damaging information produced by others. The same formula that
predicts that rational actors will refrain from studying the invisible
harms associated with their products and activities also predicts that
rational actors will invest as much time, money, and energy in
discrediting information on the adverse effects of their activities that
they expect to lose if credible information is ultimately produced that
can be used against them.101 In dramatic cases, when expensive

99. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
100. Unlike most goods, complex information is vulnerable to rather dramatic depreciation
and even obsolescence. If information, such as a research study, is relatively complicated, then
its credibility can be reduced simply through strategic efforts to attack the methods,
experimental design, or integrity of the researcher. Unless onlookers have the time and
wherewithal to investigate such attacks, the value of original studies will be reduced. Investing
in ends-oriented research that is intended to refute previous findings can diminish, however
temporarily, the value of a research study. For the breadth and sophistication of these efforts,
see infra notes 107–31 and accompanying text. Cf. infra note 404 and accompanying text
(discussing the scientific community’s heavy reliance on conflict disclosures to avoid some of
these problems).
101. Generally, one would expect it to be in an actor’s best interest to make this investment
if the loss that is expected from the information is greater than the costs of conducting
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liability or regulations could result from an objective assessment of
the externalities, actors could invest quite a lot to discredit third-party
research and obscure research results. In such instances, even
delaying the general acceptance of third-party research can produce
sufficient returns to make an aggressive and organized campaign of
obfuscation and obstruction worthwhile.102
Actors have developed a number of imaginative approaches to
obscure or discredit potentially troublesome third-party research
suggesting that their activities cause harm. The easiest approach is for
an actor simply to publicize only the positive information about a
product or activity, while keeping potentially damaging information
private. Because actors control access to key information, this tactic
allows them to present a misleadingly positive account of the
externalities associated with their products and activities that helps to
offset damaging research produced by outsiders. Various accounts
exist of industry actors who selectively publish the positive studies
within their control, while concealing or prematurely halting
unfavorable research.103 Actors can also take advantage of their

discrediting operations times the expected benefits of these discrediting projects. Actors will
thus invest in discrediting projects if expected loss from undisturbed information > [(costs of
discrediting x expected benefits from discrediting) – losses if discrediting strategy is revealed] x
high discount rate. If the actor enjoys asymmetric information that is useful to the discrediting,
then the costs of conducting the attacks are likely lower. See supra notes 90–97 and
accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Gordon C. Rausser et al., Information Asymmetries, Uncertainties, and
Cleanup Delays at Superfund Sites, 35 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 48, 49 (1998) (arguing that
potentially responsible parties at Superfund sites may use their asymmetric information
regarding their contributions to a site to delay EPA investigation and cleanup because delay
brings great cost savings); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The
Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 737–39 (making the case for
how increased profits resulting from delay in regulation make it profitable in many cases for
industry to judicially challenge regulatory requirements, regardless of the expected outcome on
the merits).
103. One industry that has engaged in such conduct is the asbestos industry. The record of
asbestos manufacturers’ attempts to conceal or downplay the hazards of asbestos is well
documented. See generally BRODEUR, supra note 35 (chronicling litigation against the asbestos
industry). Some of the more dramatic examples include animal studies on asbestosis in the
1930s, the findings of which, by agreement, belonged to the investors until they agreed to
disclose them to the public, id. at 118–19; notes detailing Johns-Manville Co.’s health review
committee meeting during which executives “developed a corporate policy of not informing sick
employees of the precise nature of their health problems for fear of workmen’s-compensation
claims and lawsuits,” id. at 145; and successful company efforts to persuade the editor of a trade
magazine that growing scientific studies on “asbestosis . . . [should] receive the minimum of
publicity,” id. at 116–17.
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superior expertise by exaggerating the positive attributes of their
products or activities in ways that could be disproved only through
104
significant investigative efforts. In some cases, actors have even
managed to subvert third-party efforts to gather needed information
by taking advantage of their ability to control the activity causing the
harm. For example, in enforcement settings, actors have temporarily
105
halted problematic activities during government inspections. In
other cases, manufacturers have gone so far as to tamper with legally
required pollution control monitors.106
If the risks associated with third-party research are great enough,
some actors may also find it necessary to undertake a more
affirmative campaign of disinformation and obfuscation.107
Manufacturing scientific controversy appears to be an established

Similar tactics have been used in other industries. For example, the manufacturer of the
Dalkon Shield concealed evidence of that product’s dangerousness. See, e.g., Tetuan v. A.H.
Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1240 (Kan. 1987) (awarding punitive damages based on corporate
misconduct, including evidence that A.H. Robins “commissioned studies on the Dalkon Shield
which it dropped or concealed when the results were unfavorable” and “consigned hundreds of
documents to the furnace”); cf. MINTZ, supra note 53, at 122 (referencing a memo by Kenneth
Moore, the project coordinator of Robins’ Dalkon Shield, reporting that Robins’ main purpose
in funding research was “to make available for publication extremely good Dalkon Shield
results“). The breast implant industry has engaged in similar conduct. See Hopkins v. Dow
Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1119, 1127–28 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming a punitive damage award
based in part on evidence that the defendant company concealed the adverse results of clinical
studies and knew that long-term studies were needed). The tobacco industry vigorously
concealed its research on the carcinogenic and addictive properties of cigarettes. See, e.g.,
STANTON GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS 15 (1996) (concluding that by the early
1960s Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation and its parent, British American Tobacco,
“had developed a sophisticated understanding of nicotine pharmacology” but did not disclose
this understanding to consumers); id. at 58–107 (outlining documentary evidence of the tobacco
industry’s knowledge of and research on the addictive properties of nicotine); HILTS, supra note
35, at 38–40 (describing both the cover-up of rich research conducted on the carcinogenic
properties of cigarettes and Brown & Williamson’s “document retention” policy that involved
shipping all such research and underlying documentation out of the country).
104. See, e.g., Shankar Vedantam, Antidepressant Makers Withhold Data on Children,
WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2004, at A1 (describing the only partial publication and dissemination of
clinical trials studying the effectiveness of specific antidepressant drugs on children and
revealing that some studies yielding negative results had not been published).
105. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Keith Schneider, Coal Company Admits Safety Test Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
19, 1991, at A14 (reporting that since 1980 six mining companies have been convicted for
tampering with devices that monitor levels of coal dust in mines).
107. The tobacco industry’s broad and expensive campaign against public science provides
the most familiar and disturbing account of this strategy. See generally HILTS, supra note 35, at
6, 8–12 (describing how tobacco officials’ strategy in 1953 was to develop “comprehensive and
authoritative scientific material which completely refutes the health charges”).
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strategy. For example, even Frank Luntz, a prominent Republican
Party consultant, openly recommends promoting scientific
controversy as a strategy for justifying President George W. Bush’s
position on global warming:
Voters believe that there is no consensus about global warming
within the scientific community. Should the public come to believe
that the scientific issues are settled, their views about global
warming will change accordingly. Therefore, you need to continue to
make the lack of scientific certainty a primary issue in the
108
debate, . . .

Discrediting damaging independent research can become a collective
endeavor when multiple actors with a common interest agree to share
the costs of the discrediting.109 In response to the highly influential Six
Cities epidemiology study used by the EPA to revise its particulate
standard, more than six hundred potentially affected industries from
the petroleum, automobile, and other business sectors organized and
formed the “Air Quality Standards Coalition” in order to criticize the
Six Cities research.110
108. Frank Luntz, Straight Talk, The Environment: A Cleaner, Safer, Healthier America
137 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal). The quotation comes
from a memo by consultant Frank Luntz to Republican policymakers obtained by the
Environmental
Working
Group
and
posted
on
its
website
at
http://www.ewg.org/briefings/luntzmemo/pdf/luntzresearch_environment.pdf (last visited July
27, 2004). See also Paul Krugman, Editorial, Salt of the Earth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003, at A21
(quoting the Lutz memo on global warming and reiterating, based on the evidence, that much of
the appearance of uncertainty is manufactured: “Very few independent experts now dispute
that manmade global warming is happening, and represents a serious threat.”).
109. Collective efforts organized by the tobacco industry, the Center for Regulatory
Effectiveness, and the Competitive Enterprise Institute provide particularly good examples of
what can be accomplished when stakeholders pool their resources. See, e.g., GLANTZ ET AL.,
supra note 103, at 108–09 (recounting that, in the wake of having conducted scientific research
illuminating the deleterious effects of tobacco use, the tobacco industry did not disclose these
studies but engaged in two simultaneous campaigns: “an internal research campaign to develop
a ‘safe’ cigarette and an external public relations campaign to convince the public that cigarettes
had not been proven dangerous to health”); Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, at
http://www.thecre.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(describing the organization, which engages in collective attacks on publicly produced science
and which sponsors legislation (thus far passed in the form of appropriations riders), providing
more legal mechanisms for challenging public science); Competitive Enterprise Institute, at
http://www.cei.org (last visited Mar. 5, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (describing
the organization, which filed a Data Quality petition against multiple agencies on global
warming—presumably on behalf of a collective of affected industries).
110. See, e.g., Richard Dahl, Spheres of Influence, 105 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1306, 1306
(1997) (describing the industries’ Coalition and their efforts to obtain the raw data from the Six
Cities Study); Jocelyn Kaiser, Showdown Over Clean Air Science, 277 SCIENCE 466, 466 (1997)

WAGNER FINAL.DOC

2004]

2/9/2005 11:06 AM

COMMONS IGNORANCE

1653

More aggressive efforts to manufacture uncertainty take on a
variety of forms, but they generally involve either blatant,
underhanded attacks on third-party research or investments in
“counter-research” carefully designed to produce results more
favorable to an actor’s interests. Although in many areas there is no
scientific consensus about certain issues and presenting another side
of an issue is legitimate, the manufactured critiques and studies
discussed here involve a strategic, ends-oriented effort to undermine
credible research and obscure scientific consensus. Many actors have
launched a frontal assault on academic or public research that
documents how their products or activities harm the public health or
the environment. In some cases, because of the inherent complexity
of the studies, even high-quality technical research can be at least
temporarily discredited by making groundless challenges about the
methods used, the reliability of the data collected, the qualifications
of the researcher conducting the study, or by suggesting that the
review processes are flawed.111 These “hired gun” attacks on thirdparty research are common in high-stakes cases when acceptance of

(describing the activities of the Coalition (although stating that it has only five hundred
industrial members) and quoting it as taking the position that the science underlying the EPA’s
particulate rule is “totally inadequate”). The American Iron and Steel Institute, presumably one
of the members of the Coalition, hired an epidemiologist from the University of Washington,
Suresh Moolgavkar, specifically to critique the Six Cities Study. Hillary J. Johnson, The Next
Battle Over Clean Air, ROLLING STONE, 48, 52 (2001). Finally, the Competitive Enterprise
Institute (an organization that does not disclose its sources of funding on its website) published
a report critical of the Six Cities Study in 2001. KAY JONES & BEN LIEBERMAN, THE ONGOING
CLEAN-AIR DEBATE: THE SCIENCE BEHIND EPA’S RULE ON SOOT (2001), available at
http://www.cei.org/PDFs/ongoing_clean_air_debate.pdf.
111. Credible studies, traditional research methods, and respected researchers (from the
perspective of a “realist-constructionist”) may all be deconstructed if those judging or
scrutinizing the science do not respect the vulnerable, socially constructed features of traditional
research methods, especially those unique to particular disciplines. See generally STEVEN COLE,
MAKING SCIENCE 12–13 (1992). To require the testing and validation of each assumption that
underlies a study would result in an infinite regress—the never-ending exposure of assumptions
that lack validation. To circumvent this logical problem, established scientific communities
informally agree on “accepted methods,” some of which necessarily are based on consensual,
but technically unvalidated, assumptions. Because they are consensual within the scientific
community, once these consensual decisions gain acceptance scientists tend to take them for
granted as necessary features of research. Unfortunately, outsiders and enemies of a particular
research study are unlikely to give deference to accepted scientific methods based on consensual
but technically unsupportable assumptions, leaving the research vulnerable to damaging
deconstruction by persons seeking to discredit it. See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Research Subpoenas
and the Sociology of Knowledge, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95, 99–100 (Summer 1996).
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112
the results could lead to shattering liability and publicity. The
tobacco industry is the most notorious with respect to using this tactic,
but it is by no means alone.113 Individual companies or trade
114
115
116
associations engaged in the production of oil, lead, asbestos, and
117
beryllium have all actively worked to discredit research that, if
widely understood and accepted, would likely result in substantial
118
liability, regulation, and market costs.

112. To be sure, some of this adversarial vetting improves the quality of science. See, e.g.,
Jocelyn Kaiser, Synergy Paper Questioned at Toxicology Meeting, 275 SCIENCE 1879 (1997)
(discussing the scientific controversy surrounding potential human health effects of endocrine
disrupters and the uproar created by a recent Tulane study on disrupters that was subsequently
withdrawn because it misreported the research). But when the motive for vetting is an endsoriented attack on specific results, the vetting is not beneficial and can distract or impair the
value of information by focusing users on trivialities and artificial or minor quibbles. See supra
note 111. Unlike with routine scientific vetting, in these efforts to discredit research, the
attackers (or hired attackers) will work backwards to try to find a problem or alternative result
that is more hospitable to their own interests. This is not how scientists review each others’
work, and it does not produce outcomes that are randomly distributed along the result
spectrum. In addition, because the attacker is biased with regard to the outcome, this type of
scientific disagreement violates one of the premiere tenets of science. See, e.g., Robert K.
Merton, The Normative Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 267, 275–77 (J.
Gaston ed. 1973).
113. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, On the Prospect of “Daubertizing” Judicial Review of
Risk Assessment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 155, 179–99 (Fall 2003) (documenting the
tobacco industry’s attack on a watershed environmental tobacco smoke epidemiology study and
the researcher who conducted it).
114. See, e.g., Jeffrey Short, Abstract, Stifling Science: Attacks on Government Scientists
After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, in Speaker Information, Center for Science in the Public
Interest, Conference on Conflicted Science: Corporate Influence on Scientific Research and
Science Based Policy 34 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(asserting that “motivated by litigation” over the Exxon spill, Exxon aggressively challenged the
documentation of harm caused by the spill, using methods that included “misrepresentation of
government data, manipulating agendas of scientific meetings, abuse of the scientific peerreview process, abuse of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), shadowing
field studies, and groundless allegation of scientific misconduct”), available at
http://www.cspinet.org/integrity/cs_conference_abstract.pdf.
115. The lead industry’s protracted and multifaceted attack on Dr. Herbert Needleman’s
research published in the New England Journal of Medicine is the most familiar example of this
type of campaign to discredit research. See infra note 119.
116. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
117. The beryllium industry, among other tactics, identifies inevitable assumptions in
research that cannot be rectified and maintains that, because of these gaps, more study is
needed. See, e.g., David Michaels, A Case Study of the Beryllium Industry 2 (2003)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
118. This tactic also is used affirmatively in challenging regulations. For example, virtually
every substantive challenge mounted against an EPA model involves multiple technical
disagreements on virtually every facet of the model. In several cases, moreover, the
disagreements appear to be manufactured challenges that enjoy little support from the record.
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In more than a few cases, an attack on the research has evolved
into an attack against the integrity of the researcher as well.
119
harassing
Unsupported allegations of scientific misconduct,
120
subpoenas or depositions, and burdensome data-sharing requests
(often through public records statutes)121 have all been used to distract
or even intimidate academic or government scientists whose research
122
has adverse implications for a company. Exxon, for example, went
to great lengths to discredit researchers who were assessing
environmental damages resulting from the Exxon-Valdez spill,
including filing harassing subpoenas seeking all records, data, and
See Thomas O. McGarity & Wendy E. Wagner, Legal Aspects of the Regulatory Use of
Environmental Modeling, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10751, 10757–70. In Power Co. v.
EPA, 135 F.3d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1998), for example, electric utilities and industry groups
challenged various aspects of the EPA’s inputs to its models: the court found all of these
challenges without basis and sometimes without support even in the briefs. Challenges rejected
included comprehensiveness of the model’s database, id. at 804, minor assumptions in the model
unsupported by the data, id. at 805, significance of certain variables such as cost, id. at 813,
weighting of smaller boilers, id., and the calculation of the cost-effectiveness of certain burners
and processes, id. at 814–16.
119. Dr. Herbert Needleman, whose research on child lead poisoning was pivotal in the
EPA’s lead phase-out of gasoline, was alleged to have engaged in misconduct. The accusations
of misconduct, brought by scientists who consulted with the lead industry, were without merit
and he was cleared of wrongdoing. Herbert L. Needleman, Salem Comes to the National
Institute of Health: Notes From Inside the Crucible of Scientific Integrity, 90 PEDIATRICS 977
(1992); Joseph Palca, Lead Researcher Confronts Accusers in Public Hearing, 256 SCIENCE 437
(1992); Gary Putka, Professor’s Data On Lead Levels Cleared By Panel, WALL ST. J., May 27,
1992, at B5.
120. See infra note 352 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Paul M. Fischer, Science and Subpoenas: When Do the Courts Become
Instruments of Manipulation?, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 159 (Summer 1996)
(describing a subpoena by R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company for confidential information used
in a controversial and critical research study); Steven Wing, The “Chilling Effect” on
Environmental Health Research: Industry Tactics and Institutional Disincentives, in Speaker
Information, Conference on Conflicted Science, supra note 114, at 36 (detailing how
“[f]ollowing [the] release of a study describing [the] health impacts of living near an industrial
swine operation, pork industry lawyers threatened to sue University of North Carolina
researchers for defamation and demanded participant records that had been obtained under
promise of confidentiality [through the Public Records Statute of North Carolina]”).
122. For more examples of efforts to discredit researchers by insinuating that their research
is not competent, see generally McGarity, supra note 113. There are also individual accounts
about firms that have captured government officials and convinced them to suppress publication
of adverse findings from government scientists. See, e.g., JoAnn M. Burkholder, Industry
Responses to Publicized Links Between Water Quality Degradation and Concentrated Animal
Feeding Operations, Remarks at the Conference on Conflicted Science: Corporate Influence on
Scientific Research and Science-Based Policy, The Center for Science in the Public Interest
(July 11, 2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (discussing this problem with government
scientist Dr. James Zahn, who conducted research on the effects of Concentrated Feeding
Operations for Swine in North Carolina).
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123
ongoing research. Research on R.J. Reynolds’ use of the “Joe
Camel” logo to induce teens to smoke threatened Reynolds to such
an extent that the company attacked the individual researchers as
well as their research. In an effort to halt this research, which was
ultimately successful, the company filed harassing subpoenas and
state public records requests seeking the release of confidential
information, such as names and addresses of the children involved in
the study. Reynolds also instigated scientific misconduct proceedings
against the researchers, which were ultimately dismissed as without
basis.124
In addition to attacking the credibility of the research and in
some cases the researcher, affected actors have also financed counterresearch designed to refute third-party research, either by producing
different results or by suggesting that the results of the independent
125
research cannot be reproduced —a devastating critique within the
126
scientific community. By hiring scientists willing to “collaborate”
closely with the sponsoring industry (under contracts that require

123. See, e.g., Steven Picou, Compelled Disclosure of Scholarly Research: Some Comments
on “High Stakes Litigation,” 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 155 (Summer 1996) (describing
how third-party subpoenas served on his research relevant to the Exxon oil spill litigation
“permanently disrupted” his research project “due to the constant need to respond to motions
and affidavits,” and how Exxon worked to deconstruct his research in order to undercut the
plaintiffs’ evidence and call into question his professional integrity); Short, supra note 114
(documenting Exxon’s aggressive challenge to the documentation of harm caused by the spill).
For an example of a critique of the integrity of government-paid scientists by an Exxon-paid
scientist, see J.A. Wiens, Oil, Seabirds, and Science. The Effects of the EVOS, 46 BIOSCIENCE
587, 594 (1996).
124. Fischer, supra note 121, at 159.
125. See, e.g., Charles H. Peterson et al., The Joint Consequences of Multiple Components of
Statistical Sampling Designs, 231 MARINE ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 309 (2002) (arguing that
Exxon-paid scientists manipulated sampling designs to reach desirable conclusions).
126. See, e.g., MUNDY, supra note 90, at 115 (discussing in detail the manufacturer of FenPhen’s strategy for research on its controversial drug, suggesting that the manufacturer first
“[p]roduce[d] studies [showing] no link or only a minimal link with valve disease” and then
“[r]aise[d] questions about the validity of the research done at the Mayo Clinic and Fargo”);
Deborah E. Barnes & Lisa A. Bero, Industry-Funded Research and Conflict of Interest: An
Analysis of Research Sponsored by the Tobacco Industry Through the Center for Indoor Air
Research, 21 J. HEALTH POL. & L. 515, 518–30 (1996) (concluding that the tobacco industry’s
sponsorship of the Center for Indoor Air Research (CIAR) compromised CIAR’s stated
mission of high-quality, objective research because of evidence of a conflict of interest in
CIAR’s choice of projects and its framing of research questions (i.e., attempting to show that
poor nutrition, occupation, or genetic predisposition could cause the same diseases attributed to
smoking) and in the discovery of likely data fabrication in CIAR studies that produced results
more favorable to the tobacco industry). When an original database is public, actors can attack
the public research more cheaply by commissioning consultants to statistically reanalyze (called
“crunching”) data until they produce favorable results.
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sponsor control of the research), sponsors historically have been able
to exert dramatic control over the outcome of research, to the point
of designing studies, framing research questions, and even editing and
127
ghostwriting articles. Sponsors also routinely reserve the right to
suppress publication of research that they fund and are not reticent to
use this right if study results are adverse to their interests.128 Some
sponsors do not stop at merely funding, influencing, and controlling
research. These sponsors have successfully published the same study
in different journals under different author names with no crossreferences, making it appear that research support favoring their
product or activity is based on several independent studies, rather
than simply a rereporting of the same findings.129 Because the
scientific community generally deems commissioned studies less
objective than independent research, scientific journals increasingly
127. See generally SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE
LURE OF PROFITS CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? (2003) (discussing this problem
throughout the book with considerable support). One of the editors of the Journal of the
American Medical Association (JAMA) has argued that ghostwriting is occurring in biomedical
articles at an alarming rate. Companies will pay prestigious big names who have not worked on
studies to appear on the byline in the companies’ place. Drummond Rennie et al., When
Authorship Fails: A Proposal to Make Contributors Accountable, 278 JAMA 579, 580 (1997). As
a result, some prominent research journals refuse to publish literature reviews or editorials by
an author with a conflict of interest in the outcome, because the extent and effect of the author’s
bias is difficult to catch through the usual methods of replication and validation familiar to
science. See, e.g., Int’l Comm. of Med. Journal Editors, Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts
Submitted to Biomedical Journals: Writing and Editing for Biomedical Publication, at
http://www.icmje.org (Oct. 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“Disclosure of [conflicts
of interest] is also important in connection with editorials and review articles, because it is [sic]
can be more difficult to detect bias in these types of publications than in reports of original
research.”). There is also some literature finding, through statistics, that commissioned research
is generally of lower quality than noncommissioned research, at least for the research
commissioned by the tobacco industry. E.g., Deborah Barnes & Lisa Bero, Abstract, Scientific
Quality of Original Research Articles on Environmental Tobacco Smoke, 6 TOBACCO CONTROL
19 (1997).
128. See, e.g., Bruce M. Psaty & Drummond Rennie, Stopping Medical Research to Save
Money: A Broken Pact with Researchers and Patients, 289 JAMA 2128, 2128–29 (2003)
(explaining that Apotex Inc. stopped two trials that were intended to identify adverse effects
from an iron-chelation therapy, and that shortly thereafter the company issued legal warnings,
under the guise of “confidentiality,” to prevent the principal investigator from publishing the
results or disclosing risks to patients); see also supra note 92 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Drummond Rennie, Fair Conduct and Fair Reporting of Clinical Trials, 282
JAMA 1766 (1999) (discussing the overpublishing—without cross-referencing—of clinical trials
with specific examples from the literature); Rennie et al., supra note 127, at 580 (arguing that
repeated publication of a single study “with or without minor additions, inflates bibliographies
and is common,” and that “[w]hen similar parts of the same trial are published repeatedly under
different authors’ names, without cross-referencing, the record is distorted in the name of
promotion, and meta-analysis is confounded to the detriment of care”).
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require disclaimers of funding and author affiliation as a condition to
130
To circumvent this disclosure requirement, some
publication.
sponsors have developed ways to “launder” their research support
through nonprofit “. . . shells, creating the illusion that they
themselves play no role in research that supports their interests.”131
Actors have also commissioned review articles and convened expert
panels that purport to summarize existing research on a topic—such
as the health effects of environmental tobacco smoke—even though,
in reality, the commissioned review articles or reports are intended
(and contractually guaranteed) to portray existing research in the
light most favorable to the sponsor.132
Unfortunately, the scientific community is generally not involved
in refuting this manufactured controversy. Because much strategically
produced research is of an applied nature, academic scientists, who
are most interested in developments pertaining to basic research and
scientific theory, are not likely to read, challenge, or attempt to

130. See, e.g., Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of
Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 337 (1992) (describing the studies that Merrell conducted
after litigation in Bendectin cases as a “lose-lose proposition” because “[i]f they showed an
effect, the studies would be used against the company” and if they did not “[a]ny slight technical
flaw in the design or execution of the experiment would be exploited by plaintiffs to undermine
Merrell’s findings”).
131. See, e.g., Alicia Mundy, Hot Flash, Cold Cash: How a Once-Respected Women’s Group
Went through The Change—With the Help of Drug Industry Money, WASH. MONTHLY,
Jan./Feb. 2003, at 35 (reporting on drug companies’ influence on a nonprofit called the Society
for Women’s Health Research, which includes substantial corporate giving, sitting on the
“corporate” board, and is ultimately reflected in the Society’s position on various issues).
132. The skillful use of review articles has been identified as one strategy used by at least the
tobacco industry. Deborah E. Barnes & Lisa A. Bero, Why Review Articles on the Health Effects
of Passive Smoking Reach Different Conclusions, 279 JAMA 1566 (1998) (finding that the most
strongly supported explanation for the discrepancy in reviews assessing the impact of passive
smoking was whether or not they were written by authors affiliated with the tobacco industry).
Some journals will not accept these commissioned review articles, although the ability of
journals to police conflict disclosures is limited. See supra note 127.
The creation of handpicked or “stacked” expert panels is even more commonplace. See,
e.g., GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 103, at 32–33 (summarizing that the Tobacco Industry Research
Committee (TIRC, later renamed Council for Tobacco Research (CTR)) was formed jointly by
tobacco companies with the publicly identified purpose of “fund[ing] independent scientific
research” on hazards of cigarettes, whereas internal documents reflect that its true purpose was
“to convince the public that the hazards of smoking had not been definitively proven”);
RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES 164–67, 205–12, 227–29, 466–68 (1996) (describing the
activities and mission of the tobacco industry’s TIRC/CTR); MUNDY, supra note 90, at 119–21
(discussing how the manufacturer of Fen-Phen convened an expert panel to review the drug, but
that many of the experts selected had allegiances to the company).
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133
Moreover, in contrast to
replicate the commissioned results.
federally funded research, private research is not subject to the
scientific-misconduct or research-objectivity regulations promulgated
by the U.S. Office of Research Integrity.134 Thus, virtually all quality
checks on much of this “offscreen” research depend on the rigor of
scientific journals and their peer review processes. Yet deficiencies in
these processes have been well documented.135 Thus, for much
research on the harms created by externalities, actors with a sufficient
stake in the outcome and with the financial wherewithal to exert
influence can significantly affect the trajectory of scientific
knowledge, at least in the short term.

C. Exceptions to the General Rule
It may not always be in a rational actor’s interest to perpetuate
ignorance about the social costs of its activities.136 If an actor loses
when the safety of its activities is not adequately assessed, the
incentives are obviously reversed. For example, legal rules that
presume the worst can create powerful incentives to conduct
research.137 Under these circumstances, because research might
produce good news that lessens liability or compliance costs, or at

133. See, e.g., James S. Coleman, Policy Research in the Social Sciences, in COMM’N ON THE
OPERATION OF THE SENATE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., POLICY ANALYSIS ON MAJOR ISSUES 25,
27–29, 40 (Comm. Print 1977) (contrasting policy research from “discipline research” and
discussing how the incentives for conducting policy research lie predominantly outside of the
scientific community); DANIEL SAREWITZ, FRONTIERS OF ILLUSION: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY,
AND THE POLITICS OF PROGRESS 98 (1996) (“[T]he science community . . . ascribes the greatest
intellectual and social prestige to basic or ‘pure’ research—the source of new knowledge—while
viewing the role of applied research and technology development as more concrete, less
difficult, and therefore less intrinsically worthy.”).
134. See Responsibility of PHS Awardee and Applicant Institutions for Dealing With and
Reporting Possible Misconduct in Science, 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.101–50.105 (2003); HSS
Responsibility of Applicants For Promoting Objectivity in Research for Which PHS Funding Is
Sought, 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.601–50.607 (2003).
135. See, e.g., DARYL E. CHUBIN & EDWARD J. HACKETT, PEERLESS SCIENCE: PEER
REVIEW AND THE U.S. SCIENCE POLICY 94 (1990) (identifying the limitations of scientific peer
review, including presenting evidence of caprice and bias, such as favoring famous authors, that
sometimes play a larger role than the quality of the authors’ work in a peer reviewer’s
evaluation); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS
69–71 (1990) (discussing studies that purport to show the influence of various forms of bias in
the peer review process).
136. If there is no perceived benefit or cost-effective way to combat publicly disseminated
research regarding an actor’s externalities, the actor will simply not invest in challenging the
research.
137. See also infra Part IV.C.2.
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least better news than existing status quo assumptions, it pays to
invest in research. The breast implant and Bendectin companies’
investment in additional research in response to plaintiff verdicts
138
provides a case in point. Similarly, an actor may worry that local
communities will express animosity about its pollution through costly
lawsuits and picketing, both of which are potentially damaging to the
actor’s corporate image. In such cases, an actor may seek to stave off
these potentially costly problems by conducting a legitimate and
publicly accessible self-study. More subtle but perhaps much more
powerful are the incentives created by worst-case cancer assumptions
(i.e., precautionary policies) used by the EPA to regulate
carcinogens.139 The EPA’s default assumption that there is a linear
dose-response relationship for cancer, with the lowest doses still
leading to harm, has provided a strong incentive for actors to
collectively fund research on carcinogenesis.140 This research, set
against the worst-case background, can only be expected to produce
good news relative to regulatory standards set at zero. In fact, at least
some of the advances in understanding cancer caused by

138. See Rebecca S. Dresser et al., Breast Implants Revisited: Beyond Science on Trial, 1997
WISC. L. REV. 705, 743–44 (documenting and citing others who observed that scientific research
on the adverse effects of breast implants and Bendectin peaked after and as a result of the
unfavorable products liability litigation).
139. In extrapolating from high-dose studies on animals to possible low-dose effects, it is
necessary to select some type of dose-response curve, but because there is generally no way to
study low-dose effects, the appropriate curve must be based on policy considerations. As a
working default dose-response curve, the EPA selects a linear curve for strong and intermediate
carcinogens and other select substances, meaning that the response to a toxin increases in direct
proportion to the dose of the toxin. See, e.g., Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk
Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960, 17,981 (Apr. 23, 1996) (recommending this “default”
assumption of linearity when there is evidence of adverse effects but not evidence to support an
assumption that the dose-response relationship is nonlinear); id. at 17,986–90 (listing seven
examples of types of substances subject to risk assessment and recommending a linear default
for four of the seven types of substances); see also National Primary Drinking Water
Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7004 (Jan. 22, 2001) (“The use of a linear procedure to
extrapolate from a higher, observed data range to a lower range beyond observation is a science
policy approach that has been in use by Federal agencies for four decades.”). Also central to this
working assumption is the corollary assumption that animals provide a reliable surrogate for
assessing the effects of a toxin on humans. E.g., COMM. ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS
AIR POLLUTANTS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK
ASSESSMENT 86 (1994) [hereinafter NRC, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT].
140. See, e.g., Sean M. Hays et al., Potential Uses of PBPK Modeling to Improve the
Regulation of Exposure to Toxic Compounds, RISK POL’Y REP. (Inside Wash. Publishers,
Arlington, D.C.), Dec. 18, 1998, at 37 (industry consultant describes and advocates greater use
of intricate and assumption-laden modeling for estimating cancer risks, a technique that is still
limited by the unavailability of data for most chemicals and pollutants).
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environmental contaminants is undoubtedly due in part to private
sector investments in research encouraged by the EPA’s protective
141
regulations.
Although certain markets might also reward as heroes those
companies that take proactive steps to ensure that their products and
activities do not create harmful externalities,142 in the environmental
law context such protective actions often follow, rather than precede,
laws that require actors to avoid these harmful activities.143 For
example, regulations passed under the Marine Mammal Protection
Act (MMPA) prohibit U.S. tuna companies from catching tuna with
nets that injure dolphins.144 When there was a public outcry because
tuna was still being caught by fleets that were not complying with
these requirements, Congress passed a second law providing for the
use of “dolphin safe” labels to allow consumers to identify tuna
145
caught with dolphin safe nets. Faced with a public boycott if they
continued to purchase from tuna suppliers who harmed dolphin,
companies like StarKist supported and even encouraged such a
federal labeling law. Federal labeling requirements could help them
regain disenfranchised consumers, while at the same time portraying
the tuna companies as corporate philanthropists who voluntarily
relinquished profits to save dolphins.146 Thus, despite preexisting laws

141. The American Chemistry Council’s Long Range Initiative Program (LRI) exemplifies
industry’s research investments in understanding the mechanisms of carcinogenesis. See, e.g.,
American Chemistry Council, Long Range Initiative (LRI) program, available at
http://www.uslri.org; LRI, The Chloroform Story: How Science Can Improve Regulatory
Decision-making, LRI PERSPECTIVES, Sept. 2003 (describing industry-funded research on
chloroform that revealed that higher concentrations of chlorine were safe for public health in
contrast to the EPA’s assumption that there was no safe dose of chlorine), available at
http://www.uslri.org/documents/cat_25/doc_362.pdf.
142. For an elaboration on when there might be competition to be heroic, see Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 369–72
(1997).
143. Cf. supra note 39 and infra Part II.A.
144. See, e.g., Taking and Related Acts Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations by
Tuna Purse Seine Vessels in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean, 50 C.F.R. § 216.24 (restricting
the use of purse-seine nets in the eastern, tropical Pacific Ocean); see also Marine Mammal
Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371 and 1374 (2000).
145. See Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000); see also
Susan C. Alker, Comment, The Marine Mammal Protection Act: Refocusing the Approach to
Conservation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 527, 557 (1996) (describing the public outcry that led to
legislation for “labeling tuna cans as dolphin safe”).
146. See, e.g., Alker, supra note 145, at 557–58 (discussing StarKist and several other tuna
companies’ reaction to the public boycott and observing that these tuna companies came away
“looking like ‘good guys’ who cared more about dolphins than profits”). Shortly after adopting
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that had already attempted to require dolphin-safe tuna in the U.S.,
StarKist and other tuna producers were viewed as corporate heroes.
Additionally, of course, a firm might simply not act rationally
and might voluntarily produce information on externalities, even if
such information would potentially reduce profits and increase
147
Indeed, a growing body of literature suggests that
liability.
corporate managers respond to a variety of stimuli when making
decisions.148 To the extent that a corporation does not consider its
immediate financial interests in deciding whether to voluntarily
produce information regarding its potential externalities, then, it
might not follow the rational paths of action previously discussed.

this dolphin safe policy, StarKist used it to its advantage in promotional materials, prompting
one competitor to note, “They took a half-page ad in the New York Times and they only
stopped murdering the dolphins the week before.” Michael J. McDermott, Charlie and the
Mermaid Sing a Different Tuna; Tuna Marketing and Environmental Policy, FOOD & BEV.
MKTG., Sept. 1990, at 24.
147. This possibility is lessened somewhat by the limited legal requirements that encourage
this production, see infra Part II, and the growing number of legal incentives that discourage
information production, see supra Parts I.A, I.B; infra Part III. The possibility that firms might
voluntarily produce information about how their products, wastes, or activities harm health and
the environment also seems diminished by the reality that firms might not realize the large
deficits in information. See infra Part IV.A. In fact, it appears that the necessary conditions for
enforcing norms and rewarding compliance are largely absent. For one, it is not clear at what
point the norm to produce information is triggered, or how much information is enough. Also,
as detailed throughout Part I, there is little chance of third parties evaluating whether the norm
has been violated. Thus, at least two of the three conditions for norm-based enforcement are
missing. See McAdams, supra note 142, at 358 (identifying three conditions under which “the
desire for esteem produces a [behavioral] norm” in a given population of individuals: (1) there is
“consensus about the positive or negative esteem worthiness of engaging in [that behavior],” (2)
there is “risk that others will detect whether one engages in [the behavior],” and (3) both the
“consensus and risk of detection [are] well-known within the . . . population”); cf. Clifford
Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental
Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1193–94 (1998) (discussing skepticism that corporations
will comply with environmental laws out of a sense of social responsibility, rather than because
of the threat of sanctions or other deterrents).
148. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 22 (1992) (“[Business informants] claimed that
they and their colleagues took seriously business responsibility, ethics, and obligations . . . to be
responsive to nonshareholding stakeholders in the corporation.”). But see JAMES V. DELONG,
OUT OF BOUNDS, OUT OF CONTROL: REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA 24 (arguing
that the EPA’s “arbitrary enforcement tends to encourage lawbreaking because business
acceptance of the modern environmental ethic depends in part upon reasonableness”).

WAGNER FINAL.DOC

2004]

2/9/2005 11:06 AM

COMMONS IGNORANCE

1663

II. THE LAWS DO NOT REQUIRE THE
PRODUCTION OF NEEDED INFORMATION
Laws that require the production and disclosure of financial
information are considered vital to ensuring a thriving securities
market and strong corporate governance.149 Information on the
potential health and environmental harms caused by dangerous
products and polluting activities seems at least as important for
informed consumer and regulatory decisions. Indeed, the case for
legal intervention is especially compelling for the production of
environmental and health information given the lack of incentives for
private actors to produce this information, and, in some cases, their
parallel inclination to actually discredit the information that is
available.150 Nonetheless, current laws implemented by the EPA
generally do not require information on a given product’s or activity’s
151
risks or harms.
Most environmental laws do aspire to ensure that needed
information on environmental harms is developed and, in some cases,
the laws even demand that actors bear full responsibility for
producing this information. Every major environmental statute
includes among its opening goals a declaration that externalities be
identified and regulated so that the public and the environment will
149. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 734–37 (1984) (discussing, with empirical evidence
(decreased price dispersion), the social benefits of the federal securities laws, in addition to their
benefit to investors); Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance:
You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1335 (1996) (discussing why
corporate financial reporting in the United States “is so much better than that elsewhere, why it
contributes so much to the fairness and efficiency of our financial markets, and most particularly
why it has contributed so much to effective corporate governance and oversight”); Joseph E.
Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics,
115 Q. J. ECON., 1441, 1467–68 (2000) (concluding that “[l]egal institutions—from reporting
requirements to strong fraud laws to laws to protect minority shareholders from the majority—
are all essential parts of a broad system of corporate governance” needed to counteract
problems arising out of asymmetric information and incentives for strategic behavior).
150. See infra Part III.C.
151. This Article considers only the laws administered by the EPA, even though similar
problems may arise in public health programs administered by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration and the Food and Drug Administration and in natural resource
programs administered by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Forest
Service, and various agencies in the Department of the Interior. See also BREYER, supra note
28, at 23–26 (discussing the classic justification for regulation based on preventing negative
spillovers, but neglecting to consider as an added justification for social regulation the goal of
requiring actors who engage in the negative spillovers to produce preliminary information about
their activities, particularly when they enjoy superior information about the activities).
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be fully protected, or at least protected to the extent reasonable or
feasible. These statutes also require actors to actively assist in
ensuring that public health and the environment are adequately
152
protected. In several statutes, in fact, the laws specifically direct the
manufacturers or polluters to produce all needed information on the
safety of their products or activities so that regulators can determine
an appropriate regulatory response.153 In the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA),154 for example, Congress declared as one of the
statutory goals that “adequate [safety] data . . . be developed . . . and
that the development of such data should be the responsibility of
those who manufacture and those who process such chemical
substances and mixtures.”155
Despite these noble statutory intentions, however, the
regulation- and litigation-driven implementation of these laws
nevertheless allows actors to escape much of the responsibility for
producing vital information on the externalities that they create.156
152. Virtually all of the environmental laws require at least some actors to identify
themselves as creating an externality, and to explicate the general nature of that externality. See,
e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2000)
(requiring manufacturers of new pesticides to conduct specific tests on the pesticide and obtain
registration from the EPA before marketing the pesticide); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (requiring
manufacturers of new chemicals to submit a premanufacture notification); Clean Water Act
(CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2) (2000) (prohibiting the point source discharge of pollution
without a permit); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6922 (2000) (requiring generators to test their wastes to
determine whether they are hazardous); id. §§ 6923–25 (2000) (requiring transporters and
treatment, storage, and disposal units handling hazardous wastes to self-identify and follow
regulatory requirements); Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(i) (2000) (prohibiting the
emissions of air toxins in major amounts without a permit that specifies emissions limits for the
source); Comprehensive Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9603 (2000) (requiring persons in charge to report releases of reportable quantities of
hazardous substances); Environmental Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act
(EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,002–11,003, 11,022–11,023 (2000) (requiring covered facilities to selfidentify; report their storage, use, and disposal of hazardous substances; and prepare an
emergency response plan). Failure to self-identify can lead to both criminal and civil sanctions.
E.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2000).
153. See infra Part II.A.
154. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2000).
155. Id. § 2601(b)(1).
156. The statutes that are most emphatic in requiring actors to produce information have
not always been written or implemented in ways that ensure production of the needed research.
As discussed at infra Part III.A.1, by requiring only the submission of “available” information
on the safety of new and existing chemicals, TSCA generally provides disincentives for
conducting new, voluntary research on chemical safety. EPCRA is written and implemented in
a similar, perverse fashion. The statute requires some information of the harmful properties of a
substance for the EPA to designate it as one of the chemicals in need of disclosure. See 42
U.S.C. § 11,002(a)(4) (empowering the EPA administrator to designate a substance as
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This Part discusses the shortcomings of the existing environmental
laws in ensuring the production of needed information. The first half
of the Part surveys the limited, affirmative requirements that the laws
do impose on actors for producing information about adverse effects.
The second half then explores the various types of information that
actors are not required to produce, even though much of this
information is privately held and is vital to assessing the harm that
results from private activities.
A. Information That Actors Are Required to Produce
Environmental laws, as currently implemented, limit the
demands placed on actors to account for the harms that their
products and activities create. There are only three circumstances
under which actors are routinely required to produce information
about their externalities, and they are discussed below.
1. Manufacturers of Certain New, Hazardous Products (E.g.,
Pesticides and “Suspect” Toxic Substances) and a Smaller Set of
Existing Hazardous Products Are Required to Conduct Prescribed
Toxicity Tests to Get or Keep Their Products on the Market. EPA
regulations require manufacturers to conduct a series of mandated
toxicological tests and obtain agency approval before marketing a
new pesticide.157 The EPA can also require toxicity testing for existing

hazardous based on its toxicity). Predictably, regulated parties vigorously challenge the listings
as insufficiently supported. The D.C. Circuit agreed for at least one chemical, not appearing to
notice the irony of a disclosure statute that allows polluters to avoid disclosure requirements if
they skillfully avoid researching the safety (or harmfulness) of a toxic pollutant. See Troy v.
Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (rejecting as arbitrary the EPA’s decision to
designate the chemical DMP as hazardous under EPCRA because both of the studies on which
the EPA relied—the only two available studies on DMP—were performed in the Soviet Union
during the 1960s and were insufficiently documented).
157. With only a few exceptions, all new pesticides are required to undergo a relatively
thorough battery of safety tests pursuant to the registration requirements of FIFRA. 7 U.S.C.
§ 136a. Because existing pesticides are grandfathered into the regulatory program and must be
tested after the fact, there is considerably less data available on them. Id. § 136a-1; see also
Neurotoxic Pesticides; Availability of Data Call-In Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 42,945 (Aug. 6, 1999)
(requiring manufacturers of existing pesticides, for the first time, “to conduct acute, sub-chronic,
and developmental neurotoxicity studies” on pesticide products). However, the need to set
pesticide tolerances under the Food Quality Protection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2) (2000), is
causing the EPA to place some additional testing demands on manufacturers of existing
pesticides. See, e.g., Envtl. Prot. Agency, Endocrine Disrupter Screening Program, at
http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/oscpendo/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (providing information on the EPA’s “approach and progress for screening and testing
chemicals for potential endocrine disruption”).
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158
pesticides, although this testing is not automatic and must be
instigated by the agency.159
Testing can also be mandated for toxic substances, although this
160
rarely occurs. If the EPA determines that a new toxic substance

Under FIFRA, the EPA has developed a chart setting out the series of tests that a
manufacturer must conduct before a pesticide is permitted to enter the market. EPA Data
Requirements for Registration, 40 C.F.R. pt. 158 (2003) (setting forth a basic core set of over
one hundred studies that would assist in determining the effects of pesticides); EPA Toxicology
Data Requirements, 40 C.F.R. § 158.340 (providing a table for all testing requirements and
guidelines under FIFRA).
Vigorous testing of new products is justified because, as noted previously, manufacturers
have superior knowledge about product contents and therefore are in the best position to
conduct these tests. In addition, manufacturers can test early in the course of product
development, thereby avoiding the costs associated with marketing a product unlikely to pass
muster with the agency. In some cases, a manufacturer can also use test results to modify a
product’s composition and, in so doing, to reduce its negative environmental impact. Research
on industrial innovation reveals that for chemical products, more than 70 percent of the total
development time (averaging from seventeen months to four or five years) is dedicated to the
final stages of product design—after the product is designed, but before the product is
marketed. See EDWIN MANSFIELD ET AL., RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN THE MODERN
CORPORATION 113–15, 118 (1971) (identifying five stages of the design of a product, beginning
with applied research and ending with manufacturing start-up, and reporting that the final four
stages consume most of the time of product design but can begin only after the product itself has
been determined), quoted in GEORGE EADS & PETER REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS:
CORPORATE RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION 53–54 (1983). The
complementary asymmetries in information discussed in Part I.B.1, supra, make placing the
responsibility on manufacturers for safety testing only that much more cost-effective.
158. This split between testing for old and new products, although problematic from an
informational perspective, is partly justified by the economic gains in testing earlier in the life
cycle and the legal and economic impediments to requiring manufacturers to test products
already on the market. Cf. James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time:
The Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 774 (1983) (“[T]o the extent
that increases in exposure to liability are likely to flow from reasonable efforts by manufacturers
to make their products safer, they discourage manufacturers from engaging at the margin in
precisely the sorts of activities that tort law purports to encourage.”).
159. See supra note 158; infra note 198 and accompanying text.
160. Except for chemicals produced in high volumes and posing a substantial risk of
exposure, as set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(A) (2000), TSCA provides the EPA with
authority to impose testing requirements on new chemicals only if the EPA can demonstrate
that the existing data are “insufficient” to assess the chemical and the EPA has reason to
suspect that the new chemical “may present” a risk or hazard. Id. § 2604(e). To get around the
vicious circle of ignorance built into these regulatory requirements, the EPA has devised a
“suspect” category of chemicals based on their structural activity, which provides some
indication, albeit imperfect, of whether they might be hazardous. If the structure of a chemical
falls into one of these forty-five suspect chemical families, the EPA requires manufacturers to
run what are often rather extensive tests to ensure that the chemical does not pose a risk.
Wendy E. Wagner, The Precautionary Principle and Chemical Regulation in the U.S., 6 HUM.
ECOLOGY RISK ASSESS. 459, 465 (2000). There is even less testing required for existing toxic
substances. See infra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
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poses a potential risk—a determination that is sometimes based solely
on the substance’s chemical structure—the EPA can require the
manufacturer to conduct specific toxicity tests before allowing the
161
chemical to be marketed. The EPA also has the authority to require
additional testing for existing toxic substances, but the agency must
first present evidence that the chemical presents a potential risk to
health or the environment.162 In both cases, the testing is by no means
automatic and, particularly for existing toxic substances, is generally
the exception rather than the rule.163 Manufacturers are also required
to report the “adverse effects” of both pesticides and toxic substances
already on the market, although these reporting requirements are not
easily enforced.164
2. Polluters Who Discharge through a Pipe into Surface Waters
or Emit or Discard into the Outside Air or onto Land More Than a
Threshold Amount of Pollution Must Get a Permit and Report Their
165
Waste Disposal Activities. Current law requires actors to obtain a

161. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT: LEGISLATIVE
CHANGES COULD MAKE THE ACT MORE EFFECTIVE, at 46 (1994) (discussing the lack of
testing required of existing chemicals and reporting that “[a]ccording to EPA officials, the
agency has not used its authority to require more testing, largely because it must undergo a
lengthy and costly rule-making process”).
162. See supra note 152. To avoid challenges under this section, most of the testing
requirements are negotiated by the EPA with manufacturers through voluntary testing
agreements. See, e.g., Holly E. Petitt, Comment, Shifting the Experiment to the Lab: Does EPA
Have a Mandatory Duty To Require Chemical Testing for Endocrine Disruption Effects Under
the Toxic Substances Control Act?, 30 ENVTL. L. 413, 426–27 (2000) (describing the EPA’s
expansive use of these testing agreements).
163. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161, at 46 (observing, based on a study of
TSCA test rules required of existing substances, that “little is known about the effects of many
chemicals used in commerce”). The inadequate state of testing was the major impetus for the
High Productive Volume (HPV) Challenge Program, which involves voluntary agreements
between the EPA and manufacturers to test chemicals produced in high volumes. Information
about the program is available at the EPA website on the HPV Challenge Program, at
http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/chemrtk/volchall.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal). This voluntary agreement was accomplished in part because the EPA has
greater authority under TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(B), to require testing for this set of
chemicals because they are produced in higher volumes and hence the exposure risks are
presumptively greater.
164. FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136d(a)(2) (2000) (“If at any time after the reregistration of a
pesticide the registrant has additional factual information regarding unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment of the pesticide, the registrant shall submit such information to the
[EPA] Administrator.”); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2607(c), (e) (reiterating the recordkeeping and
reporting requirements); see also infra notes 215–17 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1362(12), 1362(14) (2000) (clarifying that the
prohibition on “discharging” pollutants into navigable waters without a permit applies only for
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permit for major pollutant discharges and provide regular selfmonitoring reports that, to the extent possible, account for the
166
contaminants in their waste streams. In addition, the largest
dischargers of contaminants often must install monitoring equipment
on large stacks and pipes within their facilities and are required to
conduct periodic self-inspections on smaller sources within the facility
167
to ensure that the requisite pollution control equipment is in place.
(No monitoring of actual emissions is ordinarily required for small
sources of pollution at these facilities.) Some testing and associated
recordkeeping are also required of industrial facilities before they
send wastes off-site.168 The receiving facilities, which ultimately
dispose, store, or treat these hazardous wastes, are also required to
keep records of their activities and to monitor the environment into
which the treated wastes are discharged.169
To ensure a macroview of the overall magnitude of contaminants
being released into the environment, the Emergency Planning and
170
Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA) requires facilities with
especially large pollution loads to estimate and report the total
amount of pollution that they generate, release, and ship off-site, on a
chemical-by-chemical basis.171 However, these estimates need not be
documented, validated, or peer reviewed; instead, they can be based
172
As a result, there are problems of
on rough estimates.
pollutants discharged through a “discrete conveyance” or point source); RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6922, 6924 (2000) (requiring generators and owners and operators of treatment, storage, and
disposal facilities of hazardous wastes to meet federal standards for operating the respective
facilities, which includes periodically testing the wastes); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(a) (2000)
(requiring Federal Clean Air Act permits only for “major” sources of emissions, including more
dispersed “area” sources or other identified large facilities.)
166. CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a) (requiring permit holders discharging pollutants to keep
records and monitor discharges); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a)(1), (6) (requiring recordkeeping
and regular reporting of hazardous wastes generated); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(3) (requiring
enhanced self-monitoring for major stationary sources). The most thorough discussion of the
self-monitoring requirements in environmental law is Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. & Lee D. Hoffman,
Self-Reporting and Self-Monitoring Requirements Under Environmental Laws, 1 ENVTL. LAW.
681 (1995).
167. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a). Small quantity generators are effectively exempted unless they
produce extremely hazardous wastes. Id. § 6921(d).
169. See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(p), (r), (s), (v).
170. EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11,001–11,050 (2000).
171. EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11,023.
172. The regulated party is only required to make “reasonable estimates” using available
data. If monitoring is not otherwise required by law, the regulated party need not do more than
make a reasonable estimate. Id. § 11,023(g)(2). An EPA study on the quality of data reported to
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underreporting by certain facilities, both with regard to whether they
meet reporting requirements, and with regard to the data that they
173
submit about their polluting activities.
3. When the Accidental Release of a Hazardous Substance
Occurs, Actors Must Report This Release If They Believe It to Exceed
a Specified, Daily “Reportable Quantity.” Actors are required to
report sudden releases of large amounts of hazardous substances
174
from their facilities under threat of civil and criminal penalties. If
responsible for the sudden release, the actor may also be required to
finance a more extensive risk assessment and, ultimately, to pay for
resulting cleanup costs and damages to natural resources.175 Under
these reporting requirements, however, the actor is generally not
required to measure the release directly and is excused from the
obligation to report if the release is less than a threshold amount
176
(ranging between one pound and five thousand pounds in a day).
Due to their superior informational advantages, some actors may

the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) reveals that manufacturers use monitoring data as one of the
bases for estimating annual use, release, and disposal of hazardous substances less than 20
percent of the time, whereas purchase or inventory records are used in making roughly 80
percent of the estimates. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 1996 TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY: DATA
QUALITY REPORT 4-6, tbl.4-1 (1998) [hereinafter EPA TOXIC RELEASE REPORT], available at
http://www.epa.gov/tri/tridata/data_quality_reports/ index.htm.
173. The EPA concludes in its 1996 study of the data quality of the TRI reports that:
Overall, facilities correctly calculated thresholds for 95% of the EPCRA Section 313
chemicals used at the selected industries. However, the frequency of incorrect
threshold determinations suggests that the TRI database might not account for a
significant quantity of chemicals used at reportable levels. More specifically, the site
survey results suggest that for RY 1996, facilities correctly reported for 88% of the
chemicals that actually exceeded thresholds.
EPA TOXIC RELEASE REPORT, supra note 172, at 4-17. There was also systematic
underreporting of air releases and off-site transfers (by as much as half the true amount). Id. at
5-14 tbl.5-2; 6-9 fig.6.2a.
174. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (requiring the “person in charge” of a facility to
report releases of “reportable quantities” of “a hazardous substance”). Under the Clean Water
Act, the actor must report the release of any pollution, including oil and nonhazardous
substances, into navigable waters. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (requiring the “person in
charge” of a vessel or facility to report “any discharge of oil or a hazardous substance” that
exceeds quantities promulgated by the EPA). Notification requirements governing releases
from, and even the physical existence of, underground storage tanks are more expansive under
RCRA, however. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991a and 6991b.
175. The damages for which responsible parties may be liable are set forth in the following
provisions: CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(9), (10); Oil Pollution Act (OPA), 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)
(2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(u)–(w) and 6991d; CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)–(D).
176. Designation of Hazardous Substances, 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 tbl.302.4 (2003).
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succeed in underestimating release levels and forgo reporting with
177
little chance of being caught.
B. Information That Actors Are Not Required to Produce
Except for the circumscribed sets of products and circumstances
described above, actors are generally off the hook when it comes to
identifying and analyzing the harms created by their products and
activities. Even when actors are required to collect such information,
these self-assessments are limited in scope, except for cleanups.178
Typically actors are only required to provide information about the
nature of the activity and not information about its possible adverse
effects.179 Indeed, as discussed in this Section, existing laws allow most
private actors to avoid responsibility for providing any information
about the harms created by their products and activities. It is instead
left to the public, particularly government agencies, to collect and
assess this information.180
1. As Long As Their Activities Do Not Fall into the Discrete Sets
of “Covered” Acts Identified Above, Polluters and Manufacturers of
Hazardous Products Bear No Legal Responsibility for Producing Any

177. See, e.g., Blais et al., supra note 19, at 22–23 (discussing the ways that facilities can
avoid reporting unexpected, large releases of air toxins under the current regulatory system).
178. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
179. All of the pollutant monitoring requirements discussed in notes 165–73 and
accompanying text, supra, require monitoring only of the characteristics of the waste stream, not
of the probable or actual impacts on the environment. At best, responsibility for information
production stops at the discharge point. For a discussion of the limited ecological tests required
of the manufacturers of pesticides and toxic substances, see infra notes 198–99 and
accompanying text.
180. In all cases, it is the regulator, rather than the actor, who identifies the substances that
need monitoring. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(C)–(D) (referencing a House Committee
Report list of 126 toxic substances for which technology-based standards must be promulgated
under the Clean Water Act); Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (2000)
(instructing the EPA to identify and set standards for drinking water contaminants); RCRA, 42
U.S.C. § 6921(a)–(b) (directing the EPA to list hazardous wastes and to develop other
hazardous waste listing criteria); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (2000) (listing 189 air toxins for
which technology-based standards must be promulgated); EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11,023 (2000)
(establishing various reporting requirements for facilities that handle or dispose of more than a
threshold amount of a list of hazardous substances specified by Congress in the authorizing
statute); see also Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, 12 F.3d 353, 358 (2d Cir.
1993) (recounting the EPA’s CWA enforcement position, which allows the release (even in
large quantities) of toxics not listed in a Clean Water Act permit); EPA, Addition of Certain
Chemicals; Toxic Chemical Release Reporting; Community Right-To-Know, 59 Fed. Reg. 1788
(Jan. 12, 1994).

WAGNER FINAL.DOC

2004]

2/9/2005 11:06 AM

COMMONS IGNORANCE

1671

Information about Their Activities and Remain Essentially Invisible to
Regulators and the Public. Although new and some old pesticides
181
must undergo mandatory safety testing at the EPA’s command, no
toxic substance needs to be tested unless there is some evidence that
182
the chemical presents a potential risk. This creates a “Catch 22”
situation, because manufacturers can (and have) challenged the
EPA’s test requirements by arguing that the agency has insufficient
evidence to show a risk of harm sufficient to justify testing.183 This
loophole may help to explain the absence of any toxicity information
on 80 percent of the forty-five thousand products already in
commerce before 1984: under the prevailing interpretation of its
testing authority, the EPA faces significant obstacles in justifying
additional testing requirements for these untested chemicals.184
Industrial actors similarly avoid a variety of disclosure and
regulatory requirements about the disposal of hazardous wastes if
they determine that the wastes do not qualify (in toxicity and volume)
as hazardous. In some cases, they are permitted to use their own
knowledge about the substance as the sole basis for the estimation,
with no requirement for having this knowledge validated by an
185
objective third party. Moreover, as previously noted, actors need
not even monitor or report spills of toxins unless they appear—to the
186
actor—to exceed a threshold amount.
2. Even When There Is Information Indicating That a Particular
Activity or Product Is Likely Causing Harm, There Are a Number of
Circumstances for Which Actors Are Legally Excused from Reporting

181. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
182. Although TSCA does not demand that the EPA produce definitive proof of chemical
hazards, it generally does require that the agency have some scientific evidence that a chemical
presents a risk before imposing testing requirements, warnings, or use restrictions on a
manufacturer. See TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e) (2000) (permitting the EPA to require additional
safety testing if it has reason to suspect that the new or existing chemical “may present” a risk or
hazard); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(B)(i) (placing a lighter burden on the EPA to require
testing on high production volume chemicals, and requiring only that the agency show a
substantial risk of exposure).
183. The EPA must establish a “more-than-theoretical” probability of a hazard or
significant risk of exposure to require additional testing. See, e.g., Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA,
859 F.2d 977, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
184. NRC, TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10; see also supra notes 23–24 and accompanying
text.
185. Criteria For Listing Hazardous Waste, 40 C.F.R. § 262.11 (2003); see also infra notes
252–55 and accompanying text.
186. See supra Part II.A.3.
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or Monitoring Their Harmful Activities. In virtually every state, actors
who use pesticides and fertilizers that wash off into rivers and lakes as
runoff escape accountability for producing information about their
activities, even though these actors appear responsible for more than
187
half of the water pollution in the United States. Likewise, no
monitoring of emissions or ambient air is required for the smaller
sources of toxic air pollution under the Clean Air Act (although some
standard pollution control technologies are usually required), even if
cumulatively these sources account for a significant amount of the
toxic air pollution emitted by large industrial facilities.188 Even actors
who unexpectedly release toxic air pollutants as a result of a
malfunction or change in operations, or who discover that controls
designed to reduce the pollutant load have failed, may not be
required to measure, repair, or even report the problem.189

187. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GREATER EPA LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO REDUCE
NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION 8 (1990) (reporting that nonpoint source pollution is a
predominant problem for 76 percent of the lakes, 65 percent of the streams, and 45 percent of
the estuaries that fail to meet water quality standards).
188. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories,
40 C.F.R. pt. 63 (2003) (providing no requirements for monitoring emissions). But these sources
cumulatively do contribute a significant source of toxic air pollution in some urban areas. For
example, in 1999, roughly one-third of the total emissions of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs)
reported under EPCRA in Texas were from fugitive sources. (The search was done by
requesting details on air emissions through the EPA’s TRI Explorer Database which can be
accessed at http://www.epa.gov/tri/). Indeed, beyond excusing facilities from ambient
monitoring, the regulations provide facilities with fugitive sources wide latitude in selfmonitoring their compliance with required pollution control equipment. Under the regulations,
a facility is required to self-inspect to ensure compliance with technology-based requirements
for fugitive emissions sources only at specified intervals, sometimes as infrequently as once per
year. See Storage Vessel Provisions—Procedures to Determine Compliance, 40 C.F.R.
§ 63.120(a) (requiring visual inspections only once annually for storage vessels). When a facility
catches its own violation, there is a period of time during which the facility can repair the
problem without penalty. Under some fugitive pollution rules, this excused repair time can be as
long as forty-five days. Id. § 63.120(a)(4). Theoretically, then, a facility may be able to emit
HAPs from some fugitive sources in violation of an emissions requirement for as long as one
year and forty-three days without violating air quality regulations. At the same time, these
emissions would probably not be reportable emissions events because they would likely not
exceed the reportable quantity over a twenty-four-hour period.
189. Malfunctions and unexcused releases must be reported only when the operator knows
that the release exceeds the daily reportable quantity set for one or more hazardous substances
under CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2000). As a result, most releases need not be reported at
all. Even when they are reported and the state agency or the EPA determines that they are
preventable, corrective action could be required only if the emissions event produced a risk to
health and safety (a data intensive inquiry). See, e.g., Texas Emissions Event Law, TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.0216(b) (Vernon 2001).
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Actors owning land that leaches toxic substances onto
neighboring land, into public recreational resources, or into other
water supplies (including drinking water supplies), are effectively
immunized from accounting for their pollution if the amount
“appears” smaller than the reportable quantities defined by
regulations.190 The contamination may only be discovered if a
191
governmental entity or other third party identifies the problem.
Under existing regulatory requirements, for example, Beatrice Foods,
a defendant-polluter in the Civil Action drama, was legally able to
ignore the fact that its wastes were dissipating into the groundwater
until someone else discovered them (for example, local families trying
to find a cause for the high rate of childhood cancer in their
community).192 Actors who formerly conducted hazardous disposal
operations on land that they no longer own, or who sent wastes to
dangerous dump sites, also appear to bear no responsibility for
volunteering information about their prior activities, and, given their
liability risks, are undoubtedly disinclined to do so.193
190. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (requiring reports of spills of oil and hazardous
substances only above a threshold amount and, even then, only from vessels or facilities, thus
excluding runoff); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (requiring reports of releases of hazardous
substances only if they exceed a “reportable quantity”).
191. Ultimately, owners can be held liable if their contributions are discovered and lead to
response costs or cleanup activities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9606(a), 9607(a). But until then,
owners are free from responsibility. Recall some of the surprises this limited accountability
brings. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
192. This is the scenario that unfolded in the Beatrice Foods scandal, chronicled in A Civil
Action. See HARR, supra note 21. Companies such as Beatrice Foods can take such a position
provided that they do not have “knowledge” of the release of a reportable quantity of a
hazardous substance, which is based on a daily rate of leaking that seems incapable of measure
because of the passive nature of the release and that in any event is likely below reportable
quantities because of the gradual leaching. See 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (“Any person . . . shall, as
soon as he has knowledge of any release . . . of a hazardous substance from such vessel or facility
in quantities equal to or greater than those determined pursuant to section 102 of this title,
immediately notify the National Response Center . . . of such release.”); Designation of
Hazardous Substances, 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (2003) (listing reportable quantities of various
hazardous substances); see also HARR, supra note 21, at 491 (reporting that the EPA later “filed
suit against both W.R. Grace and Beatrice Foods to recover the costs of the cleanup project,”
but that the EPA appears not to have filed a claim for failure to report).
193. Reporting is only required for the “person in charge,” which appears not to include
past activities or peripheral actors (although the EPA could in theory define the term more
broadly). CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a). By contrast, past owners, generators, and transporters
can all be strictly and jointly and severally liable for any resulting cleanup required at a site
contaminated with hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Under such a scenario, it seems
unlikely that these potentially responsible parties (who appear not to be the “person in charge”)
will be very helpful in identifying the past history of dangerous hazardous sites, much less
volunteering that these sites exist.
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3. In Addition to Being Excused from Monitoring or Reporting
Potentially Harmful Activities, Manufacturing and Polluting Firms Are
Also Excused from Researching the Adverse Effects of Most of Their
Activities on Health and the Environment, Leaving the Public and
Victims to do the Scientific Research. With the single exception of
requiring responsible parties to assess contamination at hazardous
194
waste or similar sites, actors are rarely required to support, much
less conduct, ambient monitoring on the environment, even if their
pollution or products cumulatively cause residents to become
physically ill195 or are suspected of contributing to fish kills in
recreational rivers.196 In fact, only rarely are actors required to
account for the effects of their pollution or products on public health
and the environment. For example, developers of wetlands are not
required to conduct research on the wetlands they hope to fill to show
that they are not environmentally valuable. On the contrary,
opponents to the development must bear the burden of conducting
this research, even though the land is often privately held and its

194. See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text.
195. Sprayers of pesticide products, for example, might be required by state law to post signs
alerting neighbors to the spraying. See N. Y. State Pesticide Coalition, Inc. v. Jorling, 874 F.2d
115 (2d Cir. 1989) (discussing such requirements in New York and determining they were not
preempted by FIFRA). However, sprayers are neither required by federal law, nor generally by
state law, to conduct monitoring of neighboring populations to ensure that they are adequately
protected. Monitoring for the effects of pesticides, if done at all, is conducted and funded by
state and federal governments. See, e.g., Laws to Protect Public from Pesticides Not Being
Followed, at http://www.mncenter.org/p.asp?WebPage_ID=24&Profile_ID=112 (Oct. 1, 2001)
(arguing that the “Minnesota Department of Agriculture . . . has violated Minnesota law by
failing to adequately monitor pesticide use and contamination” in Minnesota); California
Department of Pesticide Regulation pesticide monitoring website, http://www.cdpr.ca.gov/
docs/empm/pubs/tribal/tribproj.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2004) (discussing an herbicide
monitoring project on tribal lands in California conducted by both the State and U.S. EPA at
tribes’ request).
196. There are, for the most part, only three circumstances in which a party suspected of
contributing to health or environmental problems may be required to reimburse the
government for the expense of assessment: (1) the liability provisions of CERCLA are met (i.e.,
the hazard is a CERCLA “hazardous substance,” the party falls into one of the four categories
of liable parties, and the government incurred response costs or injunctive relief is justified), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9606(a), 9607(a); (2) there is a sudden discharge of oil or hazardous
substances into navigable waters punishable under CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) or OPA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 2702; or (3) the release presents an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health
and welfare under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a), RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a), or CAA, 42
U.S.C. § 7603. If one of these narrow conditions is met, the EPA or other parties (under more
limited circumstances) may bring a suit against the party to recover the assessment damages or
force them to study the harm. Id.
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Even
owners can deny the access needed for research.
manufacturers of new pesticides are not required to do field testing
except when the EPA determines that this added research is needed
as a result of the high potential for ecological harm.198 Likewise,
manufacturers of toxic substances—who are, in any case, generally
excused from testing their products—are rarely, if ever, required to
conduct anything more than laboratory toxicity tests once the EPA
mandates testing.199

197. Developers and other wetland-fillers identify themselves as falling under the regulatory
crosshairs of section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the “wetland provision,” 33 U.S.C. § 1344, a
self-determination that includes a number of exemptions. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)–(f). Once parties
determine that the regulatory requirements apply to them, they must fill out an application and,
if their development is not water dependent, must typically prove that there are no practicable
alternative sites. (If their development is water dependent, they do not need to make this
showing). After they provide this information, their homework is done. A permit application is
available at http://www.spk.usace.army.mil/organizations//cespk-co/regulatory/pdf/ENG4345.pdf
(last visited Oct. 30, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). No inventory of the wetlands,
plant life, ecological functions, or wildlife is required unless the Army Corps of Engineers or the
EPA ultimately decide that added assessments are required (usually pursuant to the National
Environmental Policy Act) and also decide that the developer should conduct or finance that
assessment. Otherwise, those opposing a wetlands development or the EPA, Corps, or affected
state must prove that the wetlands have “significant” ecological value and that its destruction
will significantly impact water quality or other ecological goods. See generally Permits for
Discharges of Dredged or Fill Material into Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. pt. 323
(2003) (codifying practices that the Army Corps of Engineers must follow in issuing permits
under the CWA); 404 Regulations, 40 C.F.R. pt. 232 (2003) (defining activities exempt from
EPA regulation).
198. There are some ecological tests that pesticide manufacturers may be required to
conduct when the expected harm is expected to be high, but even then manufacturers are
generally required to test the product on only one or a few nontarget species, such as birds. See,
e.g., Environmental Fate Data Requirements, 40 C.F.R. § 158.290 (2003) (specifying additional
tests that the EPA can require to assess environmental fate); Wildlife and Aquatic Organisms
Data Requirements, 40 C.F.R. § 158.490 (2003) (specifying additional tests that the EPA can
require to assess impacts on wildlife); Nontarget Insect Data Requirements, 40 C.F.R. § 158.590
(2003) (specifying additional tests that the EPA can require to evaluate effects on nontarget
insects); see also Envtl. Prot. Agency, Data Requirements for Pesticide Registration, at
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/regulating/data.htm#longterm (last visited Mar. 3, 2004) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (summarizing data requirements, including the fact that long-term
or field studies are only required “when predictions as to possible adverse effects in less
extensive studies cannot be made, or when the potential for harmful effects is high”); infra note
202 (explaining that the EPA is attempting to conduct an ecological risk assessment on several
rodenticides).
199. Environment-related testing is not among the test guidelines for safety testing under
TSCA. See Identification of Specific Chemical Substance and Mixture Testing Requirements, 40
C.F.R. pt. 799 (2003) (listing test guidelines for toxic substances). In fact, tests for
developmental neurotoxicity and for reproductive/developmental toxicity were only added to
the TSCA test guidelines (which list the types of tests that the EPA can require under a test
rule) in 2000. See EPA, Toxic Substances Control Act Test Guidelines: Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg.
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4. Actors Are Excused from Contributing to the Development of
Methods for Assessing the Harms Caused by Their Activities, Leaving
Regulators to Struggle with Developing the Tests. The development of
the methods to assess the impact of pollution and products (like
pesticides) on public health is financed, published, and corroborated
largely with public dollars.200 The only role that private actors play in
the development of assessment tools is to pick apart agency protocols
and the necessarily limited scientific information upon which they are
based.201 The pesticide and chemical industries in particular are
vigorous critics of the EPA’s protocols and test guidelines, filing
lengthy critiques of each tentative advance made by the EPA in
assessing noncancer risks, while bearing none of the costs of these
202
innovative research efforts. The EPA’s more than thirteen-year
effort to promulgate a rudimentary rule requiring additional testing
of certain chemical substances for neurological effects provides a case

No. 78,746, 78,748, tbl.1 (Dec. 15, 2000) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 799) (listing seventeen
new test guidelines added to the TSCA list of testing requirements). Even the high production
volume (HPV) testing challenge, discussed supra note 163, requires only a few animal tests for
these widely used chemicals. The six tests are acute toxicity, genetic toxicity, repeat dose
toxicity, reproductive and developmental toxicity, and acute toxicity to fish. Physicians
Committee for Responsible Medicine, Appendix A: The HPV Animal Test Battery, at
http://www.pcrm.org/issues/PDFs/hpvappa.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2004) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
200. See, e.g., NRC, BUILDING A FOUNDATION, supra note 10, at 10, 49, 61 (pointing out
that the EPA shoulders much of the burden of producing the information needed to support its
regulatory programs, and highlighting the EPA’s stark limitations given its $500 million research
budget). But see supra Part I.C. (arguing that there are sometimes incentives for parties to
develop this information, but usually only in the shadow of onerous legal liabilities
or requirements).
201. See, e.g., McGarity & Wagner, supra note 118, at 10 (detailing how the “EPA’s models
are frequently subject to tedious, technical nitpicking” by opponents and how “[v]irtually every
substantive challenge [in court] mounted against an EPA model involves multiple technical
disagreements on virtually every facet of the model”).
202. For example, the EPA is currently attempting to conduct an ecological risk assessment
on several rodenticides after becoming aware of potential adverse effects on birds and wildlife.
Rodenticides; Availability of Preliminary Comparative Ecological Assessment, 68 Fed. Reg.
4468 (Jan. 29, 2003); see also EPA EDocket, at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/rodenticidecluster/
(last visited Mar. 3, 2004). The effort was met with vigorous resistance by manufacturers who
appeared to challenge virtually every facet of the assessment, without identifying ways in which
the assessment could be improved. See, e.g., Letter from John L. Hott, Syngenta Crop
Protection, Inc. to the EPA, Comments on Rodenticide Ecological Assessment (Mar. 31, 2003),
available at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/rodenticidecluster; see also infra notes 231–35 and
accompanying text (discussing a similar campaign against the testing of the herbicide atrazine).
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203
in point. The chemical industry provided the bulk of the critical
input on the proposed guidelines,204 and ultimately the EPA managed
to require tests for only a portion of the neurological effects of
205
The
concern with respect to ten chemicals in commerce.
manufacturers’ constant vigilance helps explain why the EPA has
made little progress in promulgating even rudimentary testing
methods to measure neurological, reproductive, ecological, and
hormonal effects.206

III. THE LAWS ENCOURAGE ACTORS TO PERPETUATE IGNORANCE
It is bad enough that environmental laws—contrary to their
promise—fail to require actors to produce information needed to
assess their externalities. But some environmental laws lead to a still
worse state of affairs: the laws sometimes reward actors for their
ignorance, penalize them for producing useful knowledge, and

203. See Multi-Substance Rule for the Testing of Neurotoxicity, 58 Fed. Reg. 40,262, 40,262–
63 (July 27, 1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 799):
EPA’s efforts to obtain data to address its concern for the neurotoxicity of specific
solvents dates back over 10 years to a proposed test rule, Chloromethane and
Chlorinated Benzenes Proposed Test Rule, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,524 (July 18, 1980), which
discussed EPA’s concerns for the neurotoxic effects of chloromethane in adults after
chronic exposure and on offspring exposed in utero, and concerns related to abuse
liability.
204. The EPA reports that public comments were received on its 1991 proposal from
Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) (Ref. 3), CMA’s Acetone Panel (Refs.
4, 5 and 68), CMA’s Glycol Ethers Panel (Ref. 6), CMA’s Ketones Panel (Refs. 7 and
8), CMA’s Oxo Process Panel (Refs. 9 through 12), the American Industrial Health
Council (AIHC) (Ref. 1), the Diethyl Ether Manufacturers Task Group (DEMTG)
(Ref. 13), BASF Corporation (BASF) (Ref. 2), The Dow Chemical Company (Dow)
(Ref. 14), DuPont (Ref. 15), Kodak (Ref. 16), Monsanto (Ref. 17), Rohm and Haas
(Ref. 18), Union Carbide (Ref. 19), the Interagency Testing Committee (ITC) (Ref.
21), Dr. J. Glowa of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Ref. 20),
Dr. D. McMillan of the University of Arkansas (Ref. 22), Dr. R. Neal of Vanderbilt
University (Ref. 25), and Drs. D. Cory-Slechta (Ref. 23) and B. Weiss (Ref. 24) of the
University of Rochester. These submissions contained both comments regarding the
proposed rule and additional studies for EPA to consider before promulgating the
final rule.
Multi-Substance Rule for the Testing of Neurotoxicity, 58 Fed. Reg. at 40,263.
205. Id. (conceding that the tests only assess neurotoxic effects after chronic exposure,
without measuring changes on offspring exposed in utero or assessing concerns related to abuse
liability, and concluding that the “EPA is requiring a very modest testing program in this area in
comparison to the scientifically acknowledged diversity of the potential neurotoxic effects of
concern”).
206. See generally Guidelines for Reproductive Toxicity Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg.
56,274 (Oct. 31, 1996); EPA, Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,846
(May 14, 1998); EPA, Neurotoxicity Guidelines, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,926 (May 14, 1998). The EPA
has not completed its development of preliminary methods for assessing hormonal effects. See
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 13, at 1.
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provide mechanisms for them to attack damaging public science that
suggests they are causing harm.
This Part discusses three ways that existing laws, rather than
promoting the production and dissemination of information about
potential harms to the environment and public health, actually
perpetuate ignorance. The first Section discusses how existing laws
not only fail to create positive incentives for the production of needed
information but actually create disincentives to information
production. The second Section discusses how existing laws increase
the asymmetric advantages that private actors have over the
production of this information, particularly through the use of
overbroad confidentiality privileges. The final Section then discusses
how recent legal developments have increased the avenues available
for regulated parties to manufacture controversy about regulatory
science and, in so doing, to delay regulation and obfuscate the
established scientific consensus.
A. Ignorance Is Bliss in Regulation and Enforcement
Under the current regulatory system, volunteering adverse
information on the effects or even the existence of harms associated
with one’s product or activity is equivalent to shooting oneself in the
foot. Regulation and enforcement increase in lockstep with the
207
availability of public information on adverse effects. Whereas no
information means no regulation, a solid body of uncontested,
adverse information will almost certainly lead to intrusive regulation,
enforcement activity, and sometimes even a ban on the activity or
product.208 This Section argues that as long as information is neither

207. See generally Priority List of Substances Which May Require Regulation Under the
Safe Drinking Water Act, 56 Fed. Reg. 1470, 1471 (Jan. 14, 1991) (explaining that the EPA
selects contaminants for regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act based in large part on
“[a]vailability of sufficient information on the substance”); NRC, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT,
supra note 139, at 253 (“In the past, EPA has often appeared to base its priorities on the ease of
obtaining data on a particular chemical.”); Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and
Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 141 (1988) (“In practice, agencies seldom
commence regulatory proceedings until considerable evidence has accumulated that a substance
may be hazardous.”); Richard Wilson et al., Uncertainty in Risk Assessment, in RISK
QUANTIFICATION AND REGULATORY POLICY 133, 136 (David G. Hoel et al. eds., 1985)
(describing how the EPA’s Carcinogen Assessment Group calculates risks for chemicals that
have been tested on animals, but often entirely neglects other chemicals that have not been
similarly tested, “even when other information suggests that risks from [such chemicals] may be
large enough to be important”).
208. See infra Part III.A.1.
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required nor rewarded but instead is used punitively by the regulatory
system, the decision about whether to voluntarily conduct and report
research on one’s product’s or activity’s externalities is an easy one.
Ignorance is bliss.
1. Information Burdens on the EPA as a Precondition to
Regulation. Despite actors’ superior knowledge about the potential
harms created by their products or activities, environmental laws
assign the burden for justifying regulatory action to the EPA.209
Although this burden does not technically require the agency to

209. The burden differs from statute to statute in terms of how much or what kinds of
evidence the EPA must produce to satisfy it. The burden is substantially lighter than parallel
common law requirements requiring plaintiffs to produce a “preponderance of the evidence” on
causation, yet the EPA must still provide some information and justification for its regulatory
decisions. See generally SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT
RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 35 (2003) (“Most of the [environmental and
public health] laws [surveyed] . . . use triggers that create less than the maximum evidentiary
burden and, in particular, most fall in the middle categories—risk threshold or significant risk
threshold.”). For most standards promulgated to regulate pollutant discharges under the Clean
Water and Clean Air Acts, Congress specified the particular substances of concern for the EPA
in advance. The EPA’s primary burden under these statutes is to ensure that its resulting
technology-based standards are not arbitrary and capricious (with the challenger bearing the
burden of showing that they are). See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(C)–(D) (2000) (referencing
a House Committee Report list of 126 toxic substances for which technology-based standards
must be promulgated under the Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (2000) (listing 189
hazardous air pollutants for which technology-based standards must be promulgated). Other
science-based regulatory decisions made under CERCLA, EPCRA, RCRA, SDWA, FIFRA,
and for ambient standards for criteria pollutants under the CAA, have required the EPA to
provide some scientific research justifiying regulation, without requiring definitive proof. See,
e.g., SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(1)(A) (2000) (providing that to promulgate a Maximum
Contaminant Level Goal, the EPA must show (1) that a contaminant “may have an adverse
effect on the health of persons” (emphasis added), (2) that the contaminant “is known to occur
or [that] there is a substantial likelihood that the contaminant will occur in public water
systems,” and (3) that “regulation of [the] . . . contaminant presents a meaningful opportunity
for health risk reduction”); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (2000) (defining “hazardous waste” for
purposes of the statute as that which because of “quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical,
or infectious characteristics may—(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in
mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or (B) pose a
substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment” (emphasis
added)). Only the regulation of existing chemicals under TSCA has been read to place a heavy
evidentiary burden for justifying protective regulations on EPA, a burden EPA can meet only
with “substantial evidence,” primarily from science and economics. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof
Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1215 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the EPA failed to present
sufficient evidence to justify a complete ban on asbestos in light of statutory language requiring
it to “promulgate the least burdensome, reasonable regulation” to achieve adequate protection
of the environment).
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210
engage in active information production and research, in reality the
lack of available information on the harms created by suspect
products and activities makes producing this information essential.211
Even mandates directing agencies to issue protective standards have
been interpreted to require some information to justify regulatory
intervention.212 When this information is sorely incomplete,
controverted, or effectively unobtainable, agencies have a difficult
213
time supporting regulatory action. Under such a regulatory system,

210. For all regulatory requirements, the EPA generally bears some burden of proof,
although the evidentiary demands can be quite light. See, e.g., Delaney Clause, Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 379e(b)(5)(B) (requiring only a test on animals showing that a food
additive is carcinogenic to justify a regulatory ban of that additive). Through time, however, the
courts and others have raised the EPA’s burden higher, particularly under some statutes. See
SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 209, at 70–71 (discussing the raised evidentiary burden
imposed on the EPA by some courts and the resulting paralysis of agency decisionmaking);
infra note 213.
211. The EPA has dedicated considerable resources to collecting information and
developing new tests. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. Yet the EPA’s role as
gatekeeper on existing and future information on health and the environment also suggests
room for capture. This may or may not explain the consistent despair that prominent bipartisan
committees express with respect to the EPA’s research priorities and the coherence of its
research programs. See, e.g., COMM. ON RESEARCH AND PEER REVIEW IN EPA, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING SCIENCE AT THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY: RESEARCH MANAGEMENT AND PEER REVIEW PRACTICES (2000) (recommending,
based on an assessment of science at the EPA, that the EPA’s areas for improvement are
strengthening its scientific leadership, enhancing the production of information, and anticipating
future
environmental
needs
with
scientific
research),
available
at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/9882.html.
212. See Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (vacating
the EPA’s zero tolerance standard for chlorine in drinking water because it is “arbitrary and
capricious” and exceeds statutory authority because it does not account for the “best available
evidence” suggesting that there is a nonzero safe level); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA,
824 F.2d 1146, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding that a zero standard for vinyl chloride
under the Clean Air Act is not appropriate and suggesting that, under the Act, the EPA may
account for remaining uncertainties in setting a nonzero standard).
213. There is a substantial body of scholarship discussing the tendency of reviewing courts to
require the EPA to produce considerable evidence to support its regulatory standards. See, e.g.,
R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 241
(1983) (discussing the implications of the reviewing courts’ insistence on complete scientific
evidence for each stage of the standard-setting process); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in
Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial
Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 311 (“Courts also have . . . require[d]
that agencies ‘find’ unfindable facts and support those findings with unattainable evidence.”).
As a result, the most studied risks tend to be regulated first. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Science
Charade in Toxic Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1681–82 (1995) (“[A]gencies tend to be
‘science-biased’ in selecting the toxic substances to regulate: instead of . . . prioritiz[ing]
substances based on the risks they present to health and the environment, the agencies appear
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actors who want to minimize regulatory intervention have little
incentive to produce information showing that their products or
activities are safe. Instead, they are best advised to maintain a status
214
quo of ignorance.
Laws that require actors who discover bad news to report it
215
further exacerbate incentives for ignorance. Under existing laws,
manufacturers of pesticides and toxic substances who discover
adverse information about their products are required to report this
information to the EPA.216 From the manufacturer’s perspective,

to . . . [select] substances with more scientifically established health effects . . . over less-studied
substances, many of which . . . [may] present greater risks at lower concentrations.”).
214. The safest course for manufacturers in the short term is to avoid safety testing
altogether, particularly for existing chemicals or new chemicals that fall through the regulatory
cracks. Most manufacturers appear in fact to follow this safer course. The OTA and the GAO
both found that the majority of premanufacture notices (PMNs) filed under TSCA contained
little to any toxicity data on the new chemicals. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161, at 45–
46; OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF PREMANUFACTURE
NOTICES
6
(1983),
available
at
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgibin/byteserv.prl/~ota/disk3/1983/8313/8313.PDF. A 1994 article also quotes EPA officials as
observing that the agency, in reviewing PMNs, “often may not have a sample of the new
chemical” and also “often does not get basic physical state information” on the new chemical.
Premanufacture Notification: Data, Funding Gaps for New Chemicals Program Prompt Concern,
Criticism from SAB Committee, 18 Chem. Reg. Rpt. (BNA) 997, 997 (1994).
Beyond the perverse incentive for ignorance, such a data bias in regulation leads to
imbalances in the regulatory terrain, much like those lamented by Peter Huber in criticizing the
old-new distinction in regulation. See Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69
VA. L. REV. 1025, 1073–75 (1983) (“Every regulation of one source of risk will cause some
secondary ‘risk displacement,’ encouraging producers or consumers to favor alternative, less
stringently regulated processes or products that will themselves be risky in some degree.”). If
some substances are regulated because there is a lot of information, and others are ignored
because there is little information, activities will shift toward the unregulated and unstudied
wastes, products, and general externalities. This problem is not new to environmental law. For
example, although Congress busily closed off opportunities to dispose of wastes into the water
and air, it left others open and thus essentially encouraged more damaging types of pollution,
like disposal of hazardous wastes on land. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, pt. 1, at 4 (1976)
(recognizing that, during the passage of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), the
“federal government . . . [spent] billions of dollars to remove pollutants from the air and water,
only to dispose of such pollutants on the land in an environmentally unsound manner”); Frances
H. Irwin, An Integrated Framework for Preventing Pollution and Protecting the Environment, 22
ENVTL. L. 1, 12–14 (1992) (discussing how fragmentation of statutes leads to the transfer of
pollutants to other environmental media).
215. See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2000) (requiring the person in charge to
immediately report a release of a reportable quantity of a hazardous substance). See generally
supra Part II.A.3.
216. See FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136d(a)(2) (2000) (“If at any time after the registration of a
pesticide the registrant has additional factual information regarding unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment of the pesticide, the registrant shall submit such information to the
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engaging in exploratory research under such a legal regime is
217
decidedly hazardous. The EPA, in turn, may use any adverse
information to promulgate stricter standards. The manufacturer, of
course, can avoid this entire scenario simply by not assessing the
safety of its products and activities. In such a legal environment,
ignorance will always be the best recourse.
The direct correlation between the availability of information
and the likelihood of regulatory intervention not only encourages
manufacturers to pursue a policy of strategic ignorance, but also
makes it beneficial for them to campaign to raise the EPA’s burden of
proof still higher for initiating regulatory action. A higher burden of
proof in an information-starved area such as health and safety
regulation could significantly reduce the number of regulations that
the agency can support.218 Requiring more research as a prerequisite
to promulgating protective regulation also places greater demands on
agency resources and ignores the fact that actors enjoy superior
information about the risks posed by their activities.
Regulated parties’ campaign to further raise the burden of proof
for the EPA is most evident in their general advocacy of informationintensive checks on regulation, like cost-benefit analysis219 and
Administrator.”); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2607(c), (e) (2000) (requiring manufacturers and
processors to maintain records of “significant adverse reactions to health or the environment . . .
alleged to have been caused by the substance or mixture” and to immediately report
“information which reasonably supports the conclusion that such substance or mixture presents
a substantial risk of injury to health or the environment”).
217. See generally Reitze & Hoffman, supra note 166, at 739–41 (discussing civil and
criminal penalties for violating reporting requirements, including criminal enforcement of false
reporting and fraud).
218. TSCA, for example, has been interpreted by the Fifth Circuit to place the burden on
the EPA not only to establish the scientifically established risks of an existing chemical before
taking regulatory action, but also to establish that the chemical’s public health risks outweigh
the social benefits of the substance and that the EPA has selected a regulatory approach to
preventing health harms that is the “least burdensome” in comparison with alternative
approaches. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1215, 1223 (5th Cir. 1991). This
heavy evidentiary burden has effectively discouraged the EPA from taking regulatory action
against dangerous chemicals. See Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of
Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 548 (1997) (“In the six
years that have passed since the Corrosion Proof Fittings opinion, the EPA has not initiated a
single action under section 6 of TSCA . . . .”).
219. The use of cost-benefit analysis to rebut protective standards is mandatory under a few
statutes. See generally Applegate, supra note 33, at 269 (recounting that FIFRA and TSCA both
target “unreasonable” adverse risks, and that the legislative history suggests that this requires
balancing costs and benefits). The most prevalent use of cost-benefit analysis occurs informally,
under an executive order that requires cost-benefit analyses for economically significant
rulemakings. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
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regulatory “good-science” reforms, which demand that the EPA
accumulate a definitive body of hard evidence on harm before
220
implementing a proposed regulation. Cost-benefit requirements
surreptitiously increase the evidentiary demands on regulators by
(1988) (specifying cost-benefit requirements issued by President Reagan); Exec. Order No.
12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000) (specifying cost-benefit
requirements issued by President Clinton and retained by President George W. Bush with only
minor changes in Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2002)). In this administrative setting,
cost-benefit analyses are not only used as an aid in conducting regulatory analysis, but are being
used more affirmatively to reorder agency priorities or even stall or abandon some protective
rulemakings altogether. Under President George W. Bush, for example, the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), within the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), has developed several initiatives that endeavor to reorder EPA priorities and
rulemakings based in large part on the results of cost-benefit accountings. See generally Draft
Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,014,
15,020 (Mar. 28, 2002) [hereinafter OMB Cost-Benefit Report] (describing OIRA’s effort to
shift from being a “reactive” to a “proactive” force “in suggesting regulatory priorities for
agency consideration”). These initiatives include targeting existing rules that “should be
rescinded or changed to increase net benefits by either reducing costs or increasing benefits,” id.
at 15,022, engaging in the same sort of activity with respect to “problematic” agency guidelines
that have not complied with process requirements like cost-benefit accountings, id. at 15,035,
and sending prompt letters to agencies when OIRA believes that they are not prioritizing a
particular, “beneficial” regulatory activity as highly as they should, id. at 15,020.
220. Good-science reforms that have been passed and implemented include the Data
Quality Act, Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub.
L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000), and the Data Access Act, Omnibus Appropriations
Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-495 (1998), discussed infra Part
III.C. Other good-science reforms are still in the proposal stages. See, e.g., Alan Raul & Julie
Zampa Dwyer, Regulatory Daubert, 66 Law & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 7 (Fall 2003) (proposing
that the Daubert test “provides a suitable framework for reviewing the quality of agency science
and the soundness of agency decisions”). The earliest versions of good-science regulatory
proposals were blatant efforts to use good science as a Trojan horse for regulatory delay by
insisting on impossible burdens of evidence as a prerequisite to regulation. President Reagan
was the originator of the idea that health and environmental regulation should not proceed
unless it is based on good science, which in turn necessitates hard proof of damage to health.
JONATHAN LASH ET AL., A SEASON OF SPOILS: THE STORY OF THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION’S ATTACK ON THE ENVIRONMENT 131 (1984); Howard Latin, Regulatory
Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1662 n.40
(1990) (“[T]here is abundant evidence that administrators [of the EPA under President Reagan]
frequently chose to ‘study’ uncertain issues as a way to avoid resolving them.”). More recent
efforts are more sophisticated and varied, but they all tend to work toward narrowing the range
of evidence that regulators can consider, as well as raising the EPA’s burden of proof to justify
regulation. See infra notes 228–35 and accompanying text. As a result, because the EPA bears
the burden of proof, and because that burden is relatively onerous, regulated entities will
volunteer information or engage in information production only when it is likely to make the
resulting regulation less stringent. Further, to the extent that the information is asymmetrical,
industry will attempt to use its superior control to its advantage by disclosing only information
that benefits it and concealing information that is damaging. Finally, the burden will encourage
obstructionist behavior from regulated parties: they will attack studies that might lead to
stronger standards. See infra Part III.C.
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requiring them to demonstrate quantitatively that the benefits of
221
regulation exceed its costs. As cost-benefit is currently practiced,
nonquantified and poorly understood harms are generally excluded
222
from the quantitative calculations. For example, a familiar poison
such as arsenic—which appears to cause neurological harms,
endocrine effects, at least seven different types of cancer,
reproductive and development effects, and other life-threatening
harms—is evaluated in a cost-benefit analysis only on the basis of its
risks of causing bladder and lung cancers, because these two cancers
are the only risks that have been studied sufficiently to be
quantified.223
Information problems of a different nature affect the cost side of
the equation. Quantifying the costs of regulation currently depends,
in large part, on the regulated parties’ estimates of compliance costs.
Because the bulk of the essential data needed to prepare these
estimates is privately held and therefore not subject to critical review,

221. Meeting this requirement, in itself, is quite resource intensive. To estimate the benefits
associated with the product or activity being considered for regulation, each potential harm
associated with the product or activity must be identified, the impact of the harm must be
quantified, and this quantification must be translated into monetary terms. The costs to industry
of complying with the proposed regulation must also be quantified. Ironically, though, for all of
the cost-benefit reports that are produced annually, none appear to account for the costs
incurred in conducting the analysis, either in terms of staff resources or delay.
222. See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 604 (1997) (“[Cost-benefit
analysis] will tend to produce lower benefit valuations than those of consumers, overestimate
costs, and cause agencies to make very few decisions in a world of serious environmental
problems from a variety of sources.”); Thomas O. McGarity, A Cost-Benefit State, 50 ADMIN. L.
REV. 7, 58 (1998) (“When information or values that arise cannot easily be factored into the
benefit models, the modelers often simply ignore them. . . . [N]eglecting ‘soft’ considerations . . .
does bias the analysis against regulatory intervention, because the cost side of the equation
implicates fewer ‘soft’ considerations than the benefits side.” (emphasis omitted)).
223. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 815-R-00-026, ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER RULE:
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1-4 (2000) (listing nonquantifiable, potential adverse effects of arsenic
including skin cancer, kidney cancer, cancer of the nasal passages, liver cancer, prostate cancer,
cardiovascular effects, pulmonary effects, immunological effects, neurological effects, endocrine
effects,
and
reproductive
and
developmental
effects),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/ars/econ_analysis.pdf. None of these nonquantified harms are
factored into either the low- or the high-bound estimates of the benefits of regulation. Id. The
benefits of preventing the two quantifiable cancers are the only benefits that are compared
against the costs of compliance to identify a final cost-benefit-justified standard. Id. at 1-6. The
standard ultimately chosen by the EPA (after some waffling within the new administration)—10
micrograms—appears on this cost-benefit table as the point at which the cost estimate and the
upper-bound benefits estimate balance at a seven percent discount rate. Id.
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224
the costs are often inflated. In fact, retrospective studies of the
veracity of industry cost estimates show that such estimates are
generally double the actual cost to the regulated party.225
These limitations on the accuracy of cost-benefit requirements—
underestimating benefits and overestimating costs—are nevertheless
ignored by many analysts.226 The Office of Management and Budget’s
(OMB’s) Annual Cost-Benefit Reports to Congress, which compile
all of the cost-benefit reports prepared governmentwide, have, on
occasion, not only failed to acknowledge both sources of error but
have presented the final estimates as if they magically identify the
precise point at which regulation is appropriate.227

224. This behavior is not necessarily duplicitous; it likely constitutes a rational reaction
aimed at preventing overregulation. Regardless of motive, economists recognize the tendency of
regulated parties to overestimate the costs of regulation. See Spulber, supra note 63, at 178–79
(concluding that asymmetric information about abatement costs to firms subject to
environmental regulations can be very entrenched); see also Jason S. Johnston, A Game
Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1343, 1350 (2002) (modeling regulatory impediments that arise from cost-benefit regimes
when the regulatory targets possess private information on the cost of compliance and enjoy
opportunities to block regulation).
225. See Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and
Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 2042 (citing a study conducted by Goodstein
and Hodge, which found that in eleven of twelve regulatory initiatives that they examined, “the
initial estimates were at least double the actual costs”). Professors McGarity and Ruttenberg
report that another study conducted in 1995 by the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment found that the ex ante cost estimates for the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration’s (OSHA’s) 1974 vinyl chloride standard exceeded $1 billion; however, a survey
released subsequently found that compliance costs were in the $228–278 million range. Id. at
2031. One of the major struggles in ensuring that industry estimates are accurate is the lack of
empirical knowledge concerning the costs of regulations for businesses or even how many
regulations apply to businesses. Id. at 2032–33. To address this information gap, the General
Accounting Office undertook a study in 1996 to understand the impact of federal regulation on
regulated businesses. Initially, most of the companies contacted were obstinate about supplying
material that would advance this study; of the fifteen that consented, little information was
provided in the way of compliance costs, and “none of the companies provided cost data that
were both comprehensive and incremental.” Id. at 2035 (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE,
REGULATORY BURDEN: MEASUREMENT CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS RAISED BY SELECTED
COMPANIES 49 (1996), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97002.pdf).
226. See infra notes 364–67 and accompanying text.
227. In a recent draft Cost-Benefit Report, for example, the OMB omitted the qualitative
costs and benefits from most of the cost-benefit tables. See, e.g., OMB Cost-Benefit Report, 67
Fed. Reg. 15,014, 15,024 tbls.5–6, 15,042 tbl.14 (Mar. 28, 2002) (assigning total dollar figures to
the benefits and costs of rules when in some rulemakings the EPA explicitly indicated that it
was only able to quantify some of the benefits and costs); id. at 15,038 tbl.13 (listing the benefits
of paperwork requirements as zero even though the OIRA concedes in the text that “[a]t
present, it is not feasible to estimate the value of annual societal benefits of the information the
government collects from the public”). In the only table in which OIRA provided an indication
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Good-science reforms appear even more obviously crafted to
exploit the limits in scientific information as an excuse to postpone
228
regulation. Under this approach, the agency, by default, must
produce definitive scientific research on harms caused by an activity
229
before rushing to regulate. Good-science advocates, however, never
urge that the regulated actors be charged with producing this goodscience research as a condition to operating, even though such a
burden would be in keeping with the precautionary objectives of the
relevant statutory mandates.230
“Good science” reforms are not only used by regulated parties to
attempt to raise the bar on the amount of evidence needed to justify
protective regulation, but are also used to limit the type of
information available to the agency to support its burden. For
example, concerned about potential regulatory restrictions on the
herbicide atrazine, its manufacturer and agricultural users argue not
only that the EPA must scientifically justify regulatory restrictions on
the product, but that the science acceptable for regulation must be

that not all costs and benefits had been quantified—Table 7—OIRA did not list qualitative costs
and benefits under the columns headed “costs” or “benefits,” but under the “other information”
column. Id. at 15,025 tbl.7. OMB concluded its report by totaling only the monetized costs and
benefits of all regulations in final, cumulative tables to provide an even more error-laden basis
for evaluating the appropriateness of regulation. Id. at 15,042 tbl.14.
228. See supra note 220. See generally Donald T. Hornstein, Accounting for Science: The
Independence of Public Research in the New, Subterranean Administrative Law, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 227 (Fall 2003). As discussed later, in their most recent incarnation, these
good-science reforms also provide regulated parties with more powerful tools for challenging
individual studies produced with public monies that incriminate their activity or product. See
infra Part III.C.
229. See DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE, 104TH CONG.,
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE: FRINGE SCIENCE AND THE 104TH CONGRESS (1996)
(report by Rep. George E. Brown, Jr., ranking Democratic member) (identifying the sinister use
of “sound science” in Congress to paralyze environmental regulation), available at
http://www.house.gov/science_democrats/archive/envrpt96.htm.
230. See supra notes 220–28 and accompanying text; see also D. Hiep Truong, Daubert and
Judicial Review: How Does an Administrative Agency Distinguish Valid Science from Junk
Science?, 33 AKRON L. REV. 365, 370 (2000) (examining “the possibility of using the Daubert
standard to effectuate a more meaningful judicial review of an agency’s determination of risk”
and arguing that “[b]y using the Daubert standards, a reviewing court is simply treating an
agency like a testifying expert”); Charles D. Weller & David B. Graham, New Approaches to
Environmental Law and Agency Regulation: The Daubert Litigation Approach, 30 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,557, 10,566–72 (2000) (providing detailed recommendations for how the
courts can incorporate Daubert into their review of agency science, including using Daubert
hearings for the review of certain agency actions).
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conducted under a limited number of EPA-approved protocols.
This means, according to industry representatives, that cutting-edge
research discovering significant adverse effects on frogs exposed to
low levels of the herbicide (the male frogs develop female
reproductive organs)232 must be excluded from the agency’s
assessment of the herbicide’s safety.233 For this research to be
acceptable, the manufacturer argues, the EPA must first promulgate
a testing protocol for these endocrine effects—a process that might
take decades, given industry opposition234—and then must compel or
235
fund applied research using those protocols. Such restrictions on
regulatory decisionmaking make it impossible for regulations to be
based on the best available science, however. To the extent that
actors succeed in convincing the EPA to exclude credible research
from its decisions because the research fails to meet their narrow
conceptions of good science, regulatory decisions become still more
information-deprived.
2. Information Burdens on the EPA as a Precondition to
Enforcement. Just as actors are likely to appreciate that producing
information about their products and activities can lead to increased
regulatory requirements, they are also likely to understand that
volunteering information about violations of existing laws will be
rewarded with enforcement actions and sanctions.236 Although some
231. See Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Request for Correction, supra note 43, at 7
(arguing that “[u]ntil and unless there are properly validated tests, there can be no reliable
information regarding atrazine’s purported endocrine effects”).
232. See Hayes et al, supra note 43 (reporting the effects of atrazine on frogs).
233. Specifically, this group of industrial actors argues:
As soon as possible, EPA should correct its Environmental Risk Assessment at pages
11, 90–94, to state that there is no reliable evidence that atrazine causes “endocrine
effects” in the environment [and thus exclude the Hayes study from regulatory
consideration]. EPA’s corrected Environmental Risk Assessment should state that
there can be no reliable, accurate or useful information regarding atrazine’s
endocrine effects until and unless there are test methods for those effects that have
been properly validated.
Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Request for Correction, supra note 43, at 9.
234. See supra Part II.B.4.
235. This latter burden is also problematic. The EPA’s lack of funds makes it unlikely that it
can finance much of the research itself, and this type of applied research is not a candidate for
general science funding from the National Science Foundation. On the other hand, if forced,
industry could conduct the research using its own scientists, labs, reporting methods, and
contractual agreements, thus exerting at least some control over the outcome. Cf. infra notes
400–04 and accompanying text (discussing problems with biased research).
236. This resulting deliberate ignorance is one of the principal justifications for the audit
laws that provide decreased penalties and, in some cases, even the promise of confidentiality
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states do attempt to reward firms with good compliance records,
most environmental enforcement regimes provide only sticks, not
carrots.238 Coors Brewing Corporation learned this lesson the hard
way when it voluntarily discovered and reported to state regulators
239
Rather than
189 violations of Clean Air Act requirements.
rewarding Coors’s candor, state regulators greeted the voluntary
disclosure with a $1.05 million fine and more stringent emissions
reduction requirements.240
Coors’s experience only serves to remind the regulated
community that when compliance costs are high and the likelihood of
being caught is low, ignorance—or at least silence—is bliss. Moral and
ethical imperatives notwithstanding, enforcement theory instructs
that rational actors will not comply with a law or regulation if the
economic benefits that they derive from their violation exceed the
241
cost of the sanction times the probability of being caught. In the
case of environmental violations, the probability of being caught
depends both on the extent to which the violation is evident and on
the resources of the enforcers: in many regulatory settings, both can

privileges for incriminating information if actors conduct self-assessments in compliance with
environmental requirements. See infra notes 263–69 and accompanying text.
237. The state of Texas does attempt to reward companies who are regularly in compliance:
the greater the number of inspections that reveal a plant is in compliance, the higher the
performance rating and the lighter the penalties for violations that are ultimately discovered or
self-reported. See 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 60.2 (West 2003). This increases the financial
incentives for firms to discover and correct violations in advance of an inspection (conditioned
on the likelihood that the inspector is also likely to discover the violations).
238. There are rarely rewards for documenting overcompliance with regulatory
requirements. Economists, however, have suggested that rewards may be in order under some
circumstances, especially when a firm enjoys private information about its compliance. See
Lewis, supra note 63, at 826–37 (discussing this literature).
239. See Coors Says Fine Could Deter Corporate Environmental Audit, Daily Env’t. Rep.
(BNA) A3 (July 28, 1993) (stating that the Colorado health department “cited Coors for 100 air
pollution emission notification violations, 56 permit violations and 33 volatile organic compound
violations”).
240. See id. The state later backed down, perhaps as a result of adverse publicity, and settled
the enforcement case by requiring Coors to pay $237,000 and reduce emissions. Coors Settles
with State over Violations Discovered During Company’s Self Audit, Daily Env’t. Rep. (BNA)
A3 (Feb. 22, 1994). The state’s initial ingratitude motivated the Colorado legislature to pass a
relatively broad audit law. Id; see also infra notes 263–69 and accompanying text (discussing selfaudit laws).
241. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, in A READER
ON REGULATION 307, 308–10 (R. Baldwin ed., 1998) (observing that firms will find it financially
imprudent to comply with legal requirements when benefits of noncompliance > (probability of
being caught in violation) x (sanctions/penalty)). The penalty should also include the costs of
defending oneself in an enforcement case.
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242
be quite low. Indeed, it is the regulators’ lack of resources for
discovering most environmental violations243 that makes
environmental enforcement so heavily dependent on self-reporting by

242. This simple calculation has been lost on at least a few judges, however. In Sierra Club v.
Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996), the district court held that the appropriate
amount of civil penalties that should be charged to a company that illegally disposed of produce
water into Galveston Bay for 797 days without a permit should be determined solely by
reference to the economic benefits that accrued to the company as a result of its noncompliance.
Under the court’s assessment methods, as long as the probability of being caught is somewhat
less than 100 percent (an inevitability) and as long as attorneys’ fees are not too high, it is in
actors’ interest to remain ignorant of their environmental obligations and any resulting
violations. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the penalty assessment, holding that it was not clearly
erroneous. Id. at 575–76. As a predictor and, of course, as precedent for how the courts will
assess civil penalties, the opinion clearly makes noncompliance the economically preferable
option. See also infra notes 270–72 and accompanying text.
243. The literature is replete with discussions of underfunded and understaffed enforcement
offices at the EPA and state environmental protection departments. See, e.g., JOEL A. MINTZ,
ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 113–18 (1995); U.S. GEN.
ACCT. OFFICE, GAO-RCED-95-65, EPA AND THE STATES: ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES
REQUIRE A BETTER WORKING RELATIONSHIP 3 (1995); Rena I. Steinzor, EPA and Its Sisters at
30: Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11,086, 11,086–89
(2001). As of 2000, the EPA employed roughly four hundred full-time inspectors to monitor
compliance nationally. See REITZE, supra note 86, at 491 n.20. Enforcement resources at the
state level provide the bulk of the enforcement artillery; yet states vary considerably in the
resources and manpower that they dedicate to environmental enforcement. See OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NO. 7100246, AUDIT OF REGION 9’S
ADMINISTRATION OF THE CALIFORNIA AIR COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM
(1997) (discussing serious weaknesses in California’s enforcement programs), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oigearch/reports/1997/air9tabl.htm; Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs
Through It (The Failure of the Enforcement in the Clean Water Act), 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 1, 34 (1997) (concluding, based on an empirical study comparing enforcement of Clean
Water Act requirements in Washington and Georgia, that substantial differences exist between
the states in their commitment to enforcing the Act). The EPA’s oversight of state programs
also provides only partial assurance that enforcement will be rigorous. See, e.g., OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NO. E1AE7-63-0045-100244, CONSOLIDATED
REPORT ON OCEA’S OVERSIGHT OF REGIONAL AND STATE AIR ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS
(1998) (discussing the shortcomings of the EPA’s ability to oversee the states’ implementation
of the Clean Air Act), available at http://www.epa.gov/oigearth/reports/1998/8100244.pdf.
TSCA and FIFRA programs are not delegated to the states, and thus the EPA remains
the sole agency overseeing enforcement of these programs. Information on the EPA’s
enforcement resources under FIFRA was not readily available, although in terms of the number
of inspections conducted by EPA regional offices, this statute fared the worst, accounting for
only 1 percent of all inspections conducted in 1998 (a decline from roughly 4 percent in 1995).
REITZE, supra note 86, at 491. Some dated information on the staffing and resources of the
EPA’s TSCA program, which primarily involves the review of premanufacture notifications
under TSCA, suggests that the program is badly understaffed. An OTA project found that in
the nineteen-year history of TSCA implementation, the EPA had reviewed only “about 2
percent of the 70,000 chemicals in commerce.” OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
PUB NO. OTA-BP-ENV-166, SCREENING AND TESTING OF CHEMICALS IN COMMERCE
11 (1995).
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244
Consequently, regulated actors, who know
regulated parties.
whether they are in compliance with regulations and can limit access
to their facilities, are able to lower the probability that their violations
will be discovered.245 When industries strategically avoid leveling with
regulators about the extent of modifications to their facility in order
to sidestep onerous Clean Air Act requirements,246 or when an oil
refinery flushes an open tank filled with volatile hazardous wastes

244. See Rechtschaffen, supra note 147, at 1253 (arguing that “self-audits uncover and
correct many violations that the government would never discover on its own”); see also infra
notes 258–59 and accompanying text.
245. This problem is appreciated by some environmental economists, who have written
articles devising regulatory approaches that no longer allow private parties to benefit from
private information regarding compliance. See Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, Moral
Hazard Problems in Fisheries Regulation: The Case of Illegal Landings and Discard, 24
RESOURCES & ENERGY ECON. 281, 281–82 (2002) (proposing a “tax/subsidy” mechanism to
regulate fisheries); Lewis, supra note 63, at 826–37 (suggesting ways to decrease information
rents through incentive regulation); Kathleen Segerson, Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint
Pollution Control, 15 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 87, 88 (1988) (describing “an economic
incentive scheme that could be used to control [pollution] even in the presence of uncertainty
and monitoring difficulties”). The problem also has been explored by Drs. Polasky and
Doremus in their analysis of endangered species protection. See Polasky & Doremus, supra note
85, at 41 (concluding from their analysis that the current Endangered Species Act (ESA), “in
which the burden of proof is on the regulator and compensation is provided only in extreme
cases, gives landowners little incentive to cooperate with information collection activity”).
Congress has been attentive to these problems, and has provided incremental adjustments to
individual environmental laws that endeavor to increase the probability of catching violations by
increasing protections to whistleblowers, see generally TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (2000); OSHA,
29 U.S.C. § 660 (2000); SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300j–9(i) (2000); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000);
CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (2000); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9610
(2000), and providing bounties to third parties who report violations, see generally CAA, 33
U.S.C. § 7413(f) (2000); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9609(d). The use of citizen suits also serves to
increase the probability that violations will be caught and sanctioned. See generally Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185
(2000) (describing the important role that citizen enforcement plays in detecting and enforcing
violations).
246. See, e.g., James Lofton, Environmental Enforcement: The Impact of Cultural Values and
Attitudes on Social Regulation, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,906, 10,913 (2001)
(discussing how, in one case:
[M]anagers [of large utility plants] were aware that if the scale and magnitude of the
massive construction projects needed to keep the plants running came to EPA’s
attention, it was unlikely that EPA would agree that these projects were routine
maintenance, repair, or replacement. Rather than seeking agency guidance to
determine if their practices were legal, [these] managers took careful notes at power
industry conferences where they were counseled to use the term “‘routine
maintenance’” rather than ‘“modifications’” when talking to EPA officials about
component replacements at coal-fired plants.
(footnotes omitted)).
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247
while front-office staff keep the state inspector waiting, they
demonstrate how much latitude they have in safeguarding potentially
damaging private information and, in so doing, limiting the
probability of an enforcement action.248
To counteract this problem and raise the probability of catching
violations, some environmental laws employ rigid self-monitoring
requirements that mandate actors to self-monitor and self-report their
polluting activities under guidelines that leave little room for
249
discretion. The Clean Water Act requirements for discharge permits
and the Clean Air Act requirements governing large electric utilities
provide the best examples of these inflexible, self-monitoring
requirements: they require actors to install monitors on large
pollution stacks and outflow pipes that automatically sample the
pollutant stream at regular intervals.250
Self-monitoring requirements established under other
environmental regulatory programs are considerably more
permissive, however. In fact, many other regulatory self-monitoring
requirements provide actors great discretion regarding when and how

247. See RUTH CLEVELAND, TEXAS NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION COMMISSION
UPSET/MAINTENANCE INVESTIGATION REPORT, BP AMOCO, TEXAS CITY BUSINESS UNIT 2
(2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
248. See also infra note 257.
249. See, e.g., EPA Technical Standards and Corrective Action Requirements for Owners
and Operators of Underground Storage Tanks, 40 C.F.R. § 280.40 (2003) (prescribing release
detection methods for all underground storage tanks to detect leaks “from any portion of the
tank and the connected underground piping that routinely contains product”).
250. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(A) (requiring dischargers to install monitoring
equipment and maintain records on discharges); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (same); id. § 7651k(a)
(requiring utilities engaged in a sulfur dioxide trading program to install continuous emissions
monitoring equipment). But see Flatt, supra note 243, at 18–19 (observing that smaller point
sources often are not required to obtain National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permits, making it difficult to track their individual or cumulative contributions to
water quality problems). In promulgating regulations for continuous emissions monitors for
large utilities, the EPA has even established penalties for monitors that fail, producing even
stronger incentives for accurate compliance information. See, e.g., Acid Rain Program: General
Provisions and Permits, Allowance System, Continuous Emissions Monitoring, Excess
Emissions and Administrative Appeals, 58 Fed. Reg. 3590, 3635 (Jan. 11, 1993) (promulgating a
rule assuming that emissions are at the maximum level whenever there are not continuous
emissions monitoring data).
However, even these programs have been criticized by the GAO for leaving substantial
gaps in both the accuracy and representativeness of self-reporting information. See U.S. GEN.
ACCT. OFFICE, GAO/RCED-90-155, AIR POLLUTION: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN
DETECTING AND PREVENTING VIOLATIONS (1990); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, GAO/RCED93-21, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: EPA CANNOT ENSURE THE ACCURACY OF SELFREPORTED COMPLIANCE MONITORING (1993).
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they self-monitor and report pollution, including allowing them to
determine whether they even fall under an environmental regulatory
251
program at all. Actors, for example, can determine based on their
own knowledge when or whether to test wastes to determine if they
252
are hazardous and subject to expensive disposal restrictions. As
253
previously discussed, actors are also given considerable discretion in
determining whether sudden releases of a hazardous substance
254
exceed threshold amounts and require reporting. Because the
regulated entities themselves make many of the key decisions about
255
how and when to comply, enforcement officials lack reliable and
consistent information about the nature of these activities.256 Thus, the

251. See, e.g., Reitze & Hoffman, supra note 166, at 743–45 (deeming it problematic that the
major environmental statutes rely heavily on facilities “to identify themselves as subject to
regulation, monitor their own compliance and report to the EPA or the authorized state
agency”).
252. See, e.g., Standards Applicable to Generators of Hazardous Waste, 40 C.F.R. § 262.11
(2003) (instructing generators of potentially hazardous wastes under RCRA to “[a]pply[ ]
knowledge of the hazard characteristic of the waste” or “[t]est[ ] the waste” according to federal
regulations but not specifying what constitutes adequate “knowledge,” how often wastes should
be tested, how to ensure that wastes being tested are representative, or how generator
compliance with the regulation should be documented); see also EPCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11,023(g)(2) (2000) (requiring facilities to make only “reasonable estimates” of their use,
manufacture, and processing of listed hazardous substances to determine whether they are
covered under the TRI requirements); supra notes 173–74. Other “knowledge-based” selfmonitoring requirements include (1) whether to report the release of a reportable quantity of
hazardous substances under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a), and associated regulations, 40
C.F.R. § 302.6 (requiring notification once a “person in charge” “has knowledge,” but only
when “the total amount of the mixture or solution equals or exceeds the RQ [reportable
quantity]”); and (2) whether a facility is “major” and thus subject to various, more stringent
emission requirements under the Clean Air Act, see CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7511e (2000) (detailing
when a source is major for purposes of heightened regulatory restrictions under nonattainment
rules, determinations that are left to the facilities’ discretion to validate).
253. See supra Parts II.B.1–2.
254. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (relying on “person in charge” to accurately assess
whether there has been a release of more than a reportable quantity of hazardous substance);
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (same).
255. See, e.g., Caroline B. Buenger, Reliance on Generator Knowledge to Characterize Waste
Under RCRA: Gambling on the Use of ‘Unacceptable’ Knowledge, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,439, 10,441–42, 10,447–48 (1997) (outlining the uncertainty of the EPA’s generator
testing requirements and its scant enforcement of the requirements (three administrative
enforcement cases in seventeen years, all of which the EPA lost), and explaining how this
uncertainty might allow a source of waste to defend itself successfully in future enforcement
actions using the “fair notice” defense).
256. In discussing an enforcement suit for violations of the Clean Air Act against a large
chemical plant in Texas, Mr. May details the regulators’ difficulties in learning about the high
concentrations of air toxins in the air, tracing them to a particular facility, and then ultimately
linking them to a particular problem inside that facility. After quoting the EPA as testifying in
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probability of identifying violations under such circumstances is
extremely low when the compliance requirements are vague and the
regulated party controls the information needed to prove
257
noncompliance.
Not surprisingly, then, a substantial shortfall exists between the
number of enforcement actions and an industry’s own admissions of
258
noncompliance. In one survey, two-thirds of corporate counsel
the trial that it “relied 100 percent on the accuracy of information reported by regulated
facilities,” the author (May) observes that “if the neighbors hadn’t complained, Huntsman’s [the
polluting facility’s] crimes would have gone entirely unnoticed.” See, e.g., May, supra note 89.
257. Actors in some settings have gone to great lengths to keep the information to
themselves. See supra notes 90–96. In the partly analogous context of Endangered Species Act
enforcement, several authors have noted the resistance of some private landowners to providing
any information on the species or providing access to their land for government regulators to
conduct an inventory. In one report, regulators resorted to using volunteers from the Girl
Scouts to survey private, open lands for endangered species because landowners were less likely
to use guns against these girls. Polasky & Doremus, supra note 85, at 23. Others have
documented landowners destroying the species’ habitat before regulators discover the animals’
existence on the private land. See David A. Dana, Natural Preservation and the Race to Develop,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 695 n.107 (1995) (discussing “substantial evidence of [landowner] races
to destroy natural habitats in anticipation of the adoption of habitat preservation restrictions”).
258. Corporate surveys suggest that firms might be more willing to conduct self-audits if
penalties for the detected violations were waived or reduced. A 1995 Price Waterhouse survey
reported that half of the corporate respondents would expand their environmental auditing if
penalties were reduced for violations voluntarily discovered and corrected, revealing a potential
shortfall between the violations caught by regulators and the violations existing within
corporations. See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention
of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,617, 19,619 (Apr. 11, 2000). Disparate empirical evidence of
substantial noncompliance with environmental requirements reinforces the possibility that at
least some firms are not engaged in self-audits, or at least not self-audits that lead to
compliance. See, e.g., Jensen & Vestergaard, supra note 245, at 281–82 (observing that illegal
landings (fishing that exceeds fishing quotas) of cod in the North Sea account for 22 percent of
the catch weight and 51 percent of the number of caught fish, a finding that they attribute to the
private information of fishermen regarding compliance); Blais et al., supra note 19 (describing
the difficulties of detecting violations of air toxics requirements); see also May, supra note 89
(describing very high, unexplained levels of air toxics at the border of a large chemical plant in
Port Neches, Texas, which ultimately were traced to broken equipment that the company
declined to fix and did not report); id. (reporting on a different study in Houston in 2002
“show[ing] that amounts of ethylene and propylene measured in the atmosphere seem to be at
least three times higher than the emissions inventories reported by industry”).
In a harsh critique of the EPA’s enforcement policies, James Delong, a senior research
associate at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, argues that most violations of environmental
laws are trivial and do not harm the environment, a conclusion that he supports with surveys of
firms regarding their prosecuted “noncompliance events” and the EPA’s statistics on civil
enforcement cases. DELONG, supra note 148, at 12–17. What Delong neglects to account for in
reaching his conclusion, however, are the substantial gaps in the EPA’s enforcement
information. The EPA’s civil cases involve only identified violations that support a calculation of
noncompliance: they say nothing about violations that the EPA has not discovered. Indeed, the
number of enforcement suits would seem to rise with the availability of evidence on the types of
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believed that their client corporations had, in the prior year, violated
at least one environmental law, yet the vast majority of these
259
violations appear not to have been either reported or caught.
Empirical statistics and enforcement reports also provide support for
the intuitive prediction that the more rigorous the enforceable
requirements, the higher the rate of compliance.260 When
environmental regulatory programs leave little discretion for actors
with regard to self-reporting, enforcement actions are more abundant;
conversely, when regulated parties are afforded discretion with
261
regard to self-monitoring, the number of enforcement actions drop.
violation. See note 207 and accompanying text. For violations about which firms are able to
guard information on compliance, one would expect a relational decline in the enforcement
suits filed. Yet, this pivotal role of private information in understanding compliance rates is
completely omitted from Delong’s critique of the EPA’s enforcement effort. See DELONG,
supra note 148, at 17 (concluding from the EPA’s enforcement record that the “number of
major violations . . . is quite small, unless EPA’s investigators are amazingly inept”); cf.
ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP, ABOVE THE LAW: HOW THE GOVERNMENT LETS
MAJOR AIR POLLUTERS OFF THE HOOK 15 (1999) (arguing that “paperwork violations” are
not necessarily insignificant but can conceal substantial underlying violations of emissions
requirements), available at http://www.ewg.org/reports_content/abovethelaw/washington.pdf.
Economists writing in the area of environmental enforcement would consider Delong’s failure
to account for the role of private information in evaluating compliance rates to be a fatal error.
See supra note 63 (discussing the effect of asymmetrical information).
259. See Marian Lavelle, Environmental Vise: Law, Compliance, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 30, 1993,
at S1 (discussing a survey of corporate counsel in which two-thirds admitted that their client
companies recently had violated environmental laws, although most lawyers surveyed asserted
that it was not possible to achieve full compliance with the environmental laws because of their
cost, complexity, and uncertainty). This survey seems to finesse related arguments that the
regulatory requirements are too complex to understand, see, e.g., DELONG, supra note 148, at
35–55, given that at least some of the applicable laws were apparently clear enough for
“corporate counsel” to conclude that their companies were violating them.
260. See Flatt, supra note 243, at 27 (empirically relating noncompliance problems for
NPDES permits under the Clean Water Act with the strength of enforcement resources);
Rechtschaffen, supra note 147, at 1206–08 (describing a number of GAO and academic reports
finding that increased enforcement of Clean Water Act requirements (in which self-monitoring
expectations are unambiguous) leads to increased compliance rates); cf. id. at 1227–30
(describing a broader range of studies that show a direct correlation between the intensity of
enforcement and compliance rates).
261. See, e.g., Maria E. Chang, Citizen Suits: Toward a Workable Solution to Help Created
Wetlands Succeed, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 98 (1993) (“Most citizen suits have
concentrated on the [Clean Water Act] because that statute requires monitoring and selfreporting, making it relatively easy to identify violations.”); LeRoy C. Paddock, Environmental
Enforcement at the Turn of the Century, 21 ENVTL. LAW. 1509, 1523–24 (1991) (observing that
the greatest number of citizen suits have occurred under the Clean Water Act “in part, because
violations cannot be as easily identified using reports submitted under those [other] programs”);
Susan D. Carle, Note, A Hazardous Mix: Discretion to Disclose and Incentives to Suppress
Under OSHA’s Hazard Communication Standard, 97 YALE L.J. 581, 581–84 (1988) (discussing
evidence of manufacturers’ extensive noncompliance with OSHA’s Hazardous Communication
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Empirical support for a similar correlation between enforcement
262
levels and compliance rates is also found in the tax literature.
Ten years of experience with self-audit laws also provide
surprising evidence of how actors may be able to escape enforcement
263
by controlling the release of internal information. These self-audit
laws, passed by at least twenty-three states and the federal
264
government, are based on the fundamental premise that regulators
Standard (HCS), which is linked to the failure of the standard to require manufacturers to
disclose product ingredients, making it nearly impossible for workers and others to enforce); see
also Polasky & Doremus, supra note 85, at 27 (discussing similar information burdens in the
enforcement of the Endangered Species Act on private land and noticing, after listing the
evidentiary obstacles for government enforcers, the dearth of enforcement cases).
262. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax
Compliance, 64 OH. ST. L.J. 1453, 1503–05 (2003) (explaining that cash businesses—which
generally lack documentation about transactions and thus have many informational
advantages—have higher than normal tax noncompliance rates).
263. See, e.g., PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 5, at 989 (describing laws that protect
environmental audits from disclosure in some circumstances); John H. Cushman, Many States
Give Polluting Firms New Protections, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1996, at A1 (reporting that “one
state after another is adopting legislation to protect companies from disclosure or punishment
when they discover environmental offenses at their own plants”). The EPA has also used selfdisclosure incentive programs for more specific reporting requirements under TSCA and testing
and reporting requirements under the Clean Air Act. See EPA AUDIT POLICY UPDATES 2002,
at 1177 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series, No. B0-00L2, 830 (May/June
2002)).
264. Rechtschaffen, supra note 147, at 1244–48 (listing and discussing twenty-three state
audit laws and the EPA’s counterproposal for an audit law). A state’s enthusiasm for providing
these rewards varies tremendously, ranging from protecting the firm from any enforcement
action while keeping the violations confidential to simply lowering penalties to a more
predictable amount if a firm voluntarily discloses the violations. See e.g., id. at 1246 (discussing
state laws that protect firms conducting self-audits from enforcement action); Leroy Paddock,
Environmental Accountability and Public Involvment, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 243, 247
(discussing the state of Minnesota’s use of penalty waivers for self-dislosed environmental
violations). EPA’s self-audit guidelines are by far the least generous, providing only reduced
sanctions for voluntarily disclosed violations. Incentives for Self-Policing; Discovery, Disclosure,
Correction and Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,711–12 (Dec. 22, 1995).
Revisions in 2000 provided more generous timelines and helpful clarifications, but still retained
the limited immunities for penalties. Final Policy Statement on Incentives for Self-Policing:
Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,618
(Apr. 11, 2000).
At the other end of the spectrum are self-audit laws, like those passed in Colorado, that
create a presumption of immunity from all penalties for self-discovered violations provided that
they are disclosed and corrected within a reasonable time. George Van Cleve & Keith W.
Holman, Promise and Reality in the Enforcement of the Amended Clean Air Act Part II: Federal
Enforceability and Environmental Auditing, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,151, 10,161
(1997). The protections offered by these more generous state laws, however, may be undercut
by the EPA’s opposition to the laws and its threat to overfile on state cases, which effectively
removes any protections that these state laws offer. Channing J. Martin, Voluntary Disclosure of
Environmental Violations: Is Mea Culpa a Good Idea or a Bad Move?, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
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will be unable to catch most violations. The laws thus attempt to
enlist the cooperation of the regulated parties by rewarding those
265
who volunteer violations. Although the merits of these audit laws
266
have been contested, their impact on the regulated community
clearly underscores the extent of these actors’ superior knowledge of
noncompliance. By January 2002, for example, 1,500 entities
nationwide volunteered environmental violations at 6,065 facilities in
order to obtain reduced penalties under the EPA’s audit policy.267
Presumably, these violations would have escaped discovery without
the incentives policy. An even more insidious lesson from the selfaudit laws arises from the nature of the violations that are being
reported. The violations that are being self-reported under the EPA’s
policy are primarily those violations that would be most easily
detected by regulators if regulators invested the resources to
investigate them. At the same time, these self-reported violations are
generally inexpensive to rectify, for example, violations of
recordkeeping requirements.268 This could mean that regulated
L. Inst.) 10,692, 10,694–96 (2002); see also Thomas J. Kelly, Jr. & Gregory S. Braker, Navigating
the Bermuda Triangle of Environmental Criminal Enforcement, 2001 A.B.A. SEC. ENV’T,
ENERGY & RESOURCES 17 (discussing adverse ramifications for criminal liability).
265. See David A. Dana, The Perverse Incentives of Environmental Audit Immunity, 81
IOWA L. REV. 969, 969–73 (2002). As defense lawyers have observed, however, the incentives in
audit laws are probably not sufficient for violations that invite other liabilities or charges. See
also Kelly & Braker, supra note 264, at 5–7 (detailing the multiple litigation risks that could flow
from voluntarily disclosing environmental violations to the EPA, including toxic tort litigation;
state enforcement; criminal charges, particularly against employees; government contracting
problems; and shareholder suits).
266. See, e.g., Dana, supra note 265, at 982–93 (arguing, with public choice models, that
audit immunities could lead to less preventative management); Rechtschaffen, supra note 147,
at 1255–57 (detailing the arguments against audit laws).
267. Martin, supra note 264, at 10,695.
268. See EPA AUDIT POLICY UPDATES 2002, supra note 263, at 822 (showing that more
than 83 percent of the audit settlements resolve violations of EPCRA and the CWA, which both
have clear reporting obligations that are easy for regulators to enforce and for regulated entities
to correct); see also Martin, supra note 264, at 10,696 (noting that the main use of the EPA’s
audit immunities is for “recordkeeping obligations” and hypothesizing that the laws might be
used more frequently when “[i]t is quick and easy to come into compliance” and “[t]here has
been no harm to the environment”). Despite the low costs of compliance, EPCRA and CWA
reporting violations can result in high penalty amounts if caught by regulators. See, e.g.,
EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11045(a) (2000) (specifying maximum civil penalties of $25,000 per day for
violations of emergency planning requirements). For example, the EPA settled with ten
telecommunications companies for six hundred violations of EPCRA and the CWA, which
required “properly notifying local emergency planning committees of the presence of hazardous
chemicals and preparing spill prevention plans to reduce the risk of environmental accidents,
and protect the safety of those who respond if an accident occurs.” EPA AUDIT POLICY
UPDATES 2002, supra note 263, at 803. Under the audit settlement, the companies corrected
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parties’ control over internal information enables them to volunteer
incriminating information only when the economics support such a
disclosure. Regulated parties’ self-reporting behavior also suggests
that they may avoid disclosing more serious violations when they
perceive that the probability of being caught by a regulator will be
low, especially as compared against the economic benefits they gain
by not installing the requisite pollution controls or satisfying other
269
regulatory requirements in a timely fashion.

these recordkeeping violations (presumably at low cost) and paid a total of $128,772 in
penalties, which was based on the amount the EPA calculated that the companies saved in
delaying their compliance. “Pursuant to the Audit Policy, the Agency has waived or proposed to
waive more than $4.2 million in potential gravity-based penalties that otherwise could have been
assessed.” Id. Putting the math together, one can assume that the companies ultimately paid
over $250,000 in penalties and compliance costs to avoid an enforcement action (and its
accompanying litigation expenses) that could have resulted in a $4.2 million penalty. See supra
note 241 (presenting the formula). Settling with the agency under the audit policy would thus be
irrational only if the probability of being caught was less than 6 percent—unlikely for such
obvious recordkeeping omissions. Even if the company expected much lower penalties (e.g., 10
percent of the maximum $4.2 million fine), it would be in its interest to engage in an audit
settlement if it thought the probability that it would be caught was 60 percent or higher. In fact,
enforcement for more obvious and even flagrant reporting violations may cause enforcement
officials to look for other violations at a plant, making volunteer settlements of these “red flags”
even more rational. This back-of-the-envelope calculation also reveals why it is not in a firm’s
interest to disclose violations that will be costly to correct (e.g., requiring new equipment valued
at $500,000) or when the probability of detection of the violation by a regulator is likely to fall in
the single digits. Assuming that the economic benefits of noncompliance are equal to the costs
of compliance ($1 million total in this example), and assuming roughly the same penalties ($4.2
million), firms would not be inclined to report violations so long as the probability that an
enforcement official would discover the violation is less than about 23 percent.
269. See, e.g., Steven A. Herman, NCSL Study Finds That State Environmental Audit Laws
Have No Impact on Company Self Auditing and Disclosure of Violations, 13 NAT’L ENVTL.
ENFORCEMENT J. 18, 19 (Dec. 1998/Jan. 1999) (finding that more than three-fourths of
corporations report performing compliance audits irrespective of the existence of audit laws, but
that they also report that they did not disclose violations, even in states with privileges). One
counterexample could be the willingness of some firms to enter into agreements with the EPA
to undertake complete facility audits. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 264, at 10,696. The nature of
these agreements might give insight into whether companies believe that the audits are in their
financial best interest because corrections are low cost or because the prospect of civil penalties
is so high that EPA assistance is needed.
To the extent that penalties under an audit policy are equivalent to the economic benefits
of noncompliance, reported violations again would seem to include only the most minor,
economically trivial violations. Economic benefit calculations, which appear to form the basis
for calculating penalties in most cases, are also likely to be attractive to regulated parties
because these parties again enjoy private information about what the economic benefits might
be. In contrast to estimating the costs of regulation for a cost-benefit analysis, however, in these
economic benefit calculations, the regulated party/violator has strong incentives to deflate
estimates. Empiricists could have some fun determining whether this underestimation occurs in
fact. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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Certain regulatory programs not only allow actors to reduce the
likelihood that they will be caught committing a violation, but also
encourage them to remain ignorant about these violations so that, in
the event of an enforcement action, they will face lesser sanctions.
Under current law, the more actors understand about the adverse
effects of their activities, the higher the penalty when they are
270
caught. Indeed, knowledgeable violators face not only high civil
fines but criminal penalties.271 If actors smell a pungent odor in their
air emissions but do not investigate, their penalties will likely be
limited to civil sanctions—punishment less severe than if they sample
the air with a device, discover an excessive level of pollutants, then do
nothing or discard or ignore the monitoring data.272 Knowingly

270. See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(3) (2000) (providing that culpability is one factor to
consider in assessing the proper amount of administrative penalties); OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT
AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CIVIL PENALTY POLICY FOR
SECTION 311(B)(3) AND SECTION 311(J) OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 10 (1998) (stating that
penalties should be based in part on “the sophistication of the respondent and the resources and
information available to it, and any history of regulatory staff explaining to the respondent its
legal obligations or notifying the respondent of violations”), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/civil/cwa/311pen.pdf.
271. Statutes providing criminal sanctions include the following: FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136l(b)
(2000); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2614, 2615(b) (2000); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (2000); CWA, 42
U.S.C. § 1319(c); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b)–(d) (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)–(e)
(2000). Cf. Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L. J. 2407, 2407–13
(1995) (arguing that the moral culpability features of criminal law are not appropriately
integrated into the decentralized environment of environmental criminal law and that reform is
needed).
272. See, e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining a case in
which the defendant-vice president of a manufacturing plant was convicted of falsifying,
tampering with, or rendering inaccurate a monitoring device or method because, contrary to the
regulatory requirements, he held back self-monitored samples that exceeded regulatory
standards and, when this did not work, he instructed employees to dilute samples with tap water
or reduce zinc concentration using a coffee filter); see also Kelly & Braker, supra note 264, at 3
(warning attorneys of the risks of criminal prosecution following the voluntary disclosure of civil
violations under the EPA’s audit policies and advising that “it may be more expedient to
disclose potential criminal violations directly to the appropriate U.S. Attorney’s Office [of
criminal investigations]”). Similar perverse incentives could also result from criminal
enforcement of the Endangered Species Act, in which private landowners are best advised not
to look for endangered species before developing land. Because criminal sanctions for
“harming” an endangered species only apply to “knowingly” harming the species, such
sanctions seem capable of being avoided by willful ignorance. See ESA, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1538(a)(2)(B), 1540(b) (2000) (providing criminal sanctions for “knowing” violations only);
cf. Michael J. Bean, The Endangered Species Act and Private Land: Four Lessons Learned from
the Past Quarter Century, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,701, 10,706–07 (1998) (discussing
the perverse incentives for owners to destroy or develop land to avoid federal regulation under
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violating the environmental laws is a crime and is sanctioned more
273
severely than reckless or civil violations.
B. Increasing Protections for Concealing Information
With such strong reasons to resist producing information, it is no
surprise that actors not only avoid learning about the adverse harms
created by their products or activities but, once such news is
discovered, actively seek legal protections to limit the disclosure of
274
the incriminating information. By claiming broad protections, actors
can raise the costs to others of accessing this information or, in some
cases, can even bar access completely. This Section details several
discrete legal protections. Each allows actors to claim confidentiality
privileges for privately held, damaging information. The protections
bar most public access to the information. Indeed, in many instances
even the EPA’s access is restricted.
1. Trade Secret or Confidential Business Information
Protections. Trade secret or confidential business information
protections,275 which provide firms with a vehicle for erecting

the ESA, and the resulting efforts of the Department of the Interior to reverse these incentives
by rewarding collaborative land management).
273. Compare, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (providing criminal penalties for
“negligent violations”), with id. § 1319(c)(2)–(3) (providing criminal penalties for “knowing
violations” and “knowing endangerment”). See also RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)–(f) (levying
criminal penalties only for knowing violations and defining “knowingly” in a way that excludes
recklessness). Although there have been concerns about the knowledge standards for criminal
environmental law, they have not taken issue with the perverse incentives for ignorance. Still,
many of the proposals for reform that have emerged from this debate implicitly circumvent
these perverse incentives by recommending that criminal law be used only for repeat, sinister
types of violations. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 271, at 2514–17 (discussing the difficult
legislative choices regarding what facts a criminal defendant should know to warrant criminal
prosecution and suggesting alternatives, some of which only require a defendant to be aware
that he is doing something reckless rather than requiring proof of the “defendant’s knowledge
of all of the technical details”); Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, Director, Office of
Criminal Enforcement, to the Environmental Protection Agency, The Exercise of Investigative
Discretion 2, at http://www.epa.gov/enforcement/resources/policies/criminal/exercise.pdf (Jan.
12, 1994) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (recommending that criminal environmental
enforcement focus on the most significant and egregious violators, such as repeat or deliberator
violators and those who tamper with data and monitors).
274. See Lyndon, supra note 83, at 20 (“In the absence of a well-developed information
context, the market not only discourages firms from producing data about side effects, but
encourages ignorance and deception.”).
275. For a thoughtful discussion of the tensions between trade secret law and health and
safety protection, see id. at 4–50.
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immediate and costly barriers to accessing information about the
harms created by their products or activities, constitute the broadest
form of information protection. Confidential business information
(CBI) claims are regularly used to limit access to health information
on toxic substances and pesticides, including information on exposure
risks, and on chemical identity and ingredients.276 Such claims can
even be used to protect information collected by inspectors in the
277
course of environmental compliance inspections. Even though most
health and safety data are legislatively excluded from trade secret
278
protections, once a trade secret claim is asserted, the EPA generally
considers it valid279 until a party requests the information under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).280 Under existing regulations,

276. See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Confidential Business Information (CBI) Review, at
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/foia/cbi.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (listing environment-related information that is commonly claimed as
confidential); infra note 290 and accompanying text. OSHA also allows employers to withhold
information on chemical identities from employees by claiming they are protected as trade
secrets, as long as they indicate that they have done so on the label. EPA Hazard
Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(i) (2003).
277. See EPA Definitions, 40 C.F.R. § 2.201 (2003) (defining a business confidentiality
claim).
278. Because trade secret protections are a general common law construct and not
constitutionally protected forms of property, Congress has authority to balance them against
other goals, including health and environmental protection. Although Congress strikes the
balance differently in the various environmental statutes, it has indicated that the balance
should favor the general disclosure of information needed to determine potential adverse public
health and environmental effects. See, e.g., TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2613(b) (2000) (stating types of
data of which disclosure is not prohibited); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (exempting all
information on “effluent data,” standards, or limitations from protection as trade secrets);
CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (2000) (same for “emission data”); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604(e)(7)(F) (2000) (identifying “information with respect to any hazardous substance” not
entitled to protection).
279. See EPA Confidentiality of Business Information, 40 C.F.R. § 2.204(c)–(d) (2003)
(placing the burden for investigating and determining the validity of a CBI claim on the EPA,
with no reference to substantiation of the claim by the claimant). The EPA has promulgated
categorical denials of CBIs for certain types of information (e.g, permit applications for NPDES
permits under the Clean Water Act), which presumably take effect immediately and reject such
claims. See, e.g., EPA Confidentiality of Information, 40 C.F.R. § 122.7(b) (2003) (identifying
narrow categories for which “claims of confidentiality . . . will be denied”).
280. See 40 C.F.R. § 2.204(a) (describing the procedures that the EPA must follow “in
making initial determinations of whether business information is entitled to confidential
treatment for reasons of business confidentiality”); Public Information and Confidentiality, 65
Fed. Reg. 80,394, 80,395 (Dec. 21, 2000) (observing that “CBI regulations generally do not
require a business to submit a substantiation until disclosure becomes an issue”). Generally, it
appears that a FOIA request serves as the impetus for the EPA to review a CBI claim. See id.
(“EPA often finds it necessary to make final confidentiality determinations as a result of FOIA
requests or rulemaking.”). In 1994, the EPA reported that it received more than forty thousand
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there are no sanctions for asserting overbroad CBI claims.
Moreover, with the exception of EPCRA,282 such claims require no
substantiation—for the privilege to apply, the firm has only to stamp
283
the documents “confidential.”
Firms that are unenthusiastic about granting public access to
information on the harms created by their products and activities face
284
few restraints in abusing these generous trade secret protections.

FOIA requests a year, many of which seek confidential business information. Public
Information and Confidentiality Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,446, 60,447 (Nov. 23, 1994).
Nonetheless, in 1990, the EPA aggressively challenged over seven hundred CBI claims under
TSCA on its own (without a FOIA trigger) and appeared to make substantial headway in
reducing the number of overinclusive claims. See Julie Yang, Note, Confidential Business
Information Reform Under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 2 ENVTL. LAW. 219, 235 (1995)
(reporting and documenting this development). The literature does not reveal whether the EPA
has been able to keep up with this internal review effort since 1990.
281. Empirical evidence discussed in notes 290–97 and accompanying text, infra, in fact
suggests that industry tends to err heavily on the side of overclaiming CBI for health and safety
information.
282. EPCRA allows firms to keep chemical identities confidential but explicitly requires
companies to justify claims in their initial CBI requests. 42 U.S.C. § 11042(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
Accordingly, the EPA has developed a second set of regulations governing claims for trade
secret protection for chemical identifiers covered under EPCRA; these regulations, in contrast
to the EPA’s regulations for other statutes, are specifically intended to “eliminate[] legally
invalid and frivolous [CBI] claims.” Trade Secrets Claims for Emergency Planning and
Community Right-To-Know Information, 61 Fed. Reg. 67,016, 67,017 (Dec. 19, 1996).
Nonetheless, if the company provides the requisite supporting documentation, the EPA appears
to grant the claim without reviewing the merits. The claim is only reviewed once a party files a
FOIA request or in the unlikely event that the EPA decides to invest resources in the review of
classified information on its own initiative. EPA Trade Secrecy Claims, 40 C.F.R. § 350.9(b)
(2003).
283. See 40 C.F.R. § 2.203. No official from the company need take responsibility for
asserting the claim, and there are no penalties for asserting the claim when it is facially frivolous.
See id. §§ 2.201–2.310; see also Christopher J. Lewis, Comment, When is a Trade Secret Not So
Secret? The Deficiencies of 40 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart B, 30 ENVTL. L. 143, 171–72 (2000)
(making this same observation regarding the lack of disincentives for overbroad CBI claims).
The firm is presumed to waive the privilege, or at least must justify it later if it does not stamp
information as confidential when first submitting it to the EPA. 40 C.F.R. § 2.203(c). See also
Yang, supra note 280, at 223 (discussing how “easy” it is for companies to file CBI claims under
TSCA). For a contrasting approach to CBI taken under EPCRA, see EPA Trade Secrecy
Claims, 40 C.F.R. §§ 350.5, 350.7, 350.13, 350.27 (2003).
Once the information is publicly disseminated, the company loses its right to claim the
misappropriation of a trade secret. See, e.g., James T. O’Reilly, Seeking a Truce in the
Environmental Information Wars: Replacing Obsolete Secrecy Conflicts with New Forms of
Sharing, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,203, 10,204 (2000) (discussing this point and
concluding that “[t]his threat of income loss provides the economic incentive that motivates
industry to oppose agencies’ broader dissemination of industry-submitted technological and
process data.”).
284. The EPA openly concedes that the problem of overbroad CBI claims is serious:
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Routinely stamping all information as “confidential business
information” is expeditious and immediately protects such
information from public scrutiny. At the same time, making a CBI
285
Indeed, to obtain
claim increases search costs for others.
information that has been improperly claimed as CBI, an interested
party must submit a FOIA request, submit a follow-up FOIA request
if pieces of information appear left out or unaccounted for, and be
prepared to litigate if the information is not produced.286 Because the
public typically is denied access not only to the nondisclosed
information, but also to the firm’s justification for asserting the CBI
claim,287 the public is handicapped in its ability to challenge an EPA
decision that information is appropriately classified as a protected

EPA receives a large number of submissions of various types of information claimed
as CBI. Many of the claims received are very broad, and the Agency has limited
resources to deal with this stream of information. As a result, large amounts of
information claimed as CBI are retained by the Agency longer than necessary, and
broad or non-specific CBI claims may limit public access to information that is not
actually CBI.
Public Information and Confidentiality: Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Withdrawal
of 1994 Proposed Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,394, 80,395 (Dec. 21, 2000).
285. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161, at 54–55 (1994) (discussing how the
scientific community and others would benefit from lower cost access to TSCA data that is
claimed CBI); Carle, supra note 261, at 596–600 (discussing manufacturers’ tendency to claim
product ingredients as trade secret protected under OSHA, making OSHA’s hazard
communication standard, which provides warnings to workers, effectively unenforceable). As a
result, a CBI claim raises the search costs for others to access the information, in some cases so
substantially that interested parties will not invest the money or time to obtain the information
or even learn how they might obtain it.
Perhaps still more likely to discourage disclosure are the onerous consequences for the
poor federal bureaucrat who makes a decision to disclose information stamped as CBI when
that official’s decision later turns out to be wrong. Agency officials who wrongfully divulge trade
secret information can be charged criminally and imprisoned for up to one year, and they must
be terminated from their position. Trade Secret Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2000). RCRA and
EPCRA also provide sanctions for persons who disclose trade secret information who are not
employees of the government. TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2613 (2000); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6927(b)(2)
(2000); EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11045(d)(2) (2000); see CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7414(c) (2000) (stating
that an administrator cannot divulge information entitled to protection as a trade secret).
286. For these and other scientific costs that flow from CBI claims, see Lyndon, supra note
83, at 36–37. Search costs are also high because the FOIA response, at its best, is a data dump.
There are few electronic search techniques to sort through the information, and it is rarely
organized. Thus, even once documents are obtained, they are costly to organize and assess.
287. See 40 C.F.R. § 2.205(c) (providing that, in most cases, a company’s substantiation for a
CBI claim should receive automatic classification as CBI); see also Public Information and
Confidentiality, 65 Fed. Reg. at 80,396 (conceding potential problems with the EPA’s policy of
automatically classifying substantiations as CBI if the firm requests them, which in turn deprives
FOIA requestors of not only the information, but the basis for the CBI claim used to prevent its
disclosure).
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288
trade secret. Although less dramatic, even agency officials can be
impeded in accessing and using information stamped CBI, regardless
of whether the claim is meritorious:

Staff discussions on [CBI chemicals] must be held in secure areas,
documents can be reviewed only in secure environments, meeting
notes themselves become confidential documents and must be
logged and guarded under lock and key, and computers must have
their memories and permanent storage media erased after
289
processing confidential data.

Available evidence confirms what one might expect from these
overgenerous trade secret protections: firms routinely use CBI claims
290
without basis. One organization even went so far as to claim a firm
address as protected trade secret information.291 In 1990, for example,
the EPA reviewed CBI claims under the Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA) and challenged some nonmeritorious claims. By 1992,
“industry had voluntarily amended and withdrawn over 600 claims
292
after EPA’s inquiries.” A 1992 study found that confidential
288. See Lyndon, supra note 83, at 35 (making this same argument).
289. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161, at 55; see also O’Reilly, supra note 283, at
10,204–06. Moreover, only “cleared” regulators are allowed access to information claimed as
CBI. Until recently, the statute was read to foreclose allowing state officials to access
information claimed as CBI. Yang, supra note 280, at 231. The EPA has worked to provide
states access to CBI information through the “contractors” provision of TSCA, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2613(a)(2). Yang, supra note 280, at 232. Nevertheless, given these barriers to access, some of
this information is likely missed or proves practicably unobtainable to agency regulators or their
citizen-oriented watchdogs.
290. See, e.g., OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & TOXICS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
FINAL ACTION PLAN: TSCA CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION REFORM 1-5 (1994)
(observing that some and possibly many CBI claims under TSCA lack merit); Sheila A.
Ferguson et al., Influence of CBI Requirements on TSCA Implementation, Hampshire
Research Associates 41 (Mar. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (concluding, by reviewing CBI claims from 1977 through 1990, that “all available
evidence supports the proposition that much of the information covered by CBI claims is not
legitimately entitled to protection as TSCA CBI”).
The GAO reports that the Hampshire Study also found that firms claimed as CBI under
TSCA information that had already been disseminated publicly. “For example, information
contained elsewhere in newspaper articles and corporate annual reports was submitted as was
publicly available information from EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory, a system that contains
nationwide information on toxic chemicals emitted into the air, ground, and water by
manufacturing facilities.” U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161, at 56–57.
291. See Industry Moves to Exempt Sensitive Information from TSCA Reporting, CHEMICAL
ENG’G, Aug. 1994, 45–46.
292. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161, at 56. The EPA’s limited resources make this
approach available only in the short term, however. Id. The EPA also reviewed CBI claims on
health and safety studies and found that over one-fifth of the claims had no merit. Id.
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information was identified in more than 90 percent of the
premanufacture notices required for new toxic substances under
293
TSCA, a statute in which Congress explicitly stated that “health and
safety stud[ies]” are not ordinarily protected from disclosure by trade
294
secret claims.
Industry representatives admit that they claim CBI protection
295
when the claim is inappropriate. In fact, the pervasiveness of CBI
claims is one of industry’s primary arguments against reforming the
system. Firms argue that such practices are so prevalent that justifying
the vast array of information that they routinely claim as confidential
business information would be unduly burdensome. They have even
argued that requiring this substantiation might violate the Regulatory
Flexibility Act296 given the added burden that the requirement would
impose on small manufacturers.297
From the standpoint of environmental and public health
protection, the EPA’s CBI program is a disaster. Allowing firms to
classify much of the information that they are legally required to
submit minimizes even the modest benefits achieved by requiring
actors to produce at least some information on the harms caused by
their products and activities. Moreover, actors taking this approach
run only slight risks. CBI claims are made discreetly, so there is little
public awareness that firms are taking advantage of this loophole. In

293. Id. at 5.
294. TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2613(b). See generally McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 83, at 874–75
(arguing that TSCA “specifically exempt[s] health and safety studies from the protections
otherwise afforded to proprietary information”).
295. In the GAO’s 1994 study, industry commentators who were interviewed “accepted the
[GAO’s] basic finding that the chemical industry does make improper confidentiality claims and
needs to address such claims.” U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161, at 58. They defended
their practice of overclaiming under TSCA, however, by arguing that “the purpose of TSCA
information is to provide EPA with a factual basis for chemical regulation, not to provide a
basis for disseminating data on the chemicals to other interested organizations.” Id.
296. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2000).
297. See, e.g., Letter from Warren E. Stickle, President, Chemical Producers and
Distributors Association & Bill Balek, President, International Sanitary Supply Association, to
the EPA Docket 2–3 (June 13, 2001) [hereinafter Stickle & Balek Letter] (responding to
probosed changes in the CBI rules, see Public Information and Confidentiality, Advance Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,394 (Dec. 21, 2000)), available at
http://www.cpda.com/Content/regulatory_affairs/archived/CPDAISSAComments.pdf. At the
same time, the agency’s administrative costs appear quite substantial. See, e.g., Lyndon, supra
note 83, at 35 (“The agency whose mandate is to foster health protection ends up in the
anomalous position of ‘sanitizing’ and protecting industry documents . . . .”).
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addition, firms face few, if any, sanctions for making overbroad CBI
claims.
Given the multifaceted advantages that accrue to firms from
classifying information on the externalities created by their products
and activities, it comes as no surprise that the EPA’s concerted efforts
298
to reform the CBI program have consistently failed. Indeed,
industry representatives not only vigorously oppose regulatory
reform, but they argue that existing protections are inadequate to
ensure that competitive secrets are safe from disclosure when public
health and safety data are disseminated. One trade association has
even insisted that still broader protections are needed and has
proposed legislation to that end.299
2. Privacy Protections. Firms also take advantage of limited
privacy protections that make it more difficult and costly for the

298. Over the past decade, the EPA has twice attempted to reform the problem of
overbroad CBI protections—without success. See Public Information and Confidentiality
Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,445 (Nov. 23, 1994); Public Information and Confidentiality,
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,394 (Dec. 21, 2000); U.S. GEN.
ACCT. OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION: EPA COULD BETTER ADDRESS CONCERNS
ABOUT DISSEMINATING SENSITIVE BUSINESS INFORMATION (June 1999) [hereinafter U.S.
GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION] (commenting on the usefulness of such
information), available at http://www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/intel/rced99-156.pdf; U.S. GEN.
ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161 (discussing the EPA’s assessment of the risks of chemicals);
Ferguson et al, supra note 290 (noting that CBI claims severely limit access to TSCA data);
Stickle & Balek Letter, supra note 297 (responding to the proposed reforms); see also Yang,
supra note 280, at 229–37 (discussing the EPA’s failed effort to reform CBI under TSCA in
1994); CBI Rule on Hold as Regulatory Negotiation Eyed, 26 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 17 (1995).
The EPA has also suggested that firms provide materials accounting to strengthen
EPCRA reporting, which would include information on toxic chemicals that enter, are used, and
leave the facility. This proposal was also opposed and ultimately terminated by industry. See,
e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION, supra, at 11, 12 (discussing
how industry opposition on CBI grounds led to the abandonment of this proposal).
299. Industry argues that even more trade secret protections are needed given the “mosaic”
effect—the ability of competitors to piece together information about their operations from bits
of publicly available data. See, e.g., Public Information and Confidentiality, 59 Fed. Reg. at
80,396 (discussing how the regulated community “has made the argument that multiple pieces of
data which may not qualify individually to be treated as CBI and are made publicly available
can be pieced together to reveal a trade secret”); Stickle & Balek Letter, supra note 297, at 5
(discussing the threats that the mosaic effect presents to trade secret information). In 1998, the
law firm of Ropes & Gray prepared a report for the Chemical Manufacturers Association that
advocated adoption of a “uniform statute that would make it easier for its members to assert
confidentiality claims based on the ‘mosaic’ argument.” U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE,
ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION, supra note 298, at 22.
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government to access information about their externalities.
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the aerial surveillance of a
large industrial facility without consent of the owner as consistent
with the Fourth Amendment,301 in-person inspections require
inspectors to obtain either prior permission from the owner or an ex
parte warrant from a court.302 Some courts, moreover, insist that such
warrants provide only limited access for inspectors. For example, if an
inspector enters a site for a routine inspection and discovers that
invasive sampling is needed—a need not anticipated when the initial
warrant was obtained—the inspector may be required to return to
court to obtain a second ex parte warrant before conducting the
sampling.303 Moreover, only government inspectors have access to
private industrial premises. Even when there are discharges from a
property onto adjacent land, neighboring residents have no way to
obtain access unless the owner invites them on the site.304
3. Litigation Settlement. Litigation settlements also provide a
vehicle for preventing public access to incriminating information on
the harms caused by one’s activities or products. Even though private
litigation has uncovered some of the most important information on
305
the adverse effects of products such as asbestos, lead, and tobacco,
300. Fourth Amendment protections from unreasonable searches and seizures generally
require government inspectors to obtain a warrant before entering a facility without consent.
There are several exceptions that weaken these protections for industrial establishments. See
REITZE, supra note 86, at 497–98, 500–03.
301. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237–38 (1986).
302. See, e.g., REITZE, supra note 86, at 499–500 (outlining a neutral EPA inspection
scheme). To obtain a warrant for administrative purposes, the inspector must generally have
some evidence of suspected violations (“reasonable suspicion of a violation”) or must be
selecting the facility at random using “neutral” criteria. Id. at 499.
303. United States v. Tarkowski, 248 F.3d 596, 599–601 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Roger D.
Schwenke, Regulatory Access to Contaminated Sites: Some New Twists to an Old Tale, 26 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 749, 754–83 (2002) (surveying case law on ways that
landowners can impede or file takings claims challenging government efforts to obtain access to
private land for purposes of sampling and cleanup).
304. To enter the site without permission or a privilege would constitute trespass.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 (1965). Even the privilege to enter private land to
abate a private nuisance appears to require the trespasser to possess information of the nuisance
to justify the entry. Id. § 201.
305. Tobacco provides the best example, see generally GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 103;
HILTS, supra note 35, although important revelations about the safety of products also emerged
in a variety of other mass tort cases, see supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text. Of course,
even the most aggressive plaintiffs’ attorneys are sometimes unable to dislodge damaging
internal documents (without resorting to theft) if the company is willing to resist discovery in
illegal ways. See, e.g., Henry Weinstein, Judge Imposes $100,000 Fine on Tobacco Company
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when private cases settle and the plaintiffs are willing—usually as a
result of a bonus payment—the record of such information can be
306
sealed or destroyed. This practice has troubled judges and scholars
because it implies that, simply by paying enough, an actor may keep
damaging information from public view, even when the actor’s
products or activities have engendered litigation precisely because the
307
actor knowingly failed to disclose the harms.
4. Nondisclosure Contracts. Actors also take advantage of
nondisclosure clauses to conceal adverse information about their
products.308 When required by law to produce certain studies,
manufacturers and others often contract the research out to
309
university scientists and consultant laboratories. These contracts
typically allow the manufacturer to retain ownership of the results
and control how the research is reported in the literature.310 Through
these contracts, firms are sometimes able to suppress research that is

Litigation, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1997, at D1 (reporting that a court imposed a $100,000 penalty
against Brown & Williamson for failing to comply with pretrial discovery orders requiring the
company to turn over internal documents).
306. See, e.g., Marty Steinberg, Protection of Proprietary Rights and Trade Secrets, C520
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 655, 672–74 (1990) (discussing how courts can (but ordinarily are loathe to) seal
files containing trade secret information or grant protective orders). Firms can also attempt to
resist sharing these documents by claiming attorney-client and related privileges for much of the
information. See, e.g., Kelly & Braker, supra note 264 (advocating the use of discovery privileges
to avoid criminal liability). But see Reitze & Hoffman, supra note 166, at 715–16 (discussing the
limits of these privilege claims when they concern self-evaluative documents sought by the
government in environmental enforcement cases).
307. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein & Catherine Wimberly, Secrecy in Law and Science, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 18–30 (2001) (discussing the problem of secrecy agreements in mass tort
cases and how they may in fact conflict with the protection of public safety); Keith Schneider,
Court Rejects U.S. Effort to Keep Exxon Valdez Settlement Agreement Secret, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
9, 1991, at A9.
308. They accomplish this through confidentiality and nondisclosure agreements. See, e.g.,
Steinberg, supra note 306, at 672 (providing overview of these agreements in the context of
trade secret protections).
309. See, e.g., Gayle Charnley & Jacqueline Patterson, Use of Human Subjects Data for
Regulating Chemical Exposures, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,923, 10,927 (2003)
(referring to pesticide manufacturers’ use of contract laboratories to conduct required testing in
course of a larger discussion about the usefulness of private clinical testing); see also supra notes
125–32 and accompanying text.
310. See, e.g., Elina Hemminki et al., The Courts—A Challenge to Health Technology
Assessment, 285 SCIENCE 203, 203 (1999) (describing several cases in which manufacturers
mounted legal challenges to prevent the dissemination of data); see also supra note 103 and
accompanying text. This is such a problem that journals are beginning to require disclosure of
these conditions as a prerequisite to publication. See infra notes 404–05 and accompanying text.
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311
unfavorable. Moreover, after suppressing research results, firms
may even be able to “shop” for other scientists to conduct the same
research with modifications to the study design or analytical methods
that, while meeting legal requirements, produce more favorable
results.312 Typically, outside parties have no way to become aware of
this trial-and-error approach. It is difficult to know the extent to
which this “gaming” of scientific research occurs, but the high rate of
bias in sponsor-financed research suggests significant sponsor
influence in both study design and the reporting of study results.313 To
the extent that firms do suppress unfavorable research, of course, this
practice distorts the scant scientific information that remains.

5. State Privilege Laws. Over the last decade, several new
protections have emerged that provide even more opportunity for
actors to keep adverse information about their products and activities
to themselves. Some state self-audit laws, for example, provide
sweeping protections for information relating to externalities. Some
states not only waive or limit sanctions, but actually provide actors
with a mechanism for making the contents of their self-audits,
including the discovery of violations, privileged—in some cases even
314
from the state government. Although strong opposition from the
315
EPA may be eroding these state privilege laws, firms have

311. D. Blumenthal et al., Withholding Research Results in Academic Life Science: Evidence
From a National Survey of Faculty, 277 JAMA 1224 (1997); Drummond Rennie, Thyroid Storm,
277 JAMA 1238 (1997); Steven A. Rosenberg, Secrecy in Medical Research, 334 N. ENG. J.
MED. 392 (1996); see also supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text.
312. See, e.g., supra notes 43, 125–32 and accompanying text (providing examples of
sponsors who have commissioned favorable research, although it is not possible to verify
directly the use of nondisclosure contracts for these arrangements); cf. Alan Zarembo, Funding
Studies to Suit Need, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003, at A1 (reporting that Exxon terminated a
contract for research on punitive damages when the research produced undesirable conclusions,
but that Exxon did not prohibit the researcher from publishing the paper).
313. See KRIMSKY, supra note 127, at 141–61 (discussing the “funding effect” in case studies
of biomedical research and citing to empirical studies, published in medical journals, observing
that the outcomes of industry-sponsored research is more favorable to the sponsor (statistically)
than parallel research that is federally funded).
314. See, e.g., Rafe Peterson, Environmental Law Update, PROB. & PROP., July/Aug. 2000, at
63, 63–64 (stating that twenty-six states have adopted environmental privilege laws that make
voluntary environmental audit reports inadmissible in court proceedings and provide immunity
from liability or reduction in penalties for violations disclosed as a result of such audit reports).
These privileges, when adopted by states, are sometimes much broader than the EPA’s
provisions. Id.
315. The EPA does this by threatening to override state protections with federal suits. See
supra note 264.
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attempted to use these laws to withhold information from local
citizens regarding releases of air toxins and contaminants into
316
groundwater. In at least one case, this effort was successful. A
hodgepodge of other state laws, particularly those governing
voluntary cleanup of contaminated land, also provides actors with an
ability to classify information about potential harms under
circumstances in which the information ordinarily would be made
public.317
6. National Security Legislation. National security legislation
may provide regulated parties with an opportunity to prevent public
disclosure and even regulatory use of unfavorable information by
318
claiming that the information presents national security risks. The
316. The Review of Activities by the Federal Government Concerning Individuals or
Organizations Voluntarily Submitting to Environmental Audits: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 105th Cong. 55 (1997) (statement of Steven Herman, Ass’t
Administrator, Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, Envtl. Prot. Agency).
317. A number of state voluntary cleanup laws reward private parties for conducting
voluntary cleanups by protecting their cleanup and sampling information from public disclosure.
See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Reforming State Brownfield Programs to Comply with Title VI, 24
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 173–74 (2000).
In some states, “any reports or information about the investigation and cleanup of a
site [containing hazardous substances] remain confidential and are not admissible or
discoverable in a civil suit or administrative action . . . unless the certified professional
responsible for reviewing the cleanup finds a ‘threat or danger to public health or
safety or the environment’ or the state brings a criminal prosecution against the
volunteer [who cleaned up the site].”
Id. at 174. Professor Mank observes, based on a survey of state laws governing the cleanup of
“brownfields” or moderately contaminated sites, that “[m]ost states do not require individual
notice to residents in the host community or even to contiguous property owners.” Id.
318. See generally Rena Steinzor, “Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors”: The Homeland
Security Act and Corporate Accountability, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 641 (2003) (discussing the
potential adverse implications of the Homeland Security Act for disclosure of environmental
information).
Detailed risk management plans, required under EPCRA to ensure rapid emergency
response to sudden leaks or plant failures, have been removed from the Internet due to
concerns that the worst-case scenarios might give terrorists dangerous ideas. See, e.g., Right-ToKnow After September 11th, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Water Res. and Env't of the
House Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 107th Cong. 20–23 (2001) (statement of Elaine
Stanley, Dir. of the Office of Envtl. Info. Analysis & Access, Office of Envtl. Info, U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency) (discussing the potential adverse implications of the Homeland Security Act for
the disclosure of environmental information); see also Joseph D. Jacobson, Safeguarding
National Security Through Public Release of Environmental Information: Moving the Debate to
the Next Level, 9 ENVTL. LAW. 327, 387–88 (2003) (criticizing the EPA’s policy and arguing that
“[n]ot posting this information on the Internet simply forces a would-be terrorist to spend a few
extra minutes on the computer researching available ‘target’ data that would otherwise be
conveniently assembled by EPA,” given that terrorist organizations have “already
demonstrated that they are willing to spend on planning their attacks”).
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319

Homeland Security Act, passed in 2002, offers the greatest potential
for this abuse because it provides facilities with the ability to claim
that information submitted voluntarily to the government—a
surprisingly ambiguous determination—is “critical infrastructure
information” with national security consequences.320 These national
security consequences not only prohibit the federal agencies from
sharing this information with the public under the Freedom of
Information Act321 but even bar federal and state agencies from using
the information to take regulatory action.322 Moreover, much like
CBI, facilities make the initial determination about what constitutes
323
“critical infrastructures” information that must be kept confidential.
Such self-classifications are likely to receive only sporadic oversight
324
by regulating agencies if the history of CBI is any guide, a danger
exacerbated by the fact that the Homeland Security Act also subjects
federal officials who disclose information labeled as “critical
infrastructures information” to criminal charges.325 Less worrisome
are restrictions, the exact nature of which is still unknown, levied by a
small cadre of government officials and journal editors on the
publication of scientific research that they believe to present security
risks.326 Some commentators suggest that these multifaceted

319. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
320. See id. § 214, 116 Stat. at 2152 (codified at 6 U.S.C.A. § 133 (Supp. 2004)).
321. See Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,524,
18,528 (Apr. 15, 2003). In this respect, some have argued that the Homeland Security Act simply
codifies the protections afforded “voluntarily submitted information” under Critical Mass
Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992), thus adding no
significant new impediments to the public disclosure of this information. See, e.g., Steinzor,
supra note 318, at 643, 652. Yet, as discussed, Homeland Security Act regulations interpret the
Act as barring federal agencies from “using” this information for enforcement actions or even
for requiring added security protections at critical infrastructures.
322. See Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information, 68 Fed. Reg. at 18,526
(“Federal agencies shall not utilize critical infrastructures information (CII) for regulatory
purposes without the written consent of the submitter.”).
323. See id. at 18,525 (designating requirements for identifying information as protected
“critical infrastructures information”).
324. For a discussion of the potentially expansive reach of the term “critical infrastructure
information,” see Steinzor, supra note 318, at 658–63.
325. See § 214(f), 116 Stat. at 2152 (subjecting any employee of the U.S. Government who
“knowingly publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any extent not
authorized by law, any critical infrastructure information protected from disclosure by this
subtitle” to a possible fine, not more than one year in prison, and termination from
employment).
326. See, e.g., DANA A. SHEA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, RL31695,
BALANCING SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS: ISSUES FOR
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protections for information under the ambiguous umbrella of national
security are only the beginning of a range of methods that industrial
actors might employ to suppress research on their products and
327
activities.
C. Providing Opportunities to Manufacture Controversy about
Public Science
Existing environmental laws not only discourage actors from
producing information and provide them with the ability to remove
from public view some of the limited information they do produce,
but several laws actually facilitate the ability of actors to disparage
credible research. The recently enacted Data Quality Act328 and Data
Access Act,329 as well as regulations governing scientific misconduct
and the subpoena of third-party information,330 all provide
opportunities for private actors to contest the quality of research and
taint the integrity of researchers, even when the actors’ charges are
without scientific merit. Most of these laws, moreover, operate in just
one direction: they allow private parties to challenge federally funded
science but insulate private research from scrutiny. Not surprisingly,

CONGRESS 13–20 (July 9, 2003) (describing measures taken by the executive branch, the
Department of Defense, Congress, and scientific professional societies to restrict the
dissemination of research that presents discoveries that could be used against the United States
by terrorists); see also MASS. INST. OF TECH., IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: REPORT OF THE AD
HOC FACULTY COMMITTEE ON ACCESS TO AND DISCLOSURE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
(June 12, 2002) (identifying the federal limitations on research posed by national security
regulations and recommending that MIT not take part in research that involves classified
research because it conflicts with the open communication principles that are fundamental to
science and academia), available at http://web.mit.edu/faculty/reports/publicinterest.pdf.
327. See, e.g., SHEA, supra note 326, at 25 (identifying some of the concerns with
classification systems imposed by the government, including overbreadth and unaccountable
decisionmaking); Eugene P. Skolnikoff, Protecting University Research Amid National-Security
Fears, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 10, 2002, at B10 (same); cf. Stephanie Strom, Small
Charities Abroad Feel Pinch of U.S. War on Terror, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2003, at A8 (reporting
that new Treasury Department guidelines that recommend the types of information that should
be provided by nonprofits on their giving and spending—guidelines intended to prevent the
channeling of funds to terrorist organizations—are so burdensome for small, international
nonprofits that it might discourage giving to these groups).
328. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L.
No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
329. Omnibus Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681495 (1998).
330. See generally Responsibility of PHS Awardee and Applicant Institutions for Dealing
with and Reporting Possible Misconduct in Science, 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.101–50.105 (2003); FED. R.
CIV. P. 45 (providing authority to subpoena third-party research).
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the genesis of at least one of the most recent and powerful tools
enabling actors to manufacture controversy about public science—the
331
Data Quality Act —has been traced to an industry consultant who
drafted the law and navigated it, in the form of an appropriations
332
rider, to enactment. Because the Act passed as a rider to a large
appropriations bill, most members of Congress seem to have been
333
unaware of its content or existence.
The Data Quality Act and the OMB’s implementing guidelines
provide interested parties with a formal process both for seeking the
correction of information that they believe is unreliable and for
334
appealing agency denials of such correction requests. Under this
law, actors have a ready-made process for challenging research,
information, and raw data that suggest their products or activities
cause adverse effects as long as the agency “disseminates” this
information, a term that seems to include using information to
support regulatory decisions.335 At the same time, most of an actor’s
331. See supra note 328.
332. See, e.g., James T. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515: How OIRA’s Expanded Information Roles
in 2002 Will Impact Rulemaking and Agency Publicity Actions, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 835, 840 n.20
(2002) (suggesting that a former director of a prominent industry group “had been the principal
drafter” of the Data Quality Act). This same consultant, and his organization, have been
relatively busy filing their own Data Quality Act complaints, or co-sponsoring complaints or
letters threatening action. See generally Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Data Quality Act
US, at http://www.thecre.com/quality/index.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2004) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
333. The Data Quality Act is devoid of legislative history or debate. See Hornstein, supra
note 228, at 232–33 (discussing the origin of the law). From the oral history surrounding its
passage, it appears that most members of Congress were unaware of its content or existence.
See, e.g., NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., ENSURING THE QUALITY OF DATA DISSEMINATED BY THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, DAY 1, at 32 (2002) [hereinafter NAS, DATA QUALITY TRANSCRIPT,
DAY 1] (quoting Alan Morrison of Public Citizen that the Data Quality Act “came up as part of
a very large appropriations act that most people didn’t even know contained this particular
piece of legislation”), available at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/stl/4-21-02_Transcript.doc.
334. See, e.g., Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and
Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. 8,452,
8,459 (Feb. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Data Quality Guidelines] (noting that section III.3 of the
Guidelines provides that “agencies shall establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected
persons to seek and obtain, where appropriate, timely correction of information maintained and
disseminated by the agency that does not comply with OMB or agency guidelines”). The OMB’s
guidelines actually enlarged the reach of the Data Quality Act. See, e.g., NAS, DATA QUALITY
TRANSCRIPT, DAY 1, supra note 333, at 133 (presenter Dan Cohen) (observing that OMB
added a substantive appeal process in its guidelines that was not required in the original Data
Quality Act).
335. The Data Quality Act applies only to information that is “disseminated,” a term
initially interpreted by experts to apply only to information that was made public. See, e.g.,
NAS, DATA QUALITY TRANSCRIPT, DAY 1, supra note 333, at 97 (quoting Alan Morrison)
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own research is protected from the reach of the Act under one or
more exclusions introduced by the OMB, the agency selected to
336
oversee the Act’s implementation across all other agencies.
Moreover, any private research that is subjected to the Act need not
be identified with conflict disclaimers or other indicia of potential
bias, even though most scientific journals insist on such measures to
337
ensure the objectivity and integrity of the research that they publish.
During its first year of implementation, the Data Quality Act was
used primarily by industry advocates to question models, information,
338
and research used by the EPA. Industry groups filed complaints
arguing for the exclusion of pathbreaking endocrine research on a

(suggesting that the requirements kick in only after the agency “puts its own interpretation” on
studies, because that constitutes a “new generation and hence dissemination of information”).
336. In the Data Quality Act guidelines, the OMB exempts from the reach of the Data
Quality Act all information claimed as a trade secret, an exemption that effectively excludes a
great deal of industry-produced health and safety information. See Guidelines for Ensuring and
Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by
Federal Agencies; Republication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8,460 (“Making the data and methods publicly
available will assist in determining whether analytic results are reproducible. However, the
objectivity standard does not override other compelling interests such as privacy, trade secrets,
intellectual property, and other confidentiality protections.”); supra Part III.B.1 (discussing how
large this category of CBI information is). Research prepared by regulated actors and submitted
as “public filings” (which arguably could include data required by the TRI under EPCRA or
routine monitoring data) or used in “adjudications” (which could include information required
in applications for licenses and permits under the environmental laws) are also exempt from the
Act under OMB’s guidelines. Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity,
Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. at 8,452.
Depending on how the EPA interprets these terms, OMB’s exceptions may exempt from the
Data Quality Act a rather large category of industry-prepared information.
337. See infra Part IV.B.2.
338. Industry has also been the primary beneficiary of this law, filing comments relating
both to the EPA’s science and to comments offered by public interest groups on the EPA’s
regulatory programs. Two-thirds of the petitions filed to date against the EPA were filed by
industry or industry-funded organizations, like the Competitive Enterprise Institute and the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. See http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/1419/ for a listing
of recent data quality charges. Although the correction requests are far fewer than expected,
most of the industry complaints are quite extensive and target large and important regulatory
projects, like the model for climate change and a risk assessment for a widely used herbicide.
See Envtl. Protection Agency, Environmental Information: EPA Information Quality
Guidelines, at http://www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/iqg-list.html (last visited Sept.
15, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The CEI even filed the first appeal of a Data
Quality Act petition, asking a district court to require the government to withdraw the climate
change model until the CEI’s criticisms have been addressed. See Andrew C. Revkin, Suit
Challenges Climate Change Report by U.S., N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2003, at A21.
For the most up-to-date status of Data Quality Act petitions, see the EPA’s log at
http://www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2004) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
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339
widely used herbicide, atrazine, and for the abandonment of climate
change models developed by the Department of Commerce,340 even
though most of the issues in dispute concerned policy and value
341
choices rather than scientific disagreements. In each of these Data
Quality Act complaints, moreover, the burden is placed exclusively
on the agency to produce and defend its documentation of the
externalities that the regulation addresses, notwithstanding contrary
instructions in the authorizing statute.342 The Act places no
responsibility on the actors themselves to produce high-quality
information that documents the safety of their products and
activities.343
A second appropriations rider, passed one year earlier—the
344
Data Access Act —provides actors with a second useful mechanism

339. See supra note 43.
340. Letter from Christopher C. Horner, Competitive Enterprise Institute, to Information
Officer, EPA, Request for Response to/Renewal of Federal Data Quality Act Petition Against
Further Dissemination of “Climate Action Report 2002” (Feb. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Horner
Letter], available at http://www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/documents/7428.pdf.
341. Indeed, most of the major petitions seeking correction of information take issue with
underlying policy choices used by the EPA, such as the conservatism of its default assumptions
in a risk assessment, rather than with the standard features of the information that it employs.
See, e.g., Horner Letter, supra note 340; Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Request for
Correction, supra note 43; Chemical Products Corporation, Request for Correction of the IRIS
Barium
Substance
File
(Oct.
29,
2002),
available
at
www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/iqg-list.html; see also Letter from Paul Gilman,
Assistant Administrator, EPA, to Jerry Cook, Chemical Products Division (Jan. 30, 2003),
available at www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/documents/2293Response.pdf.
342. See, e.g., Hornstein, supra note 228, at 239 (noting how corporations may now argue
that “any member of ‘the public’ should be allowed access to any study referenced by agencies
and that any ‘affected person’ should be allowed to lodge objections to data quality with
agencies”); O’Reilly, supra note 283, at 10,208 (discussing the possibilities for abuse of data
quality procedures to delay agency activities).
343. See, e.g., Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001,
Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (specifying that the “agency” shall provide a
complaint and correction process on all disseminated information, promulgate guidelines
establishing processes to ensure that the dissemination information is of high quality, and
maintain logs of complaint requests).
344. The Shelby Amendment was passed as a rider to the Omnibus Appropriations Act for
Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-495 (1998). The author of the bill, Senator
Shelby, maintains that there were floor discussions of the legislation that took place before the
requirement became part of the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year
1999. Richard Shelby, Accountability and Transparency: Public Access to Federally Funded
Research Data, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 378–79 (2000). He also recounts efforts to repeal the
bill or suspend its entry into force. Id. at 380. He does not explain why it was passed as a rider to
an appropriations bill, however, rather than as stand-alone legislation.
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345
for challenging research used to promulgate regulations. The Data
Access Act requires that all data underlying a federally funded study
be made available to requesting parties through the Freedom of
Information Act.346 Studies conducted without the benefit of public
funds by industries or others are not covered by the legislation’s datasharing requirements.347 The Act threatened to provide interested
parties with access to all data and records underlying research,
including ongoing research, without any compensation to the
researcher.348 After an uproar from the scientific community, the
OMB narrowed the reach of the Act to provide access only to
completed federally funded research and also requires the requestor
to compensate the researcher for time and copying costs.349
Nevertheless, the requirement for release of data underlying thirdparty studies, often provided in a readily analyzable electronic
database, makes it easier for actors to reanalyze studies using
statistical tests that can be rerun continually until they produce a

345. The Shelby Amendment (or Data Access Act) requires the OMB to amend Circular A110 to require “[f]ederal awarding agencies to ensure that all data produced under an award will
be made available to the public through the procedures established under the Freedom of
Information Act.” 112 Stat. at 2681-495.
346. Id.
347. See Final Revision, OMB Circular A-110, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,926, 54,930 (Oct. 8, 1999)
(requiring the production of research findings even if they were “produced under an award that
[was] used by the Federal Government in developing an agency action that has the force and
effect of law”).
348. The original rider was much more far-reaching than the OMB-interpreted Data Access
requirements. The central purpose of the rider, according to Senator Shelby, was to provide
interested parties with an opportunity to review and, if necessary, challenge the results of
regulation-relevant research, regardless of whether it was published or complete. Shelby, supra
note 344, at 379.
349. Vigorous opposition by the scientific community helped persuade the Clinton Office of
Management and Budget to draft implementing regulations for the Data Access Amendment
that were far narrower than Senator Shelby intended—requiring the sharing of data only for
“published studies” rather than for all ongoing research, limiting the data disclosure to data
needed to “validate the study,” and requiring requestors to pay researchers for reasonable costs
incurred in responding to data requests. See, e.g., OMB Circular A-100, 64 Fed. Reg. at 54,926;
Shelby, supra note 344, at 383–89 (discussing, with concern, the various ways in which the OMB
interpreted the Shelby Amendment narrowly to limit its reach). The regulations finally
promulgated by the OMB largely duplicate the scientific community’s informal standards for
data sharing. The act’s formal data-sharing requirements appear at least somewhat more
onerous, however. For example, data-sharing plans are required as a condition for obtaining
large National Institutes of Health grants. See NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NOT-OD-03-032,
Final NIH Statement on Sharing Research Data Release (Feb. 26, 2003) (“The NIH expects and
supports the timely release and sharing of final research data from NIH-supported studies for
use by other researchers.”), available at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD03-032.html.
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350
more favorable result. Moreover, as with the Data Quality Act, the
Data Access Act has been structured to ensure that scrutiny is
focused on public science and not on industry-sponsored science.351
Actors also use more traditional mechanisms, such as lawsuits
and subpoenas, to challenge the integrity of public science and harass
researchers, even when researchers are not parties. For example,
under the power to subpoena third-party information, Philip Morris
and Exxon both filed overbroad, harassing third-party subpoenas
against researchers who were not involved in the litigation as parties
or experts because their research findings were considered
incriminating.352 Indeed, at least in the breast implant litigation, even
plaintiffs’ attorneys appear to have used subpoenas to harass
scientists and delay their research when the research began to suggest
that breast implants did not cause serious harm to users.353 By filing
such subpoenas, actors concerned about damaging research are able
to intimidate scientists and delay research. Subpoenas also offer the

350. There are some concerns that the Data Access Amendment might still intrude on the
established norms for data sharing in some fields, such as epidemiology, in which researchers
are less likely to share elaborate databases until they have published multiple articles based on
their data collection efforts. Eliot Marshall, Epidemiologists Wary of Opening Up Their Data,
290 SCIENCE 28, 29 (2000). There are also some concerns that this new data access tool can be
used to harass researchers doing high-profile work. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
ACCESS TO RESEARCH DATA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: AN ONGOING DIALOGUE AMONG
INTERESTED PARTIES: REPORT OF A WORKSHOP viii (2002) [hereinafter NRC, DATA ACCESS
REPORT] (recounting the concerns of both organizations).
351. See, e.g., NRC, DATA ACCESS REPORT, supra note 350, at 27 (reporting that the chair
of the NRC committee, Richard Merrill, expressed concern over the fact that the Shelby
Amendment “is not bilateral in its application” because it does not apply “to data that are
generated by private dollars that are submitted to support agency decisions”); id. at 16
(reporting that panelist David Hawkins, a representative of a public interest advocacy group,
criticized the Shelby Amendment for being “one-sided” because it applies only to “federally
funded research” and not to “industry-supported studies that have been submitted on a
confidential basis”).
352. FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (providing authority to subpoena third-party research if it is relevant
to ongoing litigation). See generally Symposium, Court-Ordered Disclosure of Academic
Research: A Clash of Values of Science and Law, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Fall 1996). For
example, R.J. Reynolds served third-party subpoenas on Dr. Paul Fischer and his coauthor
requesting all documents, including confidential records, relating to the ongoing study of the
effects of the Joe Camel advertising campaign on children. The harassment led Dr. Fischer to
resign his tenured post at the Medical College of Georgia and return to family practice in a
nearby community. Fischer, supra note 121, at 162; see also Picou, supra note 123, at 155
(describing the adverse impact of Exxon’s third-party subpoenas on research on the damages
resulting from the spill).
353. See generally MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL (1996) (describing the abuse of
subpoena power by plaintiffs’ attorneys attempting to delay research at the Mayo Clinic that
threatened to substantially weaken their case for causation).
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potential for dredging up information that may later help actors
attack the merits of unfavorable research.
Finally, researchers engaged in federally supported research—
but not privately financed research—can be formally accused of
scientific misconduct. To ensure that scientific research is conducted
honestly, federal law provides the Office of Research Integrity (ORI)
the authority to investigate federally funded researchers who are
alleged to have engaged in scientific misconduct, which includes
354
Unless the
fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism of data.
supervising institution has established penalties for the filing of false
or harassing claims of misconduct against scientists, this tool can be
and has been abused—at least in the tobacco and lead industries—in
attempts to discredit researchers whose studies produce unwelcome
results.355
IV. REFORM
Under current legal rules, not only are actors best off by refusing
to take responsibility for assessing the harms that they inflict upon
society, but actors can profit from attacking public science that
attempts to conduct this research in their absence. A variety of legal
tools allow actors to carve out worrisome areas of public science with
surgical precision and discredit both research and researchers, even
when doing so runs against the existing scientific consensus and the
356
public interest. To the extent that these attacks succeed, even in the
short term, they suggest a single, ugly reality: the information on
externalities that emerges will not reflect the objective work of
talented scientists, but something less. The greater the private interest
in thwarting unwelcome research, the more likely it is that good
science will be eclipsed by biased science and manufactured critiques.
Even scientific knowledge, in other words, can be contaminated by
money.357 Although in the long term the merits of the public science
may win out, both political will and public resources will be needed to
rebuff the attacks.

354. Responsibility of PHS Awardee and Applicant Institutions for Dealing with and
Reporting Possible Misconduct in Science, 42 C.F.R., § 50.102 (2003).
355. See Fischer, supra note 121, at 166 (discussing unsupported allegations of scientific
misconduct brought against himself and his coauthor by scientists who were part-time
consultants to the tobacco industry); see also supra note 119.
356. See supra Part III.C.
357. This broader theme is explored in KRIMSKY, supra note 127.
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Thus, “commons ignorance” is not a minor problem easily
dismissed. Without accurate information on the harms caused by
products or activities, it is almost impossible to develop effective
regulatory programs to address such harms. The gaps in information
are still so large that most U.S. regulatory programs only address
cancer risks, leaving little assurance of protection from ecological,
358
neurological, reproductive, hormonal, and developmental harms.
Democratic processes also fail when decisionmakers, the attentive
public, and interest groups cannot obtain relevant information
needed to participate.359 In fact, when potential harms are hidden,
these groups may be unaware of the need to participate at all. Even
markets fail in a world where consumers and investors are unable to
make meaningful choices between companies based in part on the
safety of their products and activities. Companies that make added
investments in minimizing harmful impacts will generally not be
rewarded because their claims cannot be validated, and if their
investments are large enough they will lose out because they cannot
compete. Without reliable information for comparing the safety of
products and activities, the market is bound to favor those products
and production processes that can be done at the lowest cost,
regardless of the resulting harms to the public.360
These political and market failures are even more serious when
actors control privately held knowledge regarding potential adverse

358. See supra notes 13–14, 202–05 and accompanying text.
359. Professor Komesar provides a conceptual formula that predicts participation based in
large part on access to information. The extent of an individual’s participation, Professor
Komesar argues, is based simply on the difference between the benefits that will accrue to the
person by participating and the costs of participation. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, & PUBLIC POLICY 7–8 (1994).
360. Like the used car market, in which the sellers’ superior information about the condition
of used cars leads buyers to discount the quality of the cars and force down the price, the lack of
information could cause consumers to discount safer products and processes, making them
noncompetitive. For the classic articulation of this phenomenon, see George Ackerlof, The
Market for ‘Lemons’: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QUART. J. ECON.
488 (1970). This condition—whereby sellers have superior information regarding quality, but
buyers are unable to validate their quality claims—can lead to adverse selection, meaning that
higher quality products cannot survive in the depreciated market. The resulting adverse
selection thus favors products and production processes that can be done at the lowest cost,
regardless of the external harms their activities cause to the public. Mary Lyndon makes
precisely the same argument. See Lyndon, supra note 31, at 1814 (“Buyers’ inability to screen
products removes any incentive for manufacturers to differentiate between toxic and nontoxic
products and to screen before production. The result is a higher overall level of toxicity in
products than would result if toxicity were a visible characteristic.”); see also HISRSHLEIFER &
RILEY, supra note 60, at 307–12 (providing a fuller account of this “adverse selection”).
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effects of their products and activities. Knowledge is power. Actors
who enjoy an asymmetric advantage in accessing and controlling
information about their externalities can use it to their advantage
when attempting to influence how regulatory programs are designed.
Standards set on the basis of information available to the regulatory
agencies will be skewed when actors succeed in concealing adverse
information. Similarly, if actors are able to influence the development
of enforcement programs, one might expect those programs to be
markedly ineffective in overcoming actors’ superior information, a
361
result borne out in practice. The greater the actors’ informational
advantages, the greater are the obstacles to developing effective
regulatory programs.
This final Section presents suggestions for dealing with issues
relating both to the lack of information about environmental harms
and actors’ asymmetric control over some of the information. This
discussion presents three parallel lines of reform. First, policy analysts
and scholars must acknowledge the problem of incomplete
information, including asymmetric informational advantages, and
account for these problems in their theories, models, and proposals
for reforming environmental law. Second, reformers should address
features of the existing regulatory program that serve only to
exacerbate problems associated with the lack of information and
asymmetric control over needed information. Third and finally,
proactive efforts are essential to produce more information on the
harms caused by dangerous products and polluting activities.

361. See supra Part II.B. It is of course possible that the high evidentiary burdens placed on
regulator-enforcers discussed in Part III.A, supra, are simply a legislative accident and not the
result of sophisticated legislative and regulatory lobbying. Yet the recurring nature of the
problem leads to a reasonable suspicion that there are other forces at work. The aggressive use
and promotion of privileges, such as confidential business information, audit privileges, and
even national security protections, reinforce a suspicion that regulated parties are eager to limit
the information that can be used against them. Regulated parties’ efforts to raise the barriers for
enforcement data also underscore their interest in minimizing the risks of enforcement when
possible. See, e.g., Credible Evidence Revisions, Final Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 8,314, 8,317 (Feb. 24,
1997) (noting that industry filed comments in opposition to the EPA’s proposal to use credible
evidence in enforcement, arguing in part that the “EPA, states or citizen groups would use
credible evidence to bring enforcement actions for insignificant violations” and that “the use of
credible evidence in enforcement actions would violate sources’ constitutional right to due
process because sources would “not have sufficient ‘fair warning’ regarding potential
enforcement.”). Regulated parties can weaken enforcement programs significantly by
demanding that violations be proved with definitive information that they know enforcers will
be unable to obtain.
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A. Acknowledging the Problem
The first step to addressing the pervasive problem of incomplete
information is to admit that the problem exists and to begin to
account for it in decisionmaking and regulatory analysis.
Acknowledging the problem sounds deceptively simple, but it is not.
Accepting this problem will require rethinking and reexamining
decades of legal and economic scholarship that has neither accounted
for the dramatic gaps in current knowledge nor considered the ways
in which this incomplete information is deeply embedded in multiple
forms of market and legal failure.
For its part, thirty years of environmental law scholarship has
produced countless analyses and accompanying proposals for reform
of environmental regulation that assume a world of perfect or at least
optimal information for the circumstances: these analyses and
proposals neglect the fact that much of the critical information is
under the significant control of regulated parties. Seminal thinkers
362
such as Professors Bruce Ackerman at Yale, Richard Stewart at
363
364
NYU, and Cass Sunstein at Chicago are representative of a top
362. In both The Uncertain Search for Environmental Quality and Clean Coal/Dirty Air, as
well as in a famous Stanford Law Review debate with Howard Latin over the wisdom of
technology-based standards, Professor Ackerman demonstrates his disgust at regulatory tools
that do not use more fine-tuned, information-dependent methods of deciding policy without
seeming to consider that the tools actually evolved in this counterintuitive direction for a
reason—because information was not forthcoming. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T.
HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN
SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 328–30 (1974); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B.
Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1335–40 (1985).
363. Professor Stewart remains wedded to the errors of the Stanford article that he
coauthored with Professor Ackerman. Although Professor Stewart does concede the need for
additional scientific information in subsequent articles, he assigns the task of information
collection to centralized government, almost as an aside, without pointing out that, without this
added information, his preferred administrative tools suffer and might fail. See, e.g., Richard B.
Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21,
151–54 (2001).
364. Professor Sunstein, the most recent entrant to this genre, endorses highly analytical
tools like cost-benefit analysis and comparative risk analysis, both of which depend
fundamentally on a solid information base. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Administrative Substance,
1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 627–42. While acknowledging uncertainties and the ability of regulated
parties to resist and even impede the production of information, especially in his earlier work,
Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
103–04, 116 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit
State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 264, 301 (1996), Sunstein effectively ignores these problems in his
technocratic solutions to regulation. His endorsement of a form of cost-benefit analysis that
includes adjustments for uncertainty still lets regulated parties off the hook for producing the
information (he does not appear to endorse precautionary estimates, see infra note 377) and
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echelon of scholars who insist, often passionately, on the need to
implement elaborately information-dependent reforms without
considering the barriers to producing needed information or
discussing how to produce it. Economic critiques and analyses of
environmental law also ignore the forces favoring the
underproduction of vital information—an oversight that often
undermines both the critique and the reform proposal. For example,
Professor Myrick Freeman, an economist, expresses great impatience
with the inefficiencies of regulating polluters by requiring them to
install the best pollution control technologies, rather than by
requiring them to meet environment- or health-based standards for
each individual pollutant at a given locale. Yet Professor Freeman
naively assumes the existence of information on the harm and
environmental effects of each toxic substance, and further assumes
that polluters with this information will willingly share it with
regulators.365 Even more contemporary critiques of environmental
regulatory programs by economists typically assume that conditions
governing the production of information are much more hospitable
than they in fact are.366 For example, economists who do account for

thus also is likely to underreport uncertainties and regulated actors’ superior access to
producing the needed information. His proposals also place a significant burden on the few
quantified risk estimates that the agency is able to produce, by calculating benefits using bestguess averages and selecting arbitrary multipliers to account for the universe of remaining
unknowns. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2282–83
(2002) (advocating that in quantifying the benefits of an arsenic standard for drinking water, the
only available quantitative information (on the risks of bladder cancer) should form the
quantitative anchor and that nonquantified benefits (which he fails to list, see supra note 223
and accompanying text) should then be factored in by multiplying the bladder cancer estimates
times four). Thus, Sunstein develops an approach that creates few, if any, incentives for
additional information production and encourages actors to obfuscate and challenge what
information is available. Moreover, the prominence of Professors Sunstein, Stewart, and
Ackerman might have even served to facilitate other scholars’ uncritical acceptance of their
assumptions. Cf. Robert K. Merton, The Matthew Effect in Science, 159 SCIENCE 56 (1968)
(finding evidence that the “greats” in science generally enjoy much more critical acclaim than
newcomers, even when their contributions are equivalent).
365. A. Myrick Freeman III, Air and Water Pollution Policy, in CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 12, 49–58 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1978).
366. The failure to account for the stubborn problems of incomplete information, which is
repeated from article to article, seems entirely forgivable when set against the larger body of
economics literature. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 149, at 1461 (arguing that “much of what
economists believed—what they thought to be true on the basis of research and analysis over
almost a century—turned out not to be robust to considerations of even slight imperfections of
information”). Professor F.A. Hayek, for example, not only overlooked pervasive ignorance
regarding the existence and extent of externalities in concluding that centralized government
was inferior in forcing internalization of pollution-related externalities, but also ignored the
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asymmetries in analyzing environmental regulation still assume that
pollutant levels translate immediately and easily into quantified
harms and that victims, rather than regulated actors, enjoy superior
367
information regarding these harms. In truth, information regarding
the harmfulness of an activity, if it exists at all, is likely to be
asymmetrically held by the actor.368
Even realists who pride themselves on taking incremental or
pragmatic approaches to addressing environmental issues do not
adequately acknowledge the problems associated with the lack of
information about environmental harms.369 When choosing among
various policy options, pragmatic approaches tend to work
incrementally from what is known and take for granted that accurate
and relatively complete information is available.370 The narrow,
actors’ superior access to this information and their disinclination to produce it. Thus, his
argument that a central authority cannot cope with the complexity of all of the relevant
information seems to miss the fundamental insight that, without a central authority, there might
be no reliable information at all. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON.
REV. 519, 524 (1945) (arguing without any awareness of the equilibrium for ignorance on
externalities that “[w]e need decentralization because only thus can we ensure that the
knowledge of the particular circumstances . . . will be promptly used”).
367. See, e.g., Huber & Wirl, supra note 63, at 71, 83 (assuming that the victims have
asymmetric information about the harm caused by an actor’s externalities and concluding from
that assumption that a “pollutee pays” rule (rather than a “polluter pays” rule) could lead to
more efficient outcomes); Lewis, supra note 63, at 820, 841 (discussing how the public enjoys
privately held information about the benefits of regulation because it best knows its true
preferences for health and environmental protection). This erroneous assumption thus neglects
the most substantial and fundamental problem of environmental regulation—the lack of
information on the consequences of varying pollutant levels or types of toxic products.
Economists do seem to appreciate that a polluting firm enjoys superior access to
information concerning its compliance costs, and in some articles, economists additionally
recognize that polluters also enjoy superior information about their pollution levels. See, e.g.,
Lewis, supra note 63; Jensen & Vestergaard, supra note 245.
368. See supra Part II.B.1.
369. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 178–79, 185 (1999) (noting the great
uncertainties in environmental science and the complications that they raise for making
informed regulation, but ignoring the stubborn features of this incomplete information and
implying that regulatory policy should work to accommodate competing values, without
acknowledging the difficulty of doing so when one party enjoys superior information and the
public is more generally uninformed); SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 209 (advocating a
more incremental and pragmatic approach to regulatory decisionmaking, but not tackling the
stubborn problems of incomplete information and their effect on incremental decisionmaking).
370. See, e.g., Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through,” 19 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 79, 83–84 (1959) (providing a descriptive account of how public officials make decisions
under conditions of very limited information and proposing a normative strategy for
decisionmaking, called “successive limited comparisons,” that instructs how officials can select
among several short-term options).
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incremental decisionmaking process accepted by most pragmatists
371
blind them to large-scale forces that reward ignorance.
Environmental scholarship can no longer ignore issues relating to
the lack of information about environmental harms and regulated
parties’ asymmetric control over this information. Unless scholars and
policymakers address information problems explicitly, their
recommendations and policy decisions are unlikely to be useful and
risk being counterproductive. For example, information-intensive
legal reforms generally ignore the fact that regulated actors control
much of the needed information, leading to idyllic proposals that
inadvertently rely on the willingness of regulatees to volunteer much
of the information essential to regulate them. Three particularly
salient strands of contemporary policy analysis—cost-benefit analysis,
critiques of the precautionary principle, and good-science initiatives—
provide ready evidence of the types of analytical errors that result
when stubborn information problems are ignored.
Scholars and policymakers who promote cost-benefit analysis
tools routinely fail to consider at least four important informationrelated problems in their evaluations. First and most surprisingly,
these scholars and analysts generally ignore the fact that the
information on which cost-benefit analyses are based is woefully
incomplete and is often in the superior control of the regulated actors.
As previously discussed, under current guidelines cost-benefit
analyses consider only harms that have been identified and
372
quantified. Given the dearth of toxicity testing on most chemicals,
however, even the most basic risks, like acute effects, have been
373
quantified for only a fraction of all chemicals in commerce. Costbenefit analysis as currently practiced nevertheless must pretend that

371. See, e.g., RALPH L. KEENEY, VALUE-FOCUSED THINKING vii–ix, 29–30, 44–51 (1992)
(highlighting the benefits of value-focused thinking and discussing how neglecting a universal
map of the goals, problems, and possible solutions can result in wrongheaded decisions).
372. See supra note 227 and accompanying text; see also SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra
note 209, at 103 (observing how cost-benefit studies done by the OMB ignore the nonquantified
environmental benefits and noting that critics of regulation tend to ignore this fact); LISA
HEINZERLING & FRANK ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 2 (Georgetown Law & Policy Inst., 2002) (arguing that “[m]any
benefits of public health and environmental protection have not been quantified and cannot
easily be quantified . . . . Even when the data gaps are supposedly acknowledged, public
discussion tends to focus on the misleading numeric values produced by cost-benefit analysis
while relevant but non-monetized factors are simply ignored.”), available at http://www.law.
georgetown.edu/gelpi/papers/pricefnl.pdf.
373. See supra note 23.
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these untested or undertested chemicals bring society net benefits
374
specifically because there is no research on their potential harms.
Second, cost-benefit analysis neglects the possibility that some
information about environmental harms may be unavailable or
unreliable. As discussed throughout this Article, regulated parties are
in the best position to assess the scope and nature of the harms
flowing from their products and activities. However, as evidenced by
their ability to conduct internal research that can be concealed and to
classify information on chemical composition and health and safety,375
it is not at all clear that the publicly disseminated information used to
support cost-benefit analysis reliably reflects the safety of regulated
parties’ products and activities. Third, cost-benefit proponents fail to
come to terms with the fact that private actors are the primary source
of information on compliance costs, and they have strong incentives
to inflate these estimates in ways that go undetected. Finally, costbenefit analysts fail to consider that their heavy reliance on available
information might actually discourage actors from producing some of
this needed information. Because current cost-benefit methods lock
in existing information, without accounting for gaps in information or
identifying who is best situated to address them, private actors will
perceive that contributing information other than that which is
unambiguously in their favor has only costs, not benefits.376
Analysts who critique the precautionary principle also routinely
fail to acknowledge the principle’s capacity for creating strong
incentives for the private sector to produce information about
377
environmental harms. Under a precautionary approach, until an

374. See supra notes 225–27 and accompanying text.
375. See supra Part I.B.1.
376. See supra Part I.A.
377. The information production features have been completely ignored in some critical
commentary on the principle. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE 2, 9, 10 (John M. Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 149, 2d Series Apr.
2002) (arguing that the precautionary principle “is literally paralyzing—forbidding inaction,
stringent regulation, and everything in between,” and ignoring its benefits to information
production), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html; John D. Graham,
The Role of Precaution in Risk Management, Remarks Prepared for The International Society
of Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology Precautionary Principle Workshop, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/risk_mgmt_speech062002.html (June 20, 2002) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (ignoring the information-forcing features of the precautionary
principle and concluding that “adoption of precautionary measures should be preceded by a
scientific evaluation of the hazard and, where feasible, a formal analysis of the benefits, risks,
and costs of alternative precautionary measures,” without accounting for who will produce this
large body of information). But see Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulatory Decision
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actor can demonstrate that a product or activity is safe, that product
378
or activity will be regulated as if it is hazardous. Consequently, for
products and activities governed by this principle, it is very much in
an actor’s interest to conduct the research needed to show that their
products and activities are not as hazardous as the principle
presumes.379 Regardless of whether the precautionary principle is
ultimately a viable approach to regulation, the principle’s capacity for
forcing the production of information should not be ignored when
comparing the principle against other regulatory alternatives.
Supporters of good-science initiatives also ignore stubborn
problems of uncertain and asymmetric information in fashioning
reforms that purport to improve the state of regulatory science.
Perhaps the most remarkable oversight is the fact that good-science
laws such as the Data Access Act focus exclusively on assessing the
quality of federally funded research used for regulation and exempt
privately funded research from the same scrutiny,380 despite private
industry’s clear interest in the results of the studies that it funds.381
Good-science reform proponents also fail to account for the fact that
the reforms expect the government, rather than regulated parties, to
bear full responsibility for collecting and defending this good science.
The reforms thus do nothing to counteract perverse incentives for
actors to remain ignorant of the potential harm caused by their
activities or to take advantage of their superior access to some of the
382
needed information. Finally, analysts favoring current good-science
initiatives fail to consider whether it is sensible to invest resources in

Making Under Uncertainty, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: ISSUES IN INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 71, 102–03, 109, 111 (Timothy
Swanson ed., 2002) (acknowledging, with some approval, the precautionary principle’s tendency
to shift information production to the regulated actor, but arguing that this should not be
required unilaterally across all areas of regulation or else inefficiencies will result).
378. See John Applegate, The Precautionary Preference: An American Perspective on the
Precautionary Principle, 6 HUM. & ECOLOGY RISK ASSESS. 413, 417 (2000) (describing the
precautionary principle as taking a “foresee and forestall” approach).
379. Id. at 420–26 (identifying examples of this general precautionary approach in U.S. law).
380. See supra notes 344–47 and accompanying text.
381. See Hornstein, supra note 228, at 240–45 (discussing corporate sponsorship of
university research and the inherent dangers that lie therein).
382. See Wendy E. Wagner, The “Bad Science” Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate Over the Role
of Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 92–
93 (Fall 2003) (“There is little incentive for a regulated entity to invest in voluntary research
that could produce results that not only lead to more stringent regulatory requirements, but that
could impair, rather than improve, the marketability of its products.”); supra notes 342–43 and
accompanying text.
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disputing the limited information available when it accounts for only
a fraction of the information needed to understand the harm caused
383
by an activity or to develop a fine-tuned regulatory response.
The first step to legal reform is an accurate characterization of
the problem. To this end, more work is necessary to understand
actors’ incentives to produce information about the effects of their
activities on the environment and how current laws affect those
incentives. Thus far environmental law scholars have been of little
help in this inquiry, and if anything have reinforced imperfect
information problems as a result of their pervasive inattention to
these features of information.
B. Correctives to Existing Laws
As this Article has attempted to show, a regulatory program that
actively deters the production of reliable information about
environmental harms, in a setting where actors are already reluctant
to learn of or share such information, is indefensible. At a minimum,
reform efforts should address the most egregious shortfalls in current
environmental regulatory programs. The correctives discussed in this
Section are only a beginning, amounting to little more than tinkering
with some of the worst legal provisions that perpetuate commons
ignorance.
1. Penalties for Concealing Health and Safety Information.
Actors have considerable information about the health and safety of
their products and polluting activities, yet they conceal this
information from public view with the help of various, seemingly
384
insignificant legal protections. Many of these protections, moreover,
appear to be the result not of conscious policy decisions, but instead
stem from the failure of regulatory programs to prevent regulated
parties from keeping potentially incriminating information secret.
The most sweeping way to address this problem would be for
Congress to make it illegal to invoke trade secret and other
protections to classify information about the adverse effects of
products and activities that threaten public health and the

383. See generally Shelby, supra note 344 (discussing the OMB’s policy of providing
improved access to federally funded research data, but failing to discuss the need for similar
protections for privately produced research used in regulation, or the need for more aggressive
funding of environmental science generally).
384. See supra Part III.B.
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environment. A requirement mandating the reporting of all healthrelated information (including the chemical compositions of products
and wastes) could be enforced with both civil and criminal sanctions
and levied against any party involved in producing or concealing
information. In instances when disclosure could lead to clear
competitive losses or national security risks, the government could
intercede, at the petition of the actor, and either provide
385
compensation or classify the information. The primary drawback of
this broad-scale reform—other than its political feasibility—would
arise at the back end of the reform, if and when actors sought
compensation for the diminished value of their trade secret.
Calculating compensation awards would be especially difficult
because adjudicators would have to separate out the role of
potentially classified information in the larger setting of competitor
harm. The appropriate amount of a damage award, moreover, would
depend partly on the actor’s superior information regarding the
extent of its competitive harm. It is also unclear how many requests
for compensation the EPA would receive, leaving open the possibility
that it might incur substantial administrative costs to process
compensation requests. Given these uncertainties, the best approach
might be an incremental one, eliminating all confidentiality
protections on one category of information—e.g., all information on
pollutants and wastes—at a time.
Short of such sweeping legislative reform, the EPA could make
more incremental, but still meaningful, progress in addressing secrecy
regarding health and environmental information by limiting existing
protections. Specifically, revisions to both the EPA’s CBI regulations
and its adverse reporting regulations could increase the amount of
health-related information available to the public. The following
Sections discuss these more incremental reforms.
a. Confidential Business Information. The EPA, the General
Accounting Office (GAO), and independent research consultants
have each concluded that the overbroad regulatory protections
available for trade secrets are not legitimate, justified, or
386
A 1999 GAO report on CBI claims
economically optimal.

385. See infra notes 393–94 and accompanying text.
386. See, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 290 (expressing a commitment to limiting
overbroad CBI claims); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION, supra note
298, at 23–25 (recognizing the EPA’s creation of an information office to address industry
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pertaining to health and safety information, for example, found only
weak support for industry claims that the confidential information is
387
useful to competitors and could not otherwise be obtained by them.
Industry itself seems to acknowledge the lack of competitor interest
388
Recent
in CBI, touting the infrequency of FOIA claims.
technological developments and other changes in the competitive
environment further suggest that whatever legitimate benefits
industry may have derived from trade secret protections in the past
are becoming obsolete.389
There is a surprisingly rich body of literature suggesting remedies
for problems that arise at the intersection of trade secret and
environmental and public health regulation.390 Two of these reform

concerns with the production of information); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161, at 54
(finding that confidentiality claims “limit[] the dissemination and usefulness of the data because
many interested groups are not allowed access to the data”); Ferguson et al., supra note 290, at
41 (concluding based on review of CBI claims from 1977 through 1990 that “all available
evidence supports the proposition that much of the information covered by CBI claims is not
legitimately entitled to protection as TSCA CBI”).
387. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION, supra note 298, at 15–19.
In the report, for example, the GAO notes that “competitive intelligence professionals” and
“industry representatives” disagreed on the value of environmental reporting to secure
competitors’ secrets. Industry representatives stated that the information “often contains
valuable details about their competitors while other competitive intelligence professionals said
that such information is neither sufficient or even necessary.” Id. at 15. The GAO went on to
note that “[r]egardless of their views on the usefulness of this information, industry officials
acknowledged that they could do a better job in protecting their sensitive business information
while still complying with EPA’s and states’ reporting requirements.” Id.
In the report the GAO also provided other information suggesting that industry might be
inflating its claims that broad CBI protection in environmental regulation is needed to preserve
its trade secrets. It noted that in the two states employing materials accounting, “fewer than two
percent of the facilities . . . made confidentiality claims in 1996” or thereafter even though both
states (New Jersey and Massachusetts) have permissive CBI procedures. Id. at 18.
388. Industry representatives, for example, have argued that the “EPA receives few FOIA
requests and for a limited number and kind of product, compared to the burden of up-front CBI
justification for hundreds of thousands of components.” Stickle & Balek Letter, supra note 297,
at 1. They continue that “[c]oncerning FIFRA, there are approximately 20,000 products with up
to 400,000 components. Thousands of these pesticide products have never had a FOIA request
and never will. To require up-front substantiation of all pesticide products would be a waste of
resources [on registrants].” Id. at 2. Under TSCA, “CBI protection is a right and not a privilege”
and disclosure of chemical identity would result in “horrendous and irreparable harm for the
chemical manufacturer.” Id.
389. See O’Reilly, supra note 283, at 10,203 (discussing the “obsolescence of industry’s
fixation on the physical security of regulatory submissions containing their chemical data” in the
wake of the information age).
390. See, e.g., Lyndon, supra note 83, at 50–55 (proposing an alternative to trade secrets that
will protect industry competitive advantages); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 83, at 882–87
(recommending exclusive use periods for health and safety data that have trade secret value, but
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proposals offer particularly promising approaches to combating the
abuse of trade secret protections. Professors Thomas McGarity and
Sidney Shapiro propose the first option, which entails regulators
exempting any health and safety data or information about
environmental externalities from trade secret protection. For those
actors who can demonstrate competitive losses from the disclosure of
this information, a cost-sharing mechanism could be devised to
391
provide compensation. Under such a scheme, modeled roughly on
the data compensation schemes required for pesticide manufacturers
under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA),392 competitors benefiting from a disclosure would be
required to reimburse the disclosing firm for its costs and competitive
393
losses. In cases when the beneficiaries of the safety information are
diffuse, public funds would provide the reimbursement. Prior to
implementing such a reform, it would be advisable to conduct a
follow-up to the GAO’s 1999 study to better isolate areas in which
competitive harm is most likely and develop approaches that directly
address those potential harms.394
A second amalgam of reforms could begin by requiring firms to
provide upfront substantiation for their CBI claims.395 A further
requiring full disclosure); O’Reilly, supra note 283, at 10,208–11 (proposing a narrower trade
secret protection for protecting information and more effective mechanisms for sharing
information with the public); see also U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 161, at 5 (suggesting
specific legislative changes to TSCA to reduce the problem of overbroad CBI protections).
391. McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 83, at 874–82.
392. FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2000).
393. Under FIFRA, subsequent manufacturers that benefit from data previously submitted
by another manufacturer must compensate that manufacturer for part of the development costs
if their application occurs within ten years after the original data were produced. See FIFRA, 7
U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F) (providing the original applicant a right to “exclusive data use” for
registration of pesticides after 1978). The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of this
provision, including the use of binding arbitration to determine the amount of compensation.
See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 571 (1985). Under the right
circumstances, manufacturers can copyright their studies. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000)
(providing copyright protections to published studies and to unpublished studies provided that
certain requirements are met). But because the results of a study can be used by regulators
without having to pay copyright royalties (assuming that the manufacturer shares the study with
an agency), then other manufacturers are still able to free ride on the regulatory benefits of the
information.
394. See Lyndon, supra note 83, at 50–55 (discussing use of environmental patents to
provide firms with mechanisms for seeking compensation for disclosure of competitively
valuable information); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 83, at 882–87 (recommending full
disclosure but allowing firms to claim “exclusive use”).
395. Public Information and Confidentiality, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,394, 80,395 (Dec. 21, 2000) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 2) (discussing a proposal for up-front substantiation of CBI claims
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corrective would be to set an expiration date—say seven years—on all
CBI claims, to be extended only upon a convincing showing of need.
Finally, the EPA could levy penalties for CBI claims found to be
unjustified based either on an internal agency review or a review
conducted following a FOIA request. Such sanctions seem
reasonable, especially in light of the significant penalties that can be
levied against EPA officials who release trade secret-protected
396
Indeed, eliminating or
information without justification.
substantially reducing sanctions against government officials for the
disclosure of CBI also appears warranted.
Both sets of reforms would involve implementation costs: the
EPA would incur costs associated with determining damage awards
for affected businesses, while firms would incur expense in
substantiating their CBI claims. Although these costs diminish the
overall gains of the reforms, evidence of current CBI abuse makes
some form of legal counterpressure seem both inevitable and costjustified.
b. Suppressing Health and Safety Data through Sealing
Litigation and Nondisclosure Contracts. To limit the opportunities for
actors to conceal adverse information through nondisclosure
contracts, sealing litigation records, or by claiming various legal
privileges, the EPA could require mandatory disclosures of health
and safety information. Already, four separate statutory provisions
require actors to report adverse effects under relatively narrow
circumstances.397 By providing broader and more specific
requirements for reporting under these same provisions, the EPA
could minimize opportunities for actors to dodge or delay adverse
information reporting,398 while simultaneously enlarging the circle of
actors required to report. For example, requiring any party who
and stating that “[w]e believe this would help reduce the number of overly-broad or non-specific
claims”).
396. See supra note 285.
397. See FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136d(a)(2) (2000) (requiring the reporting of adverse effects to
the EPA); TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2607(c), (e) (2000) (same); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(4), (5)
(2000) (requiring the reporting of releases into surface waters); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a)
(2000) (requiring the reporting of releases of reportable quantities of hazardous substances).
398. For example, under the Clean Water Act and CERCLA, reporting requirements could
be revised to require the reporting of any non-de minimis releases. Legal authority exists for the
EPA to make this change because Congress clearly delegates the decision about setting
reportable quantities or threshold levels to the EPA. See CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(4);
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9602(b).
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works with the manufacturer and is aware of adverse effects
399
(including scientists hired under nondisclosure contracts) to report
such information would greatly increase the probability that adverse
information will be disclosed when these provisions are backed by
civil and criminal penalties.
2. Penalties for Inappropriately Generating Controversy about
the Credibility of Public Information. In a society that values open
communication and free speech, penalties for producing endsoriented research and unjustified scientific critiques need to be
carefully crafted. The best antidote for biased research is a system
that earmarks the source of bias, thus providing useful signals for
those trying to understand the source of controversy without chilling
speech or adversely affecting the ability of actors to perform research
as they see fit.400 In more dramatic situations, when actors actively
abuse existing processes in ways intended to harass scientists,
however, affirmative disincentives for abuse should be imposed.
a. Stigmatizing Biased Critiques and Research. Under the
current system, patently biased research and research critiques enjoy
roughly the same regulatory credibility as research produced by
scientists with no financial interest in the outcome and no sponsor
control.401 The EPA does not require conflict disclosures for scientific
information submitted for regulatory purposes, and it makes no
apparent distinction between research produced by academics under
federal contract and research funded and controlled by a regulated
party and produced as a condition to regulation.402 As a result,
399. Congress is somewhat vague about who is required to report releases of hazardous
substances. See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (requiring reporting by an undefined “person
in charge”); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (same). Under TSCA, however, “any person who
has possession of a study” is among those required to report relevant health and safety findings
on a toxic substance to the EPA. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(d). Clearer definition of what constitutes a
“study” and how to satisfy the statute’s reporting requirements could impose substantially
greater demands on researchers as well as sponsors.
400. See David Michaels & Wendy E. Wagner, Disclosure in Regulatory Science, 302
SCIENCE 2073, 2073 (2003) (proposing the use of elaborated conflict disclosures to provide the
government with information on how research independence might have been compromised in
research used for regulation).
401. The argument and reform proposed in this Section are based on Michaels & Wagner,
supra note 400.
402. As discussed, moreover, a significant portion of industry-sponsored research used in
these regulatory efforts is protected from external scientific review through trade secret and
confidential business privileges. See supra Part III.B.1. In fact, despite its promise of requiring
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decisionmakers, the public, and even the media can be misled by
research findings suggesting that there is scientific controversy about
important regulatory questions, when in truth there is relative
403
unanimity among independent scientists about the subject. The
failure to distinguish between research conducted with no apparent
agenda and research that has at least the potential for bias can have a
negative effect on the quality of regulatory decisionmaking.
The scientific community has flatly rejected the EPA’s
willingness to treat all science as equal. Scientific journals and
academic institutions have developed elaborate processes for
signaling when research has been produced by scientists with conflicts
of interest. They sometimes even refuse to publish research when the
sponsor retains control over the reporting and ultimate publication of
the results. The leading medical journals of the U.S. and Great
Britain, for example, no longer publish articles based on studies done
under contracts in which the investigators did not have the unfettered
right to publish the findings. In a joint statement, the editors of
thirteen medical journals assert that contractual arrangements
allowing sponsor control of publication “erode the fabric of
intellectual inquiry that has fostered so much high-quality clinical
research [and] make medical journals party to potential
misrepresentation, since the published manuscript may not reveal the
extent to which the authors were powerless to control the conduct of
a study that bears their names.”404 It is particularly instructive that the
scientific community relies heavily on researchers’ disclosure of
conflicts of interest despite the fact that, as part of the peer review
process, scientific editors and peer reviewers are often better situated,
because of their greater scientific expertise, to identify biased
research than regulators, the public, or political officials.
The EPA’s laissez-faire approach to research could be reformed
by adopting conflict disclosures similar to those used by the
biomedical journals. Under such a reform, researchers and scientists
providing critiques, comments, and research submitted to or used by
an agency would be required to sign a conflict form specifying the
agencies to use and publicize only “good,” “objective” science, the Data Quality Act
requirements omit any disclosure requirements for conflicts of interest. By ignoring these
disclosure requirements, the Data Quality Act seems to provide the public with misleadingly
incomplete information for evaluating the integrity of research used for regulatory decisions.
403. See, e.g., supra note 111 and accompanying text.
404. Frank Davidoff et al., Sponsorship, Authorship and Accountability, 286 JAMA 1232,
1233 (2001); see also supra note 127.
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extent of financial and sponsor influence on the research.
Researchers, for example, would be required to disclose financial and
other conflicts of interest that might bias their work, and they would
also be required to disclose whether they had the contractual right to
publish their findings without influence and without obtaining
consent of the sponsor. If their work was reviewed by a party affected
by the regulation prior to publication or submission, they would need
to disclose that review as well. Sponsors would also be required to
provide this disclosure for all information they submit to the EPA.
If the EPA mandated disclosures, sponsors relinquishing control
over the design and reporting of their sponsored research would
finally be rewarded for their restraint and openness.406 Requiring
disclosure of the extent of sponsor influence on a project would
prevent sponsors who only fund, but do not control, research from
being tarred with the same brush as sponsors who work closely with
researchers to control the design, methods, and reporting of results.
Rewards for disinterested research, in turn, should generate
incentives for doing more of it. In addition, requiring mandatory
conflict-of-interest disclosures will benefit the public, policymakers,
and the media by making it easier for them to assess the objectivity of
individual research projects, especially when a “scientific
controversy” arises.407 Requiring standardized disclosures should also

405. For an example of one such form used by the Journal of the American Medical
Association, see Authorship Responsibility, Financial Disclosure, Copyright Transfer, and
Acknowledgment
(JAMA
Form),
available
at
http://jama.amaassn.org/cgi/data/292/1/112/DC1/1 (last visited Oct. 11, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal), requiring a signature along with submitted articles.
406. Currently, because these positive attributes of researcher independence cannot be
advertised or validated, actors cannot gain reputational advantages or esteem norms from
relinquishing control over research studies. Cf. Ackerlof, supra note 360 (observing that, in
general, establishing a strong reputation is one of the primary means to avoid the downward
forces of adverse selection); McAdams, supra note 142, at 369–72 (arguing that norms work only
when others can observe the good behavior).
407. See, e.g., Cornelia Dean, Editing Science, in Speaker Information, Conference on
Conflicted Science, supra note 114, at 10 (discussing the challenges to journalists in reporting
the status of research accurately and in “learning and reporting the financial ties of those
[scientists] who make the news”). With such a reform in place, the EPA could post all research
conducted on any given chemical or environmental issue, along with the “objectivity” status of
each of the studies, based on the extent of sponsor control over the research. See, e.g., Envtl.
Prot.
Agency,
Integrated
Risk
Information
System
Substance
List,
at
http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (providing risk estimates on a chemical-by-chemical basis, with a reference list at the
end of each chemical-specific report that currently does not but could provide information
about the independence of each study). This would provide valuable information for scientists,
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assist journal editors and fellow scientists in evaluating studies when
they serve on scientific advisory boards or are otherwise involved in
reviewing regulatory science.
b. Penalties for Abuse of Process. The current regulatory system
allows actors to abuse, with impunity, a variety of litigation and
administrative mechanisms in order to delay regulation and harass
408
and discredit public scientists. The Data Quality Act, the Data
Access Act, third-party subpoenas, FOIA requests, and state public
records statutes have all been used strategically to intimidate
researchers and delay or halt their research.409 Third-party subpoenas
and the Data Quality Act arguably invite abuse, because even if the
underlying petition is ultimately determined to be unfounded, the
actions still succeed in wearing down researchers and delaying
proceedings.410 Deterrents to abuse, by contrast, are nonexistent. Few
sanctions are in place to deter abuse of any of these procedures, not

regulators, and the public. If, for example, the only positive studies on a new pesticide
registration application were “controlled by” the pesticide manufacturers or users, this
information would help in weighing all of the information, particularly if the adverse studies
were produced by parties free of sponsor control.
408. This is a concern that has been expressed by the scientific community, a group that is
historically reluctant to take part in policy deliberations. See, e.g., Frederick R. Anderson,
Science Advocacy and Scientific Due Process, ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Summer 2000, at 71, 74
(advocating a balanced approach to ensuring the credibility of scientific information because of
the dangers of actors abusing legal tools “to harass and intimidate researchers by impugning
their integrity or motives, chill new research, increase the costs of research, and deter volunteers
for research”); NRC, DATA ACCESS REPORT, supra note 350, at 2 (reporting that scientists
oppose the Data Access Amendment “on the grounds that it would invite intellectual property
searches by industry and scientific competitors, jeopardize the privacy of research subjects,
decrease the willingness of research subjects to participate in studies, expose researchers to
deliberate harassment, and increase costs and paperwork”); id. at 14 (reporting that Dr. Bruce
Alberts of the National Academy of Sciences expressed concern that “there is a danger that the
[Data Access] [A]mendment could be used to harass scientists whose work is found
objectionable by anyone, for any reason”); id. at 20 (recounting similar concerns from an invited
speaker, Judge Jack Weinstein).
409. See Bert Black, Research and its Revelation: When Should Courts Compel Disclosure?,
59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 175 (Summer 1996) (describing the use of subpoenas to
harass scientists and chill research); Robert M. O’Neil, A Researcher’s Privilege: Does Any
Hope Remain?, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 36 (Summer 1996) (describing the harm to
research and researchers from compelled disclosure and the lack of meaningful attention to the
problem by the courts); supra Part III.C.
410. See Hornstein, supra note 228, at 244–45 (discussing threats arising out of new lawsuits
brought under the Data Amendments); supra notes 338–43 and accompanying text.
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even sanctions against those who file frivolous allegations of scientific
411
misconduct.
A very straightforward reform would be to impose hefty
sanctions for abuse of these processes, similar to—but more effective
412
than—the sanctions levied for litigation abuse. Moreover, regardless
of the merits, complainants could also be required to pay the
reasonable costs incurred by researchers, attorneys (if needed), and
supporting institutions in responding to each and every misconduct
413
allegation or request for information correction. Absent such
reforms, those researchers whose work has immediate impact on
regulatory policy may be forced to halt or reduce their ongoing
research to respond, at their own expense, to each information
request, irrespective of its merits. Delaying research, in fact, may be
precisely the objective that entities requesting the information are
trying to achieve.414
If these proposed sanctions do not significantly curtail the
harassment of scientists, stronger legislative or regulatory remedies

411. See generally Scientific Misconduct Regulations, 42 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2003) (failing to
provide safeguards against trivial lawsuits). Like scientific misconduct charges, petitions against
the quality of an agency’s science under the Data Quality Act can be filed at any time, by
anyone, and can include as many complaints and challenges as the petitioner desires. There are
no costs or sanctions for filing meritless complaints under the DQA or for requesting data and
reanalyzing it in problematic ways. See NAS, DATA QUALITY TRANSCRIPT, DAY 1, supra note
333, at 99 (“[One] can file as many correction requests as [one wants. One does not] have a
quota on correction requests. . . . What the agency would or should do with them is of course a
more difficult situation.” (quoting the observations of Alan Morrison)); cf. Black, supra note
409, at 183 (recommending that, to provide some disincentives for filing harassing third-party
subpoenas, the moving party should be required to pay the attorneys’ fees for that expert “if a
compromise offer is made to the party seeking disclosure and the court’s ruling requires no
disclosure beyond the offer”).
412. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). Accordingly, if there is no good faith basis for a good-science
challenge, penalties should be levied against the challenger. Such sanctions, consistent with the
assumption of good faith, would penalize only the very worst abuses, but the threat of sanctions
could also help deter marginal abuse of these processes.
413. Currently, the only costs that might be passed on to the party filing the complaint or
data access request are the “reasonable” costs of producing data under the Data Access Act.
OMB, Final Revision, OMB Circular A-110, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,926, 54,930 (Oct. 8, 1999)
(allowing, but not requiring, the federal awarding agency to “charge the requestor a reasonable
fee equaling the full incremental cost of obtaining the research data” and explaining that “[t]his
fee should reflect costs incurred by the agency, the recipient, and applicable subrecipients”).
This approach should be extended to other good-science laws as well. See supra notes 408–09.
414. See NRC, DATA ACCESS REPORT, supra note 350, at 14 (reporting that presenter
Bruce Alberts of the National Academy of Sciences expressed concern that the data access
provision could be abused in ways that might ultimately “discourage the best young people from
choosing careers in science”).
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may be in order. Researchers at the receiving end of abusive scientific
misconduct charges, subpoenas, public records requests, and goodscience complaints should have available a set of counterclaims
providing not only damages for their time and expenses, but also
punitive awards for any delays or adverse impacts on the progress of
their research. To provide incentives for public sector groups to bring
such challenges on behalf of affected scientists, the availability of
415
attorneys’ fees is also critical.
C. Proactive Reform
Correcting the tendency of current laws to exacerbate problems
associated with the lack of information about environmental harms
will make it somewhat easier to collect needed information, but this
correction alone will not address the overarching need to increase
substantially the amount and quality of information that is available.
It is unquestionable that considerably more information is needed.416
There is less consensus, however, with regard to the specifics—what
types of information are needed most and how to determine
priorities. Several different National Academy of Science expert
panels have attempted, unsuccessfully, to develop elaborate systems
for prioritizing information needs.417 Economists similarly have
struggled to develop formulas that calculate the appropriate

415. For a similar suggestion, see Anderson, supra note 408, at 76, who proposes a nonprofit
to defend harassed scientists using good-science tools.
416. Indeed, a series of recommendations and reports by expert scientific panels convened
to address the subject reveals a strong consensus that far more information is needed. See supra
note 10 and accompanying text. Despite this consensus, research funding at the EPA appears to
be shrinking, or at best remaining steady over the decades. See POWELL, supra note 15, at 149–
50 (recommending based on a book-length study of science at the EPA that the EPA’s science
budget should increase substantially provide it with needed research support); COMM. ON
RESEARCH AND PEER REVIEW IN EPA, supra note 211, at 35–36 (identifying that research
funding at the EPA through the EPA’s research arm—the Office of Research and
Development—is approximately 7 percent of the agency’s total budget and showing graphically
how the funding has remained relatively flat from 1980 to 2000, even though the EPA’s larger
budget has fluctuated).
417. See, e.g., NRC, BUILDING A FOUNDATION, supra note 10, at 45 (identifying criteria for
prioritizing needs for environmental research, which include timing, novelty, scope, severity,
visibility, and probability); NRC, TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 10, at 207–26 (establishing a
framework for prioritizing the testing of chemicals).
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418
investment in information given the expected returns, but they
generally concede that these formulas are of little practical utility.419
Scientific and economic experts who endeavor to identify
immediate information needs ultimately converge upon the same
conclusion: determining when and whether to produce more
information is, at its core, a social question that cannot be resolved
exclusively by experts and technical analysis. The difficulty that
scientists and economists face in specifying the ideal level of
information for environmental and public health regulation derives in
large part from uncertainty about what information new research will
420
produce. At the same time, the question “How much information?”
carries with it a large set of social considerations that should not be
answered by experts, even if the experts were capable of determining
the benefits of research in advance. These complications are twofold.
First, some of the benefits, particularly the benefits to advances in
scientific knowledge and spillover benefits to the public from the
additional knowledge, defy quantification or monetization. As a
result, the only rational or legitimate way to answer the question is to
employ some democratic-based process for finding the answer.
Second, the benefits of having additional information will vary from
setting to setting and ultimately depend in part on whether the
information facilitates regulation or whether, on the other hand,

418. See, e.g., Roy Radner & Joseph E. Stiglitz, A Nonconcavity in the Value of Information,
in 5 BAYESIAN MODELS IN ECONOMIC THEORY 33, 34 (Marcel Boyer & Richard E. Kihlstrom
eds., 1984) (attempting to model the value of information to decisionmakers relative to its cost
and concluding with proof that “the demand for information will not be a continuous function
of its price”).
419. The models have been largely written off as involving an “infinite regress of
economizing on economizing on economizing,” and the effort to develop an economic model to
predict when information production efforts have reached optimality—at which point no
additional research is cost-justified—remains “a fundamental source of bounded rationality in
economic decision making.” J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., A Nobel Prize for Asymmetric Information:
The Economic Contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz, 15 REV.
POL. ECON. 3, 9 (2003).
420. Recent research in endocrine effects caused by very low exposures to chemicals, for
example, suggests watershed developments in the science of toxicology that could, at least for a
time, generate more questions than answers with each new basic research project. See John P.
Myers et al., Endocrine Disruptors—A Controversy in Science and Policy: Session III Summary
and Research Needs, 22 NEUROTOXICOLOGY 557, 557–58 (2001) (discussing the new discoveries
and resulting research needs that flow from research on endocrine disrupters).
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regulatory approaches can be devised to circumvent the need for new
421
information.
Accordingly, recommendations for information needs and
priorities are beyond the purview of a law review article. Even
without specifying directions with regard to what information is
needed, however, it seems possible to devise methods to facilitate
information production. To this end, this final Section offers
suggestions for how information can be produced under various
circumstances once information needs have been determined. The
three mechanisms for producing information presented here vary
primarily by the nature of the actors’ asymmetrical advantages over
relevant information. In all three cases, this Article consistently
assumes that actors will be responsible for producing any necessary
information on the harms created by their products and activities
422
because it is they who create the externalities in the first place.
Naturally, if instead the government carries the burden of producing
such information, it will need to expend the added costs and confront
the possible barriers associated with securing information that
regulated actors hold.
1. Ensuring Standardized Information Requirements. For
information about manufacturing or disposal activities that require
on-site access or take place in the early stages of product
development, the actors themselves are in the best position to
produce the information at the lowest cost. This is primarily because
the actors control much of the information about their products and
their manufacturing and disposal activities.423 Regulatory approaches
seeking this information, then, will obtain it at the lowest cost if they
require actors to perform the information collection.424 Not only is this

421. Because some regulatory tools can be devised to address externalities without the need
for information in the short or in the long term, the benefits of added information may be
reduced, perhaps substantially. Absolute bans on some activities, if the activities themselves are
perceived as socially valueless (like the spread of anthrax, for example), can resolve the
information problem by making additional research superfluous for purposes of regulation.
Although it might still be beneficial to understand the toxic mechanisms of anthrax and even to
determine whether some levels can be tolerated without adverse reactions, this research is no
longer answering any immediate social question.
422. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
423. See supra notes 63–80 and accompanying text.
424. For example, in the case of the cow herders on Professor Hardin’s commons, the
herders would be required to count their cattle (using specific methods) and report the number
regularly in exchange for continued use of the commons. If government officials attempted to
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the lowest-cost approach, it may be the only way to collect the
information given the extent of the actors’ control.
As long as it is possible to specify information production
requirements with precision, leaving little room for actors to
manipulate results based on their asymmetric advantages, effective
strategies can be devised for requiring actors to collect and report
information on externalities associated with their products or
425
activities. There are already several programs that require on-site
monitoring, specify methods for collecting data, and detail protocols
426
These approaches could be
for conducting prescribed tests.
expanded to require actors to collect additional information.427 For
example, facilities could be required to install on-site ambient air
428
monitors when added information on pollutant levels is needed.
collect this information, they would need to invest in regular visits to the commons. They might
need to count cattle throughout the day, and they might still lack the needed information to
trace the total number of cattle back to their respective owners if more restrictions became
necessary to protect the commons. This government-based approach to counting and tracing
cattle on the commons would likely be a much costlier approach to collecting the needed
information.
425. Ideally, these more precise information requirements could be accomplished by
combining the rigid protocols for testing described in Part II.A.1, supra, with the conflict
disclosure requirements discussed previously in notes 405–07 and accompanying text, supra.
426. See supra Part II.A.
427. The National Academy of Sciences made a similar recommendation, now nearly thirty
years old. See 2 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING,
DECISION MAKING IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: A REPORT TO THE U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY FROM THE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 50–58 (1977).
Whether the information is needed, of course, depends on the initial, bracketed decision
regarding information priorities. Incremental schemes for producing information (that similarly
dodge the overarching question and need for priorities), for example, generally require actors to
produce certain information as a condition to operation when there are reasons to suspect that
their activities could cause harm. See, e.g., Applegate, supra note 33, at 324–25 (discussing
surrogate factors used for new chemicals under TSCA, such as chemical structure, that could be
used to determine whether or how much additional data should be required); Polasky &
Doremus, supra note 85, at 42–43 (discussing occasions under which developers should be
required to prove that a development will not harm endangered species). Professor Applegate
also argues that, in this more incremental approach to requiring the production of information,
a more flexible testing authority “can reduce the absolute cost of testing by permitting a tiered
or staged testing program that requires more expensive or long-term testing only on the basis of
earlier tests that indicate some likelihood of effects.” Applegate, supra note 33, at 318.
Basic research, as discussed in Part IV.C.3, infra, would also be essential to ensuring that
perverse incentives for information production and innovation do not emerge from surrogate
factors that are too narrow or become entrenched over time.
428. See Blais et al., supra note 19, at 28 (advocating the use of ambient monitors for air
toxins because of the lack of assurance against violations and other unmonitored releases that
cause recurring upsets).
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Actors could also be required to conduct additional safety research
on their wastes and products, especially if there is reason to suspect
potential hazards or harms are not being caught by existing
regulations. Such an approach could be modeled on the testing
429
required under FIFRA. Actors who experience recurring and
unauthorized releases of pollution from their facilities might be
required to install new or additional monitors on problematic sources
to keep better, more accurate records of excessive emissions and
cumulative releases of pollutants into the environment.430
Shifting the burden of producing such information to regulated
parties will force them to internalize more of the costs associated with
their activities. Consistent with economic theory, requiring actors to
internalize these costs would help ensure that more of the external
harms imposed on society were reflected in actors’ business
decisions.431 Indeed, even when actors do not enjoy asymmetrical
control over information, public policy should require some
information production as a precondition to engaging in activities that
create externalities. Requiring the production of information as a
prerequisite to operating would ensure that actors internalize the cost
of producing this information.

429. See 40 C.F.R. § 158.240–158.740 (2003) (providing a table of testing requirements). For
a proposal of what the data call-in authority could look like legally, at least in the case of toxic
products, see Applegate, supra note 33, at 322–23. The recommended call-in authority is similar
to FIFRA’s broad mandate, but it is reinforced with specific agency guidelines.
Actors could be required to conduct regular, specified tests of wastes, in contrast to the
more ambiguous requirements for hazardous waste testing under RCRA. For example, actors
could be required to test every barrel of waste or to provide certain documentation that their
periodic sampling is representative. See supra notes 252–55 and accompanying text (discussing
the limitations of current requirements governing hazardous waste testing and compliance
under RCRA).
430. Emergency reporting requirements under CERCLA and the CWA cover only
conditions in which (1) the releases are continuous, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(f)(2) (2000); or (2) the
releases are sudden, substantial, and isolated (like a spill), id. § 9603(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5)
(2000). In truth, some releases, especially into air and water, are likely the result of equipment
malfunctions, power outages, and the like, which may recur with some regularity even though
they are not continuous. Yet even though they may occur more frequently, there is typically no
additional monitoring of these periodic “upsets.” To address this situation, the EPA could
require more regular monitoring at facilities where there are unauthorized releases of hazardous
substances. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (2000) (providing the EPA with broad authority
to respond to releases and threatened releases of hazardous substances).
431. See Applegate, supra note 33, at 308 (describing how licensing can create incentives for
information production and can shift the burden of producing information to the actor).
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2. Producing Incentives for Information Production. For cases
in which actors enjoy advantages over information so substantial that
it becomes difficult to devise standardized information production
requirements, incentive programs seem the most promising approach
432
to producing useful information. Such an approach is consistent
with findings relating to securities regulation, which conclude that
regulated entities are more inclined to produce a full range of
credible information when they are rewarded rather than penalized
for the results.433 Rather than condition incentives for divulging
incriminating information on rewards of amnesty, as state audit laws
434
do, the incentives that this Section proposes do essentially the
opposite—imposing penalties until actors can show that they are
435
actually causing fewer adverse effects than originally supposed. In
this sense, then, the incentive assumes the worst (rather than the best,
as amnesty arguably does) about actors and creates incentives for
actors to contradict this assumption. The incentives are thus akin to
the “penalty defaults” proposed by Professors Ian Ayres and Robert
Gertner, which encourage actors to reveal superior information by
assuming the worst about them as a default.436
Incentives for information production in environmental
regulation could be accomplished by basing regulatory standards on
worst-case predictions and reducing regulation when credible
information suggests that harms have been overestimated. The
amorphous precautionary principle, when employed with the

432. Cf. Lewis, supra note 63, at 840 (advocating a “game of disclosure or persuasion” in
which the actor cannot operate or pollute until regulatory approval is obtained; this game
entices an actor with asymmetrical information to disgorge that information to obtain the
license).
433. See Lowenstein, supra note 149, at 1341 (lauding the success of American capitalist
markets as a function of comprehensive disclosure requirements).
434. See supra Part III.B.5.
435. It is also unclear how strong the incentives are for information production under state
and federal audit laws. In the abstract, the extent to which amnesty or reduced penalties provide
an incentive for facilities to disclose incriminating information depends in large part on the
probability that these facilities would be caught in violation in the first instance. Given that in
many environmental regulatory settings this probability is low, the extent to which amnesty
serves as a reward depends both on the probability of being caught and the costs of compliance
associated with turning oneself in. See supra notes 268–69 and accompanying text.
436. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (“[P]enalty defaults are purposefully set at
what the parties would not want—in order to encourage the parties to reveal information to
each other or to third parties . . . .”).
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437
appropriate bells and whistles, seems to aspire to this result. To
make sure that these information incentives are real, regulators would
need to develop a system that in fact reduced regulatory burdens
when a regulated party volunteered credible exculpatory
information.438 Under this approach, actors would bear the primary
burden for producing exculpatory information. However, they would
do so only when they perceived that research results would
demonstrate that their activities were less harmful than assumed.439
Because actors have superior information about their products and
activities, they are best positioned to know whether additional
information might ultimately reveal that the externalities resulting
from their products and activities are significantly less harmful than
supposed (and that, accordingly, regulatory requirements should be
lowered). Moreover, given that there will always be uncertainty about
the harms that a product or activity causes, this approach promises to
ensure that at least part of the burden of resolving this uncertainty
falls to the actors whose products and activities create the uncertainty
in the first place.

437. See generally Carl F. Cranor, Asymmetric Information, the Precautionary Principle, and
Burdens of Proof, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 74 (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel A. Tickner eds., 1999)
(discussing the precautionary principle in the context of considering what information is needed
to protect against the health risks posed by toxic substances).
438. See Wagner, supra note 382, at 127–32 (arguing for a more precisely defined rebuttal
point for the conservative default options and other precautionary policies in environmental
regulation). Any information an actor produces to rebut protective assumptions would require
rigorous validation. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 594–609 (1984) (discussing the importance of verification costs
for information production requirements). In cases of more basic research, this might require—
beyond disclosure—validation of the result and peer review by expert panels (although facility
audits might need to be conducted by third-party professionals, with attending liability and civil
penalties for bias or fraudulent reports). Cf. Lowenstein, supra note 149, at 1355 (conceding that
even with the rigid information requirements of financial disclosures under securities laws,
regulated parties still manage to “jiggle” the numbers).
439. This is precisely the approach taken by Proposition 65, Safe Drinking Water and Toxic
Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5–25249.13 (West 1999), in
California, which requires industries to disclose chemicals present in their products and
polluting activities when these chemicals cause cancer and birth defects. The statute also
provides incentives for firms to produce information; disclosures are not required for low levels
of harm if a “business responsible for the exposure can show that the level of exposure in
question is below a scientifically based, statutorily defined threshold of risk.” Roe, supra note
46, at 10,235. This incentive system led industry to cooperate closely with California regulators,
leading to the publication of “risk-based standards for 282 individual chemicals in less than five
years, without any legal mandate” and on a small budget relative to that of the U.S. EPA. Id.
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A similar approach could be used to improve information on the
environmental harms created by a single facility. Incentives for actors
to audit and report information on these individualized harms, for
example, could be created by developing a worst-case estimate of the
extent of the polluting activities and the resulting harms (not simply
the name and total pounds of chemicals released).440 These worst-case
estimates of harms would then be available to investors, community
groups, and the public at large. Under such a scenario, facilities might
have a strong incentive to produce validated information rebutting
441
one or more of the worst-case assumptions. For example, worst-case
projections of the expected level of air toxins at a facility might be
rebutted if the facility made use of regularized ambient air monitors
(employed in ways specified by regulators).442 In addition to ensuring
accurate reporting of information about environmental harms, this
approach would provide actors with incentives to reduce harmful
activities as some academics have argued with respect to the Toxic
Release Inventory (TRI).443 It is critical to such an approach, however,

440. These worst-case projections could be based on permit data, TRI data, and other
facility-specific information; for unquantified potential harms, conservative or worst-case “fudge
factors” could be added to the estimate as placeholders pending further research. The worstcase estimate of harm would include factors adjusting facility estimates of the amount of
hazardous chemicals in products and pollutant streams to reflect credible, worst-case scenarios.
Risk analyses, using uniformly conservative estimates, would then be used to calculate the
harms and nonquantifiable, potential harms that could result from these worst case loading
estimates. The resulting information would produce an accounting of the cumulative impacts
that might be imposed on health and the environment by a facility, which would be much more
informative than the TRI (which does not translate such information) and the very primitive
scorecard tool. Envtl. Defense Network, Scorecard, at http://www.scorecard.org (last visited July
30, 2003) (providing basic data comparing pollution levels in various U.S. locales).
441. Dr. David Roe’s study of the effects of Proposition 65 disclosures on firm behavior
suggests that disclosures may in fact be a powerful tool to encourage this type of exculpatory
research. Roe, supra note 46, at 10,235–37; see also Bradley Karkkainen, Information as
Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New
Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 346 (2001) (arguing that Proposition 65 provides firms with “an
incentive to produce and disclose as much credible toxicity and exposure data as may be
necessary to persuade state regulators to establish the ‘no significant risk’ regulatory thresholds
for substances they emit”).
442. This could be also done with a certified, third-party audit, much like the use of
intermediaries and auditors in securities regulation. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and
Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 793–96 (2001)
(describing the use of these certified intermediaries or auditors).
443. See Applegate, supra note 33, at 295–96 (noting how even the approximate data
disclosed under EPCRA regarding the use and disposal of annual amounts of hazardous
substances “can be used to establish and revise laws and regulations, to influence lawmakers
and regulators, and to negotiate or litigate with emitters” (footnotes omitted)); Karkkainen,
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that the worst case be identified with some precision, or at least not
be too optimistic lest the facility find it can cause adverse effects that
are in reality worse than the assumed worst-case conditions.
3. Subsidizing Government Research. Given the powerful
incentives actors have to remain ignorant about any adverse
consequences associated with their products and activities, it is not
realistic to expect them to ignore these interests when it comes to
conducting basic or applied research that cannot be constrained with
carefully crafted protocols. As a result, most basic research used for
regulation, as well as applied research that cannot be constrained with
government-blessed protocols or rigorous oversight, should be
performed by disinterested government or federally funded academic
scientists not influenced by sponsors or financial incentives. This
approach also makes sense because regulated actors rarely enjoy
asymmetrical access to non-facility-specific research; thus assigning
responsibility for conducting basic research to regulated actors yields
few if any cost advantages.444 Currently, the federal government is
already the primary benefactor of most basic and innovative applied
research in the environmental sciences, making this proposal more a
plea for continued support than one for reform.
Although this is a more controversial suggestion, to the extent
that greater funds are needed to support research and that actors are
responsible for creating at least some of the research needs, asking
actors to pay a fee or a modest, added tax (flat or graduated) to
support a portion of such research might be appropriate.445 The
underlying logic of this suggestion is that if actors are creating at least
some of the need for environmental research, they should assist it
financially. The resulting facility-based revenues could then be used

supra note 441 (discussing the strong incentives that the TRI creates for actors to reduce their
use and release of listed hazardous chemicals).
444. In fact, especially for some basic research, such as research on toxicogenomics, the
research challeges are so extensive that it will not be cost-effective for different parties to
conduct the research simultaneously and may risk duplicating efforts. See, e.g., Envtl. Prot.
Agency, Draft: Potential Implications of Genomics for Regulatory and Risk Assessment
Applications at EPA 40–45, at http://www.epa.gov/OSA/genomics-external-review-draft.pdf
(Mar. 2004) (external review draft, on file with the Duke Law Journal) (discussing the research
challenges presented by toxicogenomics). In such cases, the government will be able to conduct
the research more cost-effectively because of its better-equipped laboratories and diverse
scientific staff.
445. See Lyndon, supra note 31, at 1835–41 (proposing a tax on companies that produce
toxic substances to finance government production of information on such substances).
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to support federal development of improved screening tests and
assessment methods and to finance basic environmental research.
CONCLUSION
Environmental regulatory programs have failed to come to terms
with the fact that much of the information needed to support
regulation will not be produced voluntarily or emerge spontaneously
over time. On the contrary, parties whose activities and products
create environmental harm have strong incentives to remain ignorant
about the nature and extent of these harms. For these actors,
“ignorance is bliss.” This Article has explored these incentives and
how they lead most rational actors whose activities and products
create externalities not only to avoid sharing this information, but
also to actively resist third-party efforts to investigate their activities.
As a result, even when the public is willing to subsidize research on
the harms that various externalities impose on society, this research
may be eclipsed by biased research and manufactured critiques
prepared by those actors who stand to lose if the truth about the
harmful effects of their activities comes to light. The only appropriate
response to this propensity for ignorance is to adjust legal rules in
ways that penalize actors when they conceal adverse information or
inappropriately attack damaging public research, and reward actors
for producing needed information.

